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Four Sluggers

March 24, 2014
Sluggers
 

                To a quite remarkable extent, it is the same story in all four cases—and yet in certain respects it is not all that common a story, and each of these players is remarkable in his own way, and in the same ways.    There were four first basemen.  .  .we will call them all first basemen. . .all born in a three-year window in the 1920s.    Ted Kluszewski was the first-born of the four and I believe is the most famous of the four although he was not quite the first to play in the major leagues,  and so I will start with him.  He was born September 24, 1924, eight miles west of Comiskey Park.  He was a large, muscular man; all four of these were large, muscular men, but Kluszewski the most notably so.   He is listed at 6-2, 225 pounds, the champion of the listed playing weights, and while listed playing weights are often at odds with observation, not so in this case.

                People are bigger now, but Kluszewski was a big man by the standards of today, and a mountain of a man in the cliché of the 1950s.  He was recruited by the University of Indiana to play football.    In 1945 the Hoosiers went 9-0 on the gridiron with one tie, won the Big Ten, and were ranked fourth in the country in the final AP Poll.   Kluszewski was an End and Kicker.     Some of you will be wondering here whether he was a Tight End or a Split End or a Defensive End, to which the answer is "Yes"; in that era football players played both offense and defense, in college and in the pros, and the distinction between Tight Ends and Wide Outs had not yet evolved.   (Two platoon football was actually invented in the Big 10 and in 1945, but that’s getting a little bit off the topic.)

                It is written, at least, that Kluszewski would probably have gone on to the NFL, were it not for the wartime travel restrictions that prohibited baseball teams from conducting their normal spring training in Florida.  The Cincinnati Reds held camp at the University of Indiana.   Kluszewski, although basically a football player, also played center field on the Hoosier baseball team, and hit .443.   The Reds invited him to work out with them, and during the workout he launched some 400-foot shots.   The Reds offered him a $15,000 contract almost on the spot. 

                Kluszewski hit .352 in the Sally League in 1946, driving in 87 runs in 90 games, and opened the 1947 season in the major leagues.    He made his major league debut on April 18, 1947, three days after Jackie Robinson’s debut with the Dodgers.    He pinch hit in the top of the 7th inning, the Reds trailing 12-5, and grounded out to third base.   He pinch hit three more times, and then was sent back to the minor leagues.

                At this moment we will switch to Vic Wertz, who remained in the majors after Kluszewski departed.    Vic Wertz had made his major league debut on April 15, 1947, which was the same day that Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier.   Wertz was the smallest of our four sluggers, and he had a round, friendly face; in a way he looked more like Paul Giamatti than a leading man.

                Vic Wertz was born five months after Kluszewski (February, 1925), in York, Pennsylvania, which is an hour’s drive due north of Baltimore.   I believe he is the only one of our four who does not have a SABR biography, although his life story might seem to be the most interesting of the four.   He was signed by the Detroit Tigers at the age of 17, 1942, meaning that he entered pro baseball four full seasons ahead of our other guys.

                Let’s hang up on that for a minute.   The fact that he entered baseball far earlier than our other players, otherwise comparable, suggests the possibility:

                a)  That he may have dropped out of high school,

                b)  That his listed age could be a baseball age, or

                c)  That he may have entered pro ball much earlier than the other players because he was the only one of the four who had no second sport, the only one who was a pure baseball player from an early age, as opposed to an athlete who chose baseball.

                In any case, he played 63 games in the Piedmont League in 1942, hitting .239 without a homer, but in the spring of 1943 he was impressive enough in camp to be assigned to Buffalo, the Tigers’ top minor league franchise.    He pinch hit for Buffalo early in the season, went 4-for-18 in 18 games, and was inducted into the United States Army on June 30, 1943.

                He served in the Pacific during World War II; he was the only one of our four who was actually in the Big War.  He played a lot of baseball during the War, amidst other duties; at one time he was on a service team with Enos Slaughter and Joe Gordon.    He mustered out in December, 1945, and returned to Buffalo in 1946, older, stronger, and more ready to play.   He hit .301 at Buffalo with 19 homers, 91 RBI.   That was the International League, Jackie Robinson’s League in 1946.    Wertz at 21—if he really was 21--was one of the youngest regular players in the league, and one of the best. 

                At 22 he was in the majors; in fact, all four of our sluggers began their major league careers at age 22, a fact which will be useful to us later, when we compare them age to age.    He batted cleanup in his first major league game, hit a single and a double, stole a base, drove in a run and scored a run; in his first major league plate appearance he triggered a five-run rally that led to a 7-0 victory.   He fell into a slump, and was a bench player until early July.  He got hot, then, hit .367 in July, .302 in August and .315 in September.   By the end of the season he was the Tigers’ #3 hitter.  

                It was a successful rookie year, for Wertz.  Kluszewski hit .377 in the Southern League and returned to the Reds at season’s end, his minor league education completed.     Meanwhile, Roy Sievers was crushing the ball for Hannibal.   Sievers was born in late 1926, making him two years younger than Kluszewski and Wertz.    Sievers grew up just three blocks away from Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis.   St. Louis was baseball mad at that time.   The Cardinals were the best team in baseball in the 1940s; Garagiola and Yogi grew up not far away, and there were three other major league players on Sievers’ high school team, none of them notable, but Earl Weaver, four years younger than Sievers, was coming along behind him.    The Cardinals and Browns both played in his neighborhood, a bleacher seat cost a quarter, and Sievers almost lived at the ballpark.   Complimented often on his "perfect" swing, Sievers would say that he developed his swing watching Joe Medwick, his favorite player with the Cardinals, and then trying to copy Medwick’s actions.

                Sievers in High School was nicknamed "Squirrel", which actually was what got me started on this article; I started wondering why a big, slow power hitter would be nicknamed "Squirrel".    It had to do with basketball; he was a star basketball player in High School, recruited to play for the University of Illinois.    Basketball players in that era were called "Cagers".   Squirrel Cage?   It’s a bit of a reach, but he was always around the cage, and somebody started calling him "Squirrel’ because he was always around the cage.   He knew he was going to choose baseball over basketball, and the Cardinals’ area scout (Wally Shannon) was at every one of his games, urging him to sign with the Cardinals.   The Cardinals, however, had a mammoth farm system, with dozens of teams, and Sievers was cagey about the prospect of battling his way through an army of minor leaguers so he could try to break into a Cardinal outfield held by Stan Musial and Enos Slaughter.   Jacques Fournier, head of the St. Louis Browns’ farm system, wound up signing Sievers without ever having seen him play, for a signing bonus of a pair of spikes.

                Sievers signed the Browns in 1945, got drafted by the U. S. Army and spent a year in uniform after the war was over.   In 1947, then, Vic Wertz had a decent rookie season with the Tigers, Kluszewski started the season in the majors but spent 90% of the season hitting .377 in the Southern League, and Roy Sievers hit .319 with 34 homers and some very large number of RBI with Hannibal in the Central Association (different sources give different RBI counts for Sievers, ranging from 128 to 144.)    At the end of the year a Browns’ Vice President said that Sievers was "probably the greatest player ever to come out of the St. Louis area."

                Our fourth slugger, Joe Adcock, spent that season at LSU, where he played basketball. Really well.   Adcock never played organized baseball growing up; his only experience with the game in his youth was just backyard games.     He was a star basketball player in High School, playing for Coushatta High School in Coushatta, Louisiana.  Coushatta, near Shreveport, was a town of a few hundred people.  In 1944 Coushatta High had only four boys in the senior class, but all four were basketball players. Adcock led Coushatta to the championship game of the state basketball tournament, Class B.   They lost the championship game, badly, but the LSU basketball coach, Jesse Fatherre, was at the game and was desperate for talent due to the war-time shortage of basketball players.    Fatherre offered basketball scholarships to Adcock and two of his teammates.

                Adcock went to LSU, but not long after he got there Fatherre was drafted as well.   Red Swanson, the LSU football coach, was left coaching the basketball and baseball teams as well as football.    Adcock, 6-foot-4 and muscular, led the SEC in scoring, at 18.6 points per game.  When the baseball season came around Swanson encouraged Adcock to come out and play baseball.  Adcock told Swanson he didn’t know how to play baseball.   Swanson told him to just come out and stand around.   Adcock came out and started taking batting practice.   In a matter of weeks he was driving baseballs all over—and out of—the park.   After a year on the baseball team he had offers from multiple major league teams, most notably the Yankees and the Cardinals.

Like Sievers, Adcock was cagey enough to know that he would move up faster in an organization with less talent.    The Cincinnati Reds offered him a contract with a nice bonus, the bonus being necessary because he could have played in the NBA.    Adcock, still only 19 years old, reported to Columbus in the Sally League, where he hit .264 with 7 homers.   With one exception he was the youngest player on the team, and, while .264 with 7 homers might not sound impressive, he was second on the team in Home Runs.    Not especially impressed, the Reds sent him back to Columbus in 1948, where he hit .279 but with only 6 homers in 434 at bats.   It was a tough place to hit, though; he was the second-best hitter on his team, behind Lloyd Merriman, who had been a football star at Stanford. Merriman would move up to the majors the next year.   Just noticing something here. . .Kluszewski signed out of Indiana (football), Adcock out of LSU (basketball), Merriman out of Stanford (football).   We may see a pattern in the players the Cincinnati Reds were signing.  

                Vic Wertz didn’t do much for the Tigers in 1948, his second season in the majors; Kluszewski hit .274 with 12 homers as a rookie for the Reds.   Actually, 1948 was not a big season for any of the four; Wertz’ average dropped 40 points, Adcock was unimpressive his second season in the Sally League, while Sievers played just moderately well in the Three-I League (Illinois-Indiana-Iowa).    Sievers hit .309 with 19 homers for Springfield, moved up to the Eastern League in August but hit just .179 in 16 games at Elmira.    Kluszewski, the rookie with Cincinnati, probably had the best year of the three; he hit .274 with 12 homers and was not mentioned in the Rookie of the Year voting.

                But all four did better in 1949.     Starting at the bottom:   Adcock played for Tulsa, Texas League, and hit .298 with 19 homers.    Wertz in his last minor league season, Buffalo in 1946, hit .301 with 19 homers.    Sievers in his last minor league season, 1948, hit .309 with 19 homers for Springfield.   He also met his wife there; they are still married today.

                In 1949 Kluszewski, regular first baseman for the Reds, hit .309, although without the power that he would later develop.    Roy Sievers was the American League rookie of the year, hitting for almost the same average as Kluszewski (.306) but with twice as many home runs (16).   And Vic Wertz hit for almost the same average (.304), but drove in 133 runs.

                Ted Williams and Vern Stephens, teammates in 1949, drove in 159 runs each.  Vic Wertz drove in more runs than any other major league player, other than the two Red Sox.    Eighty walks gave him an on base percentage of .385.    Ted Kluszewski had a good year in 1949; he was a regular all year, hit .309 and drove in 68 runs.   Vic Wertz drove in 67 runs in May and June—30 in May, 37 in June.  

                A player with 283 total bases and 20 homers could be expected to drive in 91 runs; Wertz exceeded expectations by a whopping 42 RBI.     It appears, to the extent that we can understand what happened, that Wertz must have batted an extremely large number of times with runners in scoring position.    The records are incomplete, but in the data such as it exists Wertz did not have a notably high batting average with runners in scoring position, and actually homered much more often with the bases empty than with men on base.    The American League, however, was going through a mini-epoch of extremely high walk totals.   Sixteen American League pitchers walked 100 or more batters in 1949, two pitchers per team.    Tommy Byrne walked 179 batters in 196 innings, and finished 15-7.    Ellis Kinder walked 99 batters in 252 innings, finished 23-6 and had the 9th-best control record among American League pitchers.   

                The Tigers, Wertz’ team, had four regulars with .400 on base percentages—George Kell, .424, Johnny Groth, .407, Hoot Evers, .403, and Aaron Robinson, .402.    This contributed heavily to Wertz’ remarkable RBI total.   Still, Wertz had a tremendous season—and Roy Sievers had a tremendous season, becoming the first American League player to win the Rookie of the Year Award.    Sievers was playing left and center field for the Browns.    This chart compares the players through the 1949 season:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Batting

Fielding

Total

Player

YEAR

G

AB

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

Wertz

1947

102

333

6

44

.288

.376

.432

.809

9

5

2

3

11

8

.587

Wertz

1948

119

391

7

67

.248

.335

.396

.731

9

8

2

3

11

12

.472

Wertz

1949

155

608

20

133

.304

.385

.465

.851

15

10

6

2

21

12

.638

                                 
                                 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Batting

Fielding

Total

Player

YEAR

G

AB

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

Klu

1947

9

10

0

2

.100

.182

.100

.282

0

1

0

0

0

1

.000

Klu

