In the previous article in this series, Strikeout Tigers, I looked at strikeouts by team, and identified the 1946 Detroit Tigers as perhaps the greatest strikeout team of all time, and the 2003 Detroit Tigers as the worst.  This installment uses the same approach, but looks at walks by teams.  

            Walk totals have not changed as much, over time, as strikeout totals have.  They are relatively more constant, the key word being "relatively".   If walks were completely constant over time, then we wouldn’t need to adjust the context for changes over time, but. . .they’re not. 

            Let us start here with the 1949 Yankees, a team which could walk a dozen men before ordering breakfast.  The ’49 Yankees are a famous and fascinating team, for many reasons.  After the 1948 season the Yankee Dynasty seemed to be teetering on the brink of collapse.   Winning pennants regularly through 1943, they finished third in 1944, as the St. Louis Browns won the pennant, and then finished fourth in 1945, behind the Detroit Tigers, the Washington Senators and the St. Louis Browns.  In 1946 they finished third, behind the Red Sox and the Tigers, and in that season Joe McCarthy resigned as manager, probably because his drinking was out of control. 

            In 1947 the Yankees did win the pennant and the World Series, but in 1948 they slipped back to third place.  One pennant in five seasons was not what the Pinstriped Pretty Boys had been accustomed to, and after the 1947 season Bucky Harris was given his, pun intended, Walking Papers. 

            Casey Stengel was not a popular choice to replace him.  Stengel, who had managed two times previously without much success, was regarded more as a clown than as a savant, and his selection as the Yankees new manager was greeted with derision by many—just as the hiring of Joe Torre was in the late 1990s.   

            The Yankees began the 1949 season with a fantastic rash of injuries.  Joe DiMaggio was unable to play the first half of the season.  Charlie Keller was done.  Relief ace Joe Page walked three men in one inning in his season’s debut.  They had injury after injury after injury—and still they won. 

            The Yankees won, in part, because some of the things Stengel did worked better with a good organization than they had with a poor one.  Hank Bauer in 1948 had hit .305 with 23 homers, 100 RBI for Kansas City, a Yankee farm team.  Gene Woodling, who had failed major league trials in 1943, 1946 and 1947, had hit .385 with 22 homers, 107 RBI in the Pacific Coast League.  Stengel added Woodling and Bauer to the Yankee roster, not to replace their other outfielders, but to supplement them. 

            Platooning—using right-handed hitters against left-handed pitchers and vice versa—had been a hugely popular strategy from 1914 until the mid-1920s.  It died off, mostly went away, because players didn’t like it.  Stengel brought it back, using Bauer against left-handed hitters and Woodling against right-handers, in combination with the other outfielders that he already had.  This enabled the Yankees to withstand the injuries and keep winning.

            Another thing that Stengel did was (1) to pitch around outstanding hitters aggressively, and (2) to rely on the double play to an almost unprecedented extent. 

            1950s baseball—I know this is 1949, but you get my point—1950s baseball was based around one or two key power hitters per team.  The little guys at the top of the order were supposed to get on base, and the power hitters were supposed to clean them up.  Almost every team had a couple of big guys who could hit 25 or 40 home runs—but most of the lineup was guys who would hit 6 to 8 homers a year, or less.  In 1949 the Red Sox had Ted Williams (43 homers) and Vern Stephens (39), and also Bobby Doerr (18), but no one else on the team was in double figures in homers.   The White Sox did not have ANYONE who hit more than 7 home runs.   The Indians had three guys with 18 to 24 homers, but no one else with more than 8.   The Tigers had only one player with more than 13 homers, Vic Wertz who had 20 (and drove in 133 runs).   The Philadelphia A’s had one guy with 24 homers and one with 23, but no one else with more than 10.  Washington had two guys with more than 11 homers; they had 18 and 14.   Even the Yankees had only two players with more than 14 homers, and they had 20 and 24.

            It wasn’t like it is now, when even the leadoff hitter on the team hits 15 or 20 homers, and the combination of catchers will total up to 25.  There were one or two power hitters on a team; that’s all.  Stengel’s approach was to just pitch around them, walk them, and use the double play to avoid big innings.

            Not in 1949, but later on, Stengel’s teams had two huge statistical advantages over their opponents:  Home Runs, and Double Plays.   In 1950 the Yankees hit 159 homers and grounded into 122 double plays, making them +37 homers-to double plays.  Their opponents were 118 to 143, or -25.  In 1952 the Yankees were 129 to 94 in HR-GDP; their opponents were 94 to 159.  The Yankees were +35 in home runs to GDP; their opponents were -65.   In 1953 the Yankees were 139-106 (+33); their opponents were 94-150 (-56).   In 1954 the Yankees were 133-92 (+41); their opponents were 86-158 (-72).   In 1955 the Yankees were 175-101 (+74); their opponents were 108-145 (-37).   It got bigger over the years.  In 1956 the Yankees were 190-104 (+86); their opponents were 114-167 (-53). 

