Let’s look at the five relief pitchers already inducted into the Hall of Fame, plus two fellows who are sure bets to get elected when they finally hang ‘em up:
|
IP
|
W-L
|
Saves
|
K
|
ERA
|
ERA+
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
2254
|
143-122
|
227
|
1610
|
2.52
|
146
|
Rich Gossage
|
1809
|
124-107
|
310
|
1502
|
3.01
|
126
|
Rollie Fingers
|
1701
|
114-118
|
341
|
1299
|
2.90
|
119
|
Bruce Sutter
|
1042
|
68-71
|
300
|
861
|
2.83
|
136
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
991
|
52-54
|
387
|
911
|
3.29
|
122
|
Mariano Rivera
|
1090
|
71-52
|
526
|
1006
|
2.25
|
202
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
1042
|
59-68
|
591
|
1103
|
2.73
|
147
|
Two things: first, I’ve listed the players based on the year when they first became relief pitchers. Second, I’ve only posted Dennis Eckersley’s stats as a relief pitcher.
Why? To give a sense of how usage patterns among relief pitchers have changed over the years. It’s very clear: Wilhelm threw a ton of innings, Goose and Rollie threw a lot of innings, but less than Wilhelm. Sutter and Eck and Rivera and Hoffman have pitched fewer innings as relief pitchers than the others. If Eckersley is listed with his 3000 innings pitched, it makes the table more confusing.
Let’s get Lee Arthur Smith on the list.
|
IP
|
W-L
|
Saves
|
Strikeouts
|
ERA
|
ERA+
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
2254
|
143-122
|
227
|
1610
|
2.52
|
146
|
Rollie Fingers
|
1701
|
114-118
|
341
|
1299
|
2.90
|
119
|
Rich Gossage
|
1809
|
124-107
|
310
|
1502
|
3.01
|
126
|
Bruce Sutter
|
1042
|
68-71
|
300
|
861
|
2.83
|
136
|
Lee Smith
|
1289
|
71-92
|
478
|
1251
|
3.03
|
131
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
991
|
52-54
|
387
|
911
|
3.29
|
122
|
Mariano Rivera
|
1090
|
71-52
|
526
|
1006
|
2.25
|
202
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
1042
|
59-68
|
591
|
1103
|
2.73
|
147
|
Lee Smith is a bridge from those closer who threw 1-3 innings and had a few more wins and loses every year (Sutter, Gossage) to the one-inning ‘closers’ we have today.
In discussions about the Hall of Fame, we talk a lot about benchmarks, about standards. What is the standard number of home runs a slugging outfielder should hit to get elected? What is the expected offensive production from a shortstop? How about a catcher?
The standards for relief pitchers getting into the Hall of Fame are less clear than the standards for other positions, because a) those standards are drawn from a very small group of players and b) the changing nature of the position makes it difficult to determine exactly what the standards are.
Still: measured by the career standards of Hall-of-Fame relievers, Lee Smith does just fine.
-Smith ranks 4th (out of eight) in innings pitched. He is behind Wilhelm, Fingers, and Goose, but he’s well ahead of Rivera, Hoffman, Sutter and Eck’s innings as a closer. It will take Rivera about three more seasons as a closer to pass Smith in innings pitched. It will take Hoffman close to four more seasons.
-Smith still ranks third all-time in saves, and was the #1 guy for a long time until Hoffman and then Rivera passed him. Hoffman and Rivera are both certain Hall-of-Famers: the only men who have passed Smith in saves are locks for enshrinement.
-Smith has the second-best strikeout rate of the eight players listed, behind only Trevor Hoffman. Smith also ranks fourth among the closers in career strikeouts as a reliever.
-His ERA, adjusted for contexts, is very good. He’s below Rivera, Hoffman, Wilhelm, and Sutter, but he’s ahead of Fingers, Gossage, and Eckersley. Smith spent a lot of hitter’s parks (Wrigley, Fenway).
-Smith’s W-L record is the worst of any of the relief pitchers on the table above. It would be easy to dismiss that as inconsequential, but it does matter. Sutter, Eck, and Hoffman have losing records, but Smith’s W-L record is the worst on the list.
