Jimmy Dykes 107, Tony Batista 75

            Overcoming an early 27-4 deficit caused by Batista’s power, 1920s/1930s third baseman Jimmy Dykes won four categories by lopsided margins and coasted to an easy 107-75 victory over the inimical Tony Batista.   Dykes had large advantages over Batista in terms of Hitting for Average, Plate Discipline, Length of Career and the Success of his Teams:

            Dykes was a #2 seed; Batista at 15.   Dykes in the second round will play the winner of the Billy Nash/Joe Randa contest, which will be held in Baltimore next Tuesday, September 21.   Dykes will play the winner on September 25.

            We have commented on this many times in the past, but Tony Batista was just a very odd player.    There is a popular video of Batistia, easy to find, which shows him, in Japan, being hit with a pitch, starting to charge the mound, but changing his mind halfway to the mound and running to first base instead.   It leaves the pitcher laughing.   That’s Tony Batista.   There is another video of him, not as common, that shows him trying to beat the throw to first and, when he does beat it, running all the way to the right field foul pole; he just keeps going, as if he had forgotten when he was supposed to slow down.

            Batista had a very odd batting stance, similar to Bill Hall, in which he started extremely open, with both eyes pointed at the pitcher, then closed up his stance as the pitch came to the plate.    However, while Hall destroys left-handers, Batista was that very rare right-handed power hitter who didn’t hit left-handers; his career slugging percentage was 50 points higher the wrong way.    He was just an odd player, and if you watched him for nine innings he would do something odd nine times.   He would call the shortstop off the play when it was clearly the shortstop’s play.   He would dodge out of the way of the pitch—from the on-deck circle.   It’s hard to explain.

            When Batista came to the majors he was a rail-thin athlete who was more a shortstop than a third baseman.   As players do he thickened out over the years, but he wasn’t a bad defensive player, and he did hit 41 homers and drive in 114 runs in 2000, and he did hit 32 homers and drive in 110 runs in 2004.   His 221 career homers are easily the most of any player eliminated so far, but even in 2004 his on-base percentage was just .272 (!), so his offensive won-lost contribution was just 11-17, despite the very good power numbers.  For his career his offensive won-lost record was 85-115, which is very similar to most of the other players who have been eliminated in the early rounds of this competition.   His defensive contribution, 30-18, was very good. 

Tony Batista—Wins and Losses

Bando blasts Jacoby, 100-71

            Cleveland native Sal Bando, a #3 seed, easily took care of business in the first round of the Cleveland regional, outpointing Brook Jacoby in every area except hitting for average:

            Jacoby’s 16-point edge in hitting for average (.270 to .254) translated to a 14-point scoring advantage, which gave Jacoby his only lead of the game.  Travis Fryman and Frank Malzone will meet in Cleveland on July 19, and Bando will meet the winner of that match on September 24.

            Brook Jacoby came to Cleveland with Brett Butler in a trade for Len Barker in October, 1983; the deal—initiated by the Braves—turned out to be a steal for the Indians, as Barker had arm issues, while Jacoby had a good career and Butler a better one. Jacoby had one of the worst “clutch” years in memory in 1987, when he hit .300 with 32 homers but only 69 RBI, missing his expected RBI by 36.    27 of Jacoby’s 32 home runs that year were hit with the bases empty, and he hit just .221 with runners in scoring position.

            In the earlier versions of the Win Shares system, this would have counted against Jacoby.  In this version it doesn’t; not saying I was wrong to do it the other way before, I just decided to go in a different direction this time.   That season, then, scores at 18-10 (18 Wins, 10 Losses), and Jacoby also had other seasons that ring in at 18-13, 17-13, and 20-11.   Although he was just a .500 player when you include his learning years and his fading years, he did have considerable value in the heart of his career.

Brook Jacoby—Wins and Losses

Ken Boyer 84, David Bell 59

            Ken Boyer used big advantages in Hitting for Average, Career Length and Awards to ride to a comparatively easy win over David Bell in a matchup of two of baseball’s most famous families.   Boyer is the #4 seed in the St. Louis regional.   Scott Rolen will face Howard Johnson in the 5/12 matchup tomorrow, and then Boyer will face the winner on September 23. 

            While David Bell obviously was not a hitter of the caliber of Ken Boyer, he was a very good defensive player, and one thing I had not realized about him is that it would be hard to find another of these modern journeyman players who played so consistently for teams having good years.   Bell played for very good teams with the Indians, the Cardinals, the Mariners, the Giants, and the Phillies.   He played for a Mariner team that won 116 games in 2001.   Moving to San Francisco in 2002, he helped the Giants to a 95-win season and the National League championship, then moved on to Philadelphia, where he played for four straight teams that won 85 games or more.   His “Team Success Percentage”, .688, is the fourth-highest in the tournament, and is 140 points higher than any other player who has been eliminated in the early going.   We have him with an offensive won-lost record of 88-125, but a defensive won-lost mark of 37-17:

David Bell—Wins and Losses

McMullen Upsets Castilla in Overtime

Rockies Fans Incensed

            In the first upset of the Brooks Robinson Invitational Tournament, 12^th seeded Ken McMullen, a 1960s Dodger castoff who saved his career with the woeful Washington Senators, has ousted from the tournament 5^th seeded Vinny Castilla.   McMullen used a 17-2 advantage in Plate Discipline to build an early lead over Castilla, and won the game in overtime, 63-62:

            McMullen will meet Carney Lansford in a second-round match on September 23. 

            Colorado Rockies’ fans were incensed at the judging, questioning not only McMullen’s 15-point advantage in plate discipline, but his 7-point edge in speed.

            “A 9-2 edge for McMullen in speed?   Get real,” said Castilla supporter Herman Caseworker.  “I saw Ken McMullen play the day he came to the majors.   He was too big to be a third baseman, and he couldn’t get out of his own way.”   Caseworker pointed out that Castilla hit more triples in his career than McMullen (28-26) and stole more bases (33-20).

            Castilla had far better triple crown numbers than McMullen.   Castilla hit .276 in his career; McMullen hit .248.   Castilla hit twice as many homers (320 to 156), and drove in 500 more runs (1,105 to 606).   Those are huge advantages, and, on top of that, it must be said that Castilla was a better defensive third baseman than McMullen.   McMullen was OK, but Castilla was quite good.  Castilla’s career was longer, his numbers are better, and his defense was better; it is natural to assume that he was the better player.   When we reach the opposite conclusion, that requires an explanation.

            First, there is a huge, huge difference in the offensive context in which these men competed.   Among the leagues in which McMullen was a regular were the American League in 1972 (3.47 runs per game), the American League in 1968 (3.41 runs per game), the American League in 1965, ’66 and ’67 (3.94, 3.80, and 3.74) and the American League in 1971 (3.87).    Among the leagues in which Castilla was a regular were the National League in 1995 (4.63 runs per game), 1996 (4.68), 1997 (4.60), 1998 (4.60), 1999 (5.00), the American League in 2000 (5.30), and the National League in 2004 (4.64).  

            When you weight the league norms by the player’s plate appearances in each season, you get a career norm of 3.86 for McMullen, 4.67 for Castilla.   That’s a big difference.

            Let’s look at the parks.    McMullen came to the majors with the Dodgers in 1962—an extreme pitcher’s park.   From there he went to Washington in 1965—a pitcher’s park—from there to the Angels in 1971—a very extreme pitcher’s park—and from there back to the Dodgers.   He finished up with a couple of years in Oakland and Milwaukee—both pitcher’s parks.

            Castilla played his best years in Colorado; enough said.   His other years, not in Colorado, included years in Atlanta (pre-Turner Field), Tampa Bay, and Houston.   McMullen’s Career Park Adjustment Factor was .957; Castilla’s was 1.157.   Those are not the raw park factors, which compare runs scored and allowed at home to runs scored and allowed on the road; those are the park adjustments, which compare the overall effects on run context, considering that only half of the games are played in the home park and making some other technical adjustments.  The raw park factors would be roughly .900 and 1.33.

            When you combine the league norms and the park factors, McMullen’s career was played in a run context of 3.70 runs per game.   Castilla’s career was played in a context of 5.40 runs per game.    That’s a mammoth difference. 

            McMullen drew 510 walks in his career, making 4,083 outs, which is an average of 3.37 walks per 27 outs.   As it happens this is, for his era, exactly the league average—3.37 walks per 27 outs.

            Castilla in his career drew only 423 walks, making 5,287 outs.   That’s an average of 2.16 walks per 27 outs.  That’s 38% below the league norm. 

            Looking at all factors of offense, Castilla created about 958 runs in his career, making 5,287 outs.   That’s 4.69 runs per 27 outs, which is well below average for the offensive context in which he competed (5.40 runs per game).   What happens when you create fewer runs than those with whom you compete?   You lose.   Sorry to patronize.

            McMullen created only 614 runs, true—many less than Castilla’s 958.   But McMullen created 614 runs with 4,083 outs, which is 4.06 runs per 27 outs.   His offensive context was 3.70 runs per 27 outs.   McMullen was about 54 runs better than an average hitter in his offensive context, 614 to 560.   Castilla was about 100 runs below average, 958 runs to 1058.   There’s a 154-run gap between them as offensive players, when compared to the league norms.

            Yes, Castilla was an extremely good defensive player, but McMullen was pretty good, too.   It is unlikely that the difference between them defensively was 40 runs, let alone 154.  

            Yes, Castilla’s career was longer, but the difference between them was mostly just losses.   Castilla had a few more Wins contributed to his team; he had many more Losses.   That’s not a positive.

            On the issue of speed. . .McMullen hit two fewer triples in a shorter career, but McMullen hit 20% more triples per plate appearance than did Castilla.   Castilla stole 33 bases in his career—and was thrown out 43 times.   McMullen stole 20, and was thrown out 19 times, which isn’t good data either, but it’s better than Castilla’s.    Normalized per plate appearance, Castilla has 28% more stolen bases, 76% more caught stealing.

            Castilla grounded into 20 double plays per 650 plate appearances.    McMullen grounded into 17.   Triples, stolen bases, GIDP. ..all three major speed indicators show that McMullen was probably faster than Castilla.

            Vinny Castilla in 1996 hit .319 with 46 homers, 144 RBI—really impressive numbers.   In Colorado he hit .368 with 26 homers, 91 RBI.   On the road he hit .270 with 20 homers, 53 RBI—which actually, those are very good numbers, too, unless you compare them to the out-of-the-world numbers compiled in Colorado.   Castilla was a winning player in those years, with a won-lost equivalent of 20-15 that year, and records the previous two seasons of 19-14 and 19-13. 

            Now the Rockies (in 2010) have another young third baseman piling up national debt type numbers, and once again, as you might expect, he has a massive home/road differential; actually, it is bigger than Castilla’s.  Once more, as we did with Castilla, we hear the arguments for why the third baseman’s numbers should not be reduced or should not be fully reduced to a normal context.   There are basically two arguments:

            1)  That the Rockies have a special challenge in going on the road, unlike the challenge of other teams, in that the pitching patterns change so dramatically.   Because it is hard to throw a good breaking pitch at 5,000 feet, pitchers don’t throw as many breaking pitches, and, when they do, those pitches are more likely to hang.   When the Rockies go on the road, their hitters have to make adjustments that nobody else has to make.

            2)  The thin air in Colorado causes medical issues.   The thinner air at higher altitude reduces the amount of oxygen in the air, which increases recovery time from minor and major injuries.   This is scientifically proven.

            You want to know what I think?  What a ton of malarkey.  I understand, I think, why the Rockies’ fans feel this way.   If you hear constantly that the players on “your” team are not as good as everybody says they are, not as good as their numbers, you’re going to get pretty tired of hearing that.    If you start hearing that on Monday morning, you’re going to get pretty tired of it by Thursday afternoon.   The Rockies fans have been hearing it for almost 20 years. 

            But some Rockies fans, with one foot in the sabermetric camp, seem to feel that they can bully the rest of us into giving the Rockies players special treatment by acting as if they’re being treated unfairly when we evaluate them the same way that we evaluate anybody else.  There is no place for that in a grown-up discussion of the facts.

            Look, the Rockies have the largest home-field advantage, over time, in major league baseball.   It is an entirely reasonable debate as to whether that is, in fact, a home-field advantage or a road disadvantage.   You can argue that.

            What you can’t argue is, it’s a fact.   It is also a fact that athletes in many sports train at high altitudes for the advantages that this gives them.   It is also a fact that, for hundreds of years, people have been sent to the mountains for their health.   It is a loser’s argument; oh, poor Colorado hitters, they just don’t have a fair chance to learn to hit a major league curve ball.   Well, OK.   Do you want to play in the majors, or don’t you?    Do you want us to evaluate you as a major league hitter, or as a minor league hitter?

            When the Rockies were a struggling franchise winning 75 games a year, there was a place for those kind of arguments—but they’re not there anymore.   This is a winning franchise now.   If they want to play with the big boys, they can act like the big boys.   Yes, there are special challenges to playing in Colorado, but there are special challenges to playing in New York, too, and there are special challenges to playing in Kansas City or Oakland or San Francisco.   The question that the good Lord asks you every morning is, do you want to deal with those challenges, or do you want to whine about them?  

            Well. . .I’m ranting.   Ken McMullen was a better player than Vinny Castilla; I’m not going to say that he wasn’t because saying that he was will annoy the Rockies fans. 

Vinny Castilla—Wins and Losses

            In tommorrow’s matchups, #6 seed Willie Kamm will go to war with the mighty Troy Glaus (#11) in Los Angeles, Scott Rolen will take on Howard Johnson in St. Louis (5 vs. 12), Bob Elliott will square of with Dean Palmer in Cleveland (4 vs. 13), and third-seeded Toby Harrah will confront 14^th-seeded Ray Knight in Baltimore.

            Saturday’s contests will be Matt Williams (4) vs. Melvin Mora (13) in Baltimore, Larry Parrish (5) vs. Heinie Zimmerman (12) in Cleveland, Don Money (6) vs. Aramis Ramirez (11) in St. Louis, and Adrian Beltre (7) vs. Kevin Seitzer (10) in Baltimore.   Cyber Space Seating is still available.  

            This chart ranks and compares the ten players who have so far been eliminated from this tournament: