OK, Group I was just to establish a base line.   Group II was players who played at a Hall of Fame level for some portion of their careers, but who came and went too quickly to be taken seriously as Hall of Fame candidates.   Group III was players who are not in the Hall of Fame and who had short careers, but who are considered Hall of Fame candidates, at least by some people.   We found four or five of them who do seem to be worthy of Hall of Fame consideration, but many more who weren’t.

            Today’s group is intended to be what we would call no-questions-asked Hall of Famers—players who were so dominant that, even though their careers are short, they seem like obvious Hall of Famers anyway.    There are seven players in our group, which brings us to a total of 52.

52.   Herb Score (75-58, 562)

51.   Bob Locker  (71-46, .603)

50.   Tony Conigliaro (95-82, .537)

49.   Johnny Murphy (88-58, .600)

48.  Brian McRae  (134-151, .470)

47.  Tiny Bonham (111-69, .618)

46.  George Case  (138-148, .482)

45.  Vince Coleman  (144-166, .465)

44.  Steve Gromek (140-120, .538)

43.  Sam Chapman (138-152, .475)

42.  J. R. Richard (125-97, .565)

41.   Scott Fletcher (147-153, .490)

40.   Jack McDowell (126-87, .548)

39.  Bobby Higginson  (142-121, .540)

38.  Jim Ray Hart (130-79, .622)

37.   Spud Chandler (123-54, .696)

36.   Bob Veale (145-116, .556)

35.  Pete Fox  (161-156, .509)

34.  Johnny Allen (145-107, .576)

33.  Sal Maglie (142-83, .631)

32.  Thornton Lee  (158-127, .555)

31.  Bobby Shantz  (153-99, .607)

30.   Firpo Marberry (159-104, .604)

29.   Jim Maloney (163-91, .642)

28.   Lu Blue (191-163, .539)

27.   Rico Carty (179-112, .615)

26.  Allie Reynolds (192-144, .572)

25.  Riggs Stephenson (171-81, .671)

24.  Danny Tartabull  (175-93, .654)

23.  Johnny Pesky (168-95, .640)

22.  Ken Williams (179-106, .630)

21.   Ron Guidry (176-95, .650)

20.  Dominic DiMaggio (186-127, .595)

19.  Don Newcombe (181-96, .653)

18.  Smokey Joe Wood  (177-86, .673)

17.  Hal Trosky (184-104, .638)

16.  Nomar Garciaparra (191-95, .668)

15.   Albert Belle (205-106, .660)

14.  Roy Campanella (166-71, .701)   Win Share Value of 214

            As much as any player on this list, Campanella provides a challenge to our system of analysis, and really requires us to take a second look at some critical issues.

            On a certain level, it can be argued that Roy Campanella fails to meet any of the three tests that I have laid out for a Hall of Famer.  It’s a border-line call.   He is supposed to have 100 more Win Shares than Loss Shares, but he has only 95.   He is supposed to have three seasons with 30 or more Win Share Value, but he has only two—plus a season at 29.   Still, he does fall short of the standards, and thus, if we assume that Campanella does belong in the Hall of Fame—which I am willing to assume—then we have to conclude that our system has failed.   Our system has diagnosed as a non-Hall of Famer a player who would be selected to the Hall of Fame almost as soon as he became eligible.

            What do we conclude, then?   Let’s lay out the possibilities:

            1)  Campanella deserves inclusion as a historic figure,

            2)  Campanella was over-rated by contemporary sportswriters, who placed an unrealistic value on his defense,

            3)  Campanella was voted into the Hall of Fame quickly in part because of his great popularity, and in part because of sympathy for him due to the tragic ending of his career,

            4)  Campanella was a better defensive player than our system gives him credit for being, and

            5)  Our rules are not designed to deal with a case like this.

            There is probably some truth in all of these statements, except perhaps (4); I reject the argument that Campanella was better defensively than we have rated him, and we’ll get to that in a moment.   Let’s take these on one at a time:

1)  Campanella deserves inclusion as a historic figure. 

Yes, Campanella is a historic figure, and does deserve some recognition on this basis.   Jackie Robinson was not the Lone Ranger.   We wouldn’t care about him if he was.   Campanella was a central figure on a historic team, and a central player in one of the game’s greatest dramas.   We don’t give all of the credit for that to Jackie.

            2)  Campanella was over-rated by contemporary sportswriters, who placed an unrealistic value on his defense,

            Well.  ..yes, I think that’s true.

            Look, here’s the real problem with Campanella:

            a)  He only played ten years,

b)  He only played 83 games in 1948,

c)  He hit .207 in 1954,

d)  He hit .219 in 1956,

e)   He hit .242 with 13 homers in 1957. 

f)  None of those seasons can be described as “great” in any way, shape or form.   His “greatness” is confined to at most six seasons—two of which are very difficult to describe as “great”.

g)  He was slow.

h)  While his walk rates were above average, he never walked more than 67 times in a season.