(Just an aside: I thought it might be a Wrigley effect: I figured that in home run-friendly parks a closer would be more apt to lose a game. But Smith’s W-L record in Wrigley was 27-26, which blows my hypothesis right out of the water.)
By the career standard of the seven closer who are or will be elected into the Hall-of-Fame, Lee Smith is an obvious Hall-of-Famer.
Going A Little Further
The good folks over at baseballreference have a terrific addition to their statistical measures: a detailed look at the situations when a pitcher entered a game. Let’s look at where Smith ranks among the others in converting save situations:
|
Saves
|
Blown Saves
|
SV%
|
Mariano Rivera
|
526
|
62
|
89%
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
591
|
71
|
89%
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
390
|
71
|
85%
|
Lee Smith
|
478
|
103
|
82%
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
201
|
63
|
78%
|
Rollie Fingers
|
341
|
109
|
76%
|
Bruce Sutter
|
300
|
101
|
75%
|
Goose Gossage
|
310
|
112
|
73%
|
Lee Smith converted 82% of his save opportunities, which ranks him in the middle of the pack. He’s behind Rivera, Hoffman, and Eckersley, but is ahead of Wilhelm, Fingers, and Gossage.
What about inherited runners? Did Lee Smith do a good job of keeping inherited runners from scoring?
|
Inherited Runners
|
Inherited Rns Scored
|
IS%
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
341
|
70
|
21%
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
349
|
91
|
26%
|
Lee Smith
|
510
|
143
|
28%
|
Mariano Rivera
|
318
|
93
|
29%
|
Rollie Fingers
|
783
|
225
|
29%
|
Bruce Sutter
|
445
|
137
|
31%
|
Goose Gossage
|
832
|
277
|
33%
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
553
|
186
|
34%
|
He did: only Hoffman and Eckersley have been tougher on inherited runners than Lee Smith, who allowed just 28% of inherited runners to score.
Baseballreference lists the degree of difficulty when a relief pitcher is used. This is based on a metric invented by Tom Tango, who has a terrific site over at tangotiger.net. High leverage situations are described as situations when the leverage index of the first batter the reliever faces is higher than 1.5. Medium leverage is between 0.7 and 1.4. Low leverage is when the first batter has a leverage index lower than 0.7. For what it’s worth, a leverage index of 1.00 is considered a neutral situation.
Starting the ninth inning with a one-run lead has a higher leverage than starting with a three-run lead.
|
Relief Apps
|
Lev Hi
|
Lev Md
|
Lev Lo
|
Bruce Sutter
|
659
|
472
|
106
|
81
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
975
|
636
|
204
|
135
|
Lee Smith
|
1008
|
638
|
170
|
200
|
Rollie Fingers
|
901
|
558
|
173
|
170
|
Goose Gossage
|
951
|
569
|
164
|
218
|
Mariano Rivera
|
902
|
532
|
204
|
166
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
701
|
394
|
165
|
142
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
832
|
403
|
188
|
241
|
Let’s covert these totals to percentages:
|
Hi%
|
Md %
|
Low%
|
Bruce Sutter
|
72%
|
16%
|
12%
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
65%
|
21%
|
14%
|
Lee Smith
|
63%
|
17%
|
20%
|
Rollie Fingers
|
62%
|
19%
|
19%
|
Goose Gossage
|
60%
|
17%
|
23%
|
Mariano Rivera
|
59%
|
23%
|
18%
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
56%
|
24%
|
20%
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
48%
|
23%
|
29%
|
Sixty-three percent of Smith’s relief appearances came in high leverage situations, which is the third-best total of the closer listed on our tables.
In regards to Average Leverage Index, or the average degree of difficulty that a relief pitcher is used for, Lee Smith again does extremely well:
|
aLI
|
Bruce Sutter
|
2.042
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
2.010
|
Lee Smith
|
1.925
|
Mariano Rivera
|
1.837
|
Rollie Fingers
|
1.677
|
Goose Gossage
|
1.632
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
1.433
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
1.430
|
Only Sutter and Hoffman were regularly used in more difficult situations than Lee Smith, who is ahead of the great Rivera.
Lastly, let’s look at career Win-Probability Added, or WPA. As you might remember from my article about the MVP of the Yankee dynasty, WPA is very kind to relief pitchers: during their years with the Yankees, Rivera has notched a much higher WPA than teammates Jeter and Posada. WPA is another Tom Tango statistic, and it is one of the best measures for evaluating a closer’s value to a team, as it measures the team’s chances of winning when the pitcher enters the game against the eventual outcome.
|
WPA
|
IP
|
WPA/100 IP
|
Mariano Rivera
|
48.85
|
1090
|
4.48
|
Trevor Hoffman
|
35.49
|
1042
|
3.41
|
Bruce Sutter
|
19.61
|
1042
|
1.88
|
Lee Smith
|
23.97
|
1289
|
1.86
|
Goose Gossage
|
31.40
|
1809
|
1.74
|
Dennis Eckersley
|
14.75
|
991
|
1.49
|
Rollie Fingers
|
10.67
|
1701
|
0.63
|
Hoyt Wilhelm
|
unknown
|
2254
|
unknown
|
I’ve listed Smith’s Win Probability Added against the other relief pitchers, as well as his WPA per 100 innings pitched (mostly because it looks a whole lot neater than WPA per inning pitched, or per nine innings pitched).
As you can see, Smith ranks far below Hoffman and Rivera, but is about even with Sutter and Gossage, and well ahead of (reliever) Eckersley and Rollie Fingers.
-Of the eight closers listed, Smith ranks 4th in converting save opportunities.
-In allowing inherited runners to score, Smith ranks 3rd.
-In terms of leverage, only two pitchers have appeared in a greater percentage of high leverage situations than Smith has.
-In terms of Win Probability Added, Smith ranks fourth, neck-and-neck with Bruce Sutter and Goose Gossage.
By advanced metrics, Smith still does well against the pack of Hall-of-Fame relief pitchers.
The Sabermetric/BBWAADivide
Lee Smith will almost certainly be elected to the baseball Hall of Fame by the BBWAA. He has notched between 35-45% of the vote each year, topping out at 44.5% during last year’s vote. With no relief pitchers with a reasonable shot of getting elected coming onto the ballot until Rivera and Hoffman decide to retire, Smith faces no real competition for votes. He will get elected, and I wouldn’t be surprised if it happened this year.
Smith has not done well in the BJOL vote. Last year he received just 14% of the vote, and he isn’t doing a whole lot better this year.
Why is that? And: who is right: the BBWAA who routinely gives Smith 40-60% of their votes, or the readers of the BJOL, who are far less generous with their votes.
To answer the first question, I suspect that the readers of the BJOL are generally less kind to readers for a number of reasons:
1- Being a relief pitcher is, generally speaking, a step down: you are moved to the bullpen because you can’t be a starter. Bad starters will often have great success closing out games, but you seldom see a closer covert successfully to the starting rotation.
2- Relief pitchers are measured by a stat, ‘saves’ that most of us agree is ridiculous in measuring the efficiency of a pitcher.
3- The position has changed dramatically over the last forty years, and only now are we seeing anything close to a consistent pattern of usage.
4- That modern pattern of usage, as Bill has pointed out in numerous places, is far less efficient than previous usage patterns. Having your best bullpen arm pitching in the ninth with a three-run lead is far less useful than having him pitch in the sixth inning of a tie game.
5- The standards for what makes someone a quality relief pitcher are difficult to know, and the contextual elements are not as easily understood as they are for players at other positions.
6- The standards that the Hall of Fame has set seem capricious and strange. Bruce Sutter gets in before Goose Gossage? Eck is elected on his first ballot, Fingers is elected during his second year, but Hoyt Wilhelm needs eight years?
7- Every year it seems someone comes out of nowhere to save 40-50 games. It happened last year: Heath Bell, who had two career saves during his entire career, paced the NL with 42 saves. This dilutes the perception of difficulty: to save forty games as a relief pitcher is influenced as much by luck as by skill.
There are probably a dozen more reasons why we’re not giving Lee Smith our votes. As for the question of whether or not we should vote for Smith: I haven’t voted for Smith, but I’m convinced. I think there are good reasons to have high standards for relief pitchers being elected to the Hall of Fame. But it seems clear to me that Lee Smith meets those standards.
Dave Fleming is a writer living in Chicago. He welcomes comments, questions, and suggestions here and at dfleming1986@yahoo.com