            This is not a typical championship team pattern.  In many areas, the 1950s Yankees were just an ordinary team.  They really had only one outstanding starting pitcher, while Cleveland usually had three or four.  But the Yankees huge advantages in Home Runs vs. Double Plays enabled them to win almost every year.

            Frankie Frisch was known for saying "Oh, those bases on balls."  His theory, as a manager, was that his pitchers shouldn’t walk anybody.  Casey was exactly the opposite.  He didn’t care AT ALL about the walks.  Walk all the people you want:  Just pitch around the two guys in the lineup who can beat you, avoid giving up home runs, and get a ground ball to get out of the inning.  If you give up 3 or 4 runs, that’s OK; we’ll score enough to win the game.  Just don’t give in, don’t give up solid contact, keep nibbling at the corners until you get a ground ball to get out of the inning. 

            The 1949-1950 Yankees issued fantastic numbers of walks, for a championship team.   In 1949 his #1 starter, Vic Raschi, walked 138 men.  His #2 starter, Allie Reynolds, walked 123 in 214 innings, and his #4 starter, Tommy Byrne, walked 179 in 196 innings—and still managed to finish 15-7.  His relief ace, Joe Page, and his #5 starter, Fred Sanford, had appalling walk rates.   The only guy on his team who didn’t walk people was Ed Lopat.   Stengel’s last team with the Yankees, 1960, was beaten in the "Walks" category, 609 to 538, and beaten in strikeouts, 819 to 714, but had a HR/GDP ratio of 193-114 (+79), while their opponents were 123-135 (-12). 

            Other than Stengel’s Yankees, teams which issue a lot of walks relative to their era generally wind up with losing records; I’ll document that in a second.  These are the 10 worst-walking teams of all time:

            1915 Philadelphia Athletics                     55

            For the sake of clarity, the "55" there means that the 1915 Philadelphia Athletics were 4.5 standard deviations below the norm in terms of walks per batters faced.   They faced 5,777 opposing hitters, and walked 827 of them.  That’s almost exactly one in seven, or 14.315%.   The norm for the era was .0797, or one walk for every 12 or 13 hitters, and the standard deviation of walks on a team basis was .01421.   The 1915 Athletics—hard not to call them the "A’s", but they were called the Athletics at the time—were four and a half standard deviations worse than the norm, thus "scored" at 55.   It’s the same method I used yesterday, in evaluating team strikeouts. These are the 10 worst-walking teams of all time:

            1915 Philadelphia Athletics                     55

            1987 Texas Rangers                             ​  59

            1986 Texas Rangers                               62

            1949 New York Yankees                          66

            1971 Cleveland Indians                           67

            1916 Philadelphia Athletics                      67

            1951 St. Louis Browns                            71

            1996 Detroit Tigers                               &nb​sp; 71

            1911 St. Louis Cardinals                          72

            1994 Oakland A’s                                     74

            The 1915-1916 Philadelphia Athletics were the team that Connie Mack was left with after he sold off his stars so that they would not jump to the Federal League.  They finished 43-109 and 36-117, 1915 and 16.  The 1971 Cleveland Indians lost 102 games; the 1951 St. Louis Browns lost 102.  The 1996 Tigers lost 109.  Most teams that walk lots of hitters wind up losing lots of games. 

            But three of these teams managed to have winning records despite issuing large numbers of walks.  Those three were the 1949 Yankees, the 1986 Texas Rangers, and the 1911 Cardinals.  The 1986 Rangers had a knuckleballer as their #1 starter, Charlie Hough; he walked 89 men.  Their 2-3 starters were Edwin Correa, a 20-year-old who walked 126 men, and Bobby Witt, a 22-year-old who had the best fastball in baseball at that time, but who walked 143 men in 158 innings.   One of their relievers, Mitch Williams, walked 79 in 98 innings.   That team, which I think of as Craig Wright’s team, managed to win 87 games anyway.   The 1911 Cardinals, managed by Roger Bresnahan, finished 75-74 despite walking the planet. 

            But high-walk teams generally, most of the time, will struggle.  Of the 100 worst-walking teams of all time, 84 finished with losing records.  27 of the 100 teams lost 100 games.  The three best won-lost records by those 100 teams were, in order:  the 1950 Yankees (98-56), the 1949 Yankees (97-57), and the 1955 Yankees (96-58). 

            Turning our attention now to the teams that DIDN’T walk people, we’ll start with the 2005-2006 Minnesota Twins, managed by Ron Gardenhire with Rick Anderson as the pitching coach.   (Casey’s pitching coach was Jim Turner, a ground ball pitcher.)   From 2000 to 2004, the position of the #1 pitcher in baseball was traded around among several outstanding pitchers, usually Pedro Martinez or Randy Johnson, but sometimes Clemens, Maddux or Schilling.  About 2005, the position was taken over by Johan Santana.   Santana didn’t walk people, but then Santana did everything right; he was the best pitcher in baseball at that time. 

            Backing Santana in the Twins rotation were two pitchers who were not outstanding, but who just never walked anybody.  Carlos Silva was the most extreme pitcher I have ever seen in terms of challenging every hitter on every pitch; maybe not, but he was high on the list.  He really didn’t have anything except the fastball and a changeup, and the fastball was junk.  But he would just throw the "fastball" again, and again, and again, and then a changeup or two.  The Red Sox would just crush the ball 20 times a game, but he’d stay out there and keep working, and sometimes he’d win a game 7-6 or 5-3 or something.  I remember one game, the Red Sox must have hit 10 balls off the wall, but we kept running into outs on the bases and he got a couple of double play balls, and eventually he beat us. 

            Brad Radke wasn’t quite Carlos Silva; he genuinely had outstanding control.  He’d mix up his pitches, and he’d hit spots.  He didn’t walk anybody, either, but at least he could actually pitch, so it wasn’t quite as frustrating when he beat you.   The 2005 Twins were 2.9 Standard Deviations better than the league at not walking people:

            2005 Minnesota Twins                 129

            2014 Washington Nationals          128

            2006 Minnesota Twins                 128

            1993 St. Louis Cardinals              128

            2003   New York Yankees             126

            1933 Cincinnati Reds                   126

            1920 Pittsburgh Pirates                125

            2015 Washington Nationals           125

            1932 Cincinnati Reds                    125

            1904 Boston Red Sox                   125

            All of those teams had winning records except the 1932-1933 Cincinnati Reds; actually the top 23 teams on this list all had winning records, except for the 1932-1933 Cincinnati Reds.  The Reds played in a park where you almost could not hit a home run, so their pitchers for many years were taught to just lay it in there and let them hit it.  But oddly enough, for several years in that time period, the Reds did not have a legitimate center fielder.  They kept trading for old guys from other teams, guys who used to be right fielders, and they would put them in center.  Why they thought that would work, I don’t know. 

            There are 2,550 teams in this study, which can be divided into 5 groups of 510 teams each.   In that grouping, the 510 teams with BEST walk rates relative to the era have an average won-lost record of 84-73 and an average winning percentage of .535.  

            I should have presented that chart yesterday, with the strikeout study, so let me do that now:

            A comparison of the charts shows that, over time, strikeouts have had slightly more impact on the won-lost column than have walks. 

            Also, something I wrote yesterday was apparently incorrect, so let me correct the record on that.  What I wrote yesterday was this:

The best strikeout teams ever are 3+ standard deviations above the norm, but no team is 3 standard deviations BELOW the norm.  Talent in major league baseball is not normally distributed; it is the right-end tail of the bell-shaped curve.  The effects of this on the team strikeout distribution curve are slight, but certainly detectable. 

            But today, we see that the opposite is true:  no team is three standard deviations BETTER than the league norm, but six teams have been three standard deviations WORSE than the league norm, and two of them have been four standard deviations worse.   It could be, then, that the relevant factor is not the bell-shaped curve, the normal distribution curve, but rather that the "achievement" is limited to zero in a game on the low-end level, but unbounded on the upper-end level.   Teams walk an average of three men a game, let’s say; you can’t walk less than zero in a game, but you can walk more than six.   This may explain why the data is asymmetrical; it is unbounded on one side.   Or maybe it is just something that happened, and doesn’t mean anything; who knows?

            In closing, let me put on record in average walks and the standard deviations in each decade.  From 1900 to 1909 pitchers walked .06876 of all batters faced, and the standard deviation of this (on the team level) was .01097.  Figured on the level of individual pitchers, the mean would be the same, but the standard deviation among individual pitchers would be higher than it would for teams:

            We can see, then, that walks increased gradually from 1900 to 1959, actually 1962, contracted sharply with the redefined strike zone in 1963, and have been relatively stable since 1969, although down somewhat in the last decade, no doubt due to the high strike being called again as it was not called for many years.  Over time, the differences between teams have gotten steadily smaller.