Those are real and meaningful negatives.  Sometimes Campanella’s advocates do not want to face the fact that we are dealing here with some limitations.  Big ones.   Roy Campanella was 135 runs better than a league-average hitter over the course of his career.   Cliff Johnson was at +144 runs, and Don Mincher was +138.   This is not normally Hall of Fame territory.

            3)  Campanella was voted into the Hall of Fame quickly in part because of his great popularity, and in part because of sympathy for him due to the tragic ending of his career.

            Yes, that’s probably true, but at the same time, Campanella does have huge positives as a player.

            4)  Campanella was a better defensive player than our system gives him credit for being.

            Well, we have Campanella rated, as a defensive player, at 55-6, a winning percentage of .896.   I believe that’s the fourth- or fifth-highest percentage I’ve ever seen; I remember that Bill Mazeroski was over .900, and Ozzie Smith may have been, and two players that we will see tomorrow will rank higher than that, but .896 is a fantastic defensive winning percentage.  It’s hard to argue that a player who is rated as one of the very best defensive players of all time is under-valued because he is underrated defensively.

            The response that echoes back to me is that Campanella may have a .900 winning percentage as a catcher, but that the area assigned to his defense is not large enough.    That’s always possible, but. . .I don’t think that’s the right way to think about the issue.   I wrestled with this problem for months while designing the Win Shares and Loss Shares system, and I concluded that the best way to think about it is that all players have the same responsibility to play defense; it’s just that some make more of a defensive contribution than others.   Catchers make more of a defensive contribution than first basemen.   Campanella and Jim Hegan make more of a defensive contribution than Stan Lopata and Mike Stanley, even though Lopata and Stanley were catchers.

            If we assigned Campanella a larger responsibility to play defense, we would have to assign him a lower success percentage.   We’d gain nothing, and it would cause numerous other problems in the Win Shares accounting system.    I don’t believe that under-rating his defense is the problem.

            5)  Our rules are not designed to deal with a case like this.

            That’s it.   It’s just that the Hall of Fame rules need to be a little bit different for an outstanding catcher (or for a relief ace) than they are for other players.   The 30 Win Share Value standard is too high for players who only play 130 games a year, and Campanella had only the two seasons when he played more than 127 games in the field.

            We need two special codicils, for catchers and relievers, the first of which is to redefine what is a high-impact season.  A high-impact season for a catcher or relief ace is any season in which the player has a Win Share Value of 30 or is +13 or more in Win Shares versus Loss Shares.   Campanella was 21-4 in 1955 (when he was voted the MVP); it’s a sensational record, but the Win Share Value is 29.   With the special rule for catchers Campanella has four high-impact seasons, Mickey Cochrane has seven, and that problem goes away.

            Also. . .second special codicil for catchers and relievers. . .a player should be +100 Win Shares over Loss Shares or have a Winning Percentage of at least .667 in a Hall-of-Fame qualified career.    Campy played ten years and is at .701; thus, he meets two of the three Hall of Fame standards.    Team Success Percentage:  .742.

13.   Jacques Fournier  (209-102, .673)

12.  Dolph Camilli (211-97, .685)

11.   Sandy Koufax (216-115, .653)  Win Share Value 266

            You will remember that, in the Herb Score entry, we explained that Power Pitchers are assigned more responsibility for the innings they pitch than are finesse pitchers.   Thus Koufax, with an actual career won-lost record of 165-87, has a “pitching” won-lost contribution of 202-86, plus a 13-28 mark as a hitter.    Ending his career with four straight high-impact seasons, he meets two of our three tests of a Hall of Fame player, missing only the standard of 300 Career Win Shares.   His individual won and lost contributions by season are: 1955, 3-2 (.598); 1956, 2-6, (.269); 1957, 9-7 (.551); 1958, 11-13 (.441); 1959, 13-13 (.506); 1960, 14-13 (.518); 1961, 21-16 (.563); 1962, 17-9 (.661); 1963, 32-10, (.768); 1964, 24-6 (.802); 1965, 36-10 (.780); 1966, 34-9 (.787).     Team Success Percentage:   .706.

10.  Charlie Keller (191-25, .883)

9.   Babe Herman (217-97, .692)

8.   Tony Oliva (221-105, .678)

7.  Jackie Robinson (211-55, .793)  Win Shares Value of 288

            Roger Kahn is fond of making the argument that Jackie Robinson’s true greatness as a player escapes the record book.   I worry that, in some sense, this trivializes his impact as a player, almost as if we were saying that his numbers aren’t too good.   His numbers are awfully good.   Although his career was very short—less than 1400 games—we have him with Win Share Values, beginning in 1949, of 39, 32, 46 and 39.    We have him with won-lost records of 159-44 as a hitter, which is sensational, and 51-11 as a fielder, which is even better.   Even were he not a historic figure, he would clearly be worthy of enshrinement in Cooperstown, based on his performance on the field.   Team Success Percentage:   .748.

6.  Roy Thomas (232-100, .698)

5.  Don Mattingly (243-127, .656)

4.  Frank Chance (218-46, .825)  Win Share Value of 303

            Chance’s career on base percentage is the same as his slugging percentage, .394.  Chance was the manager and first baseman for the most successful baseball team of all time, in terms of winning a very high percentage of their games over a period of years.   The Cubs of Tinker, Evers and Chance had higher winning-percentages than the Yankees with Gehrig and Ruth.    We credit him with an offensive won-lost record of 167-13—based on having an on base percentage 67 points over the league, in an era in which runs were very scarce—and a defensive mark of 51-34, which is quite outstanding for a first baseman.    Team Success Percentage, .790.

3.  Mickey Cochrane (224-72, .757)  Win Share Value of 300

            Cochrane, as noted earlier, had only two seasons with Win Share Value of 30 or higher, but he had individual won-lost contributions, beginning in 1927, of 20-6, 20-9, 21-9, 22-5, 23-2, 21-7, 20-4, 19-5, and 20-3, and thus qualifies easily by the Campanella rules.   Cochrane never caught more than 137 games in a season, and had only three seasons of more than 130.    What it looks like, based on his records, is that he was catching every game except the second games of double-headers.     Teams in his era played more than 20 double-headers a year.     Team Success Percentage:  .824.

2.   Hank Greenberg (231-55, .806)  Win Share Value of 319

            Greenberg and Joe DiMaggio have similar batting stats—both short-career players.   DiMaggio had a slightly higher batting average (.325-.313), but Greenberg had a slightly better on base percentage (.412 to .398) and slugging (.605 to .579).    But DiMaggio:

            a)  Played in a much tougher park for a hitter, and

            b)  Came along three years later and retired four years later, in an era when offensive numbers were declining rapidly.   Greenberg’s career offensive context is 5.06 runs per game, or 822 runs per 162 games.   DiMaggio’s is 4.60 runs per game, or 745 runs per 162 games.

            Greenberg was still a great player, and he actually rates much better as a defensive player than I expected him to.   Although his defensive reputation was not sterling, his won-lost contribution was 41-37, which is quite good for a first baseman/left fielder.   Team Success Percentage, .697.

1.  Joe DiMaggio (322-45, .876)  Win Share Value of 460

            Several years ago Bill Deane and I had a month-long e-mail argument about Joe DiMaggio’s defense.    As Bill saw it at that time—and probably still does, I don’ t know—there was no actual evidence that DiMaggio was an outstanding defensive center fielder; that was all just based on reputation.   But we have him with a defensive won-lost record (based strictly on his statistics) of 65-33, easily the best of any outfielder among these 52 players.

            DiMaggio was idolized by the sportswriters of his era, who tended to dismiss with contempt the notion that Mays or Mantle could possibly be the equal of The Great DiMaggio.   It was a generation thing; the pre-war sportswriters who were still on the scene in the mid-1950s felt threatened by the emergence of new superstars—and new sportswriters—and waxed romantic about the old.  The sportswriters of the 1950s were the first generation of college-educated sportswriters.   The old guys in many cases didn’t like them and didn’t trust them.   The 1950s sportswriters—who were small boys when DiMaggio was king—were mostly reluctant to take on DiMaggio’s aura in order to defend Mantle.  This battle gave DiMaggio a tremendous halo effect, which in turn alienated the sportswriters of my generation—the second generation of post-war sportswriters--who mostly thought (and mostly have written) that DiMaggio was horribly overrated.

            But my generation is fading now, as well, and whatever one may say, Joe DiMaggio was a great player.   We have him with individual Won-Lost contributions of 31-2 (1937), 29+6 (1939), 25-1 (1940), 32+4 (1941), 25-3 (1947), 28-5 (1948) and 15-0 (1949).   Even in 1951, when he was a shadow of himself, he was still 16-9.    The + signs indicate that he was “over the top” in those seasons—that is, that his contributions to victory were too large to be stated within the area of responsibility assigned to him.    He was outstanding in every phase of the game, and, despite the shortness of his career, he easily exceeds every Hall of Fame test.   His team Success Percentage:  .904, is the highest we have seen yet, although we will break that record once again before this series is finished.

            OK, we have two more groups to go through here.   Tomorrow’s group includes Dizzy Dean, Larry Doby, Johnny Evers, Rollie Fingers, Joe Gordon, Chick Hafey, Addie Joss, Ralph Kiner, Freddie Lindstrom, Phil Rizzuto, Joe Tinker and Ross Youngs.

(Note: The numbers in parentheses are each player's Win Shares Loss Shares and Win Shares Percentage.  Win Shares Value and Team Success Percentage are defined in this article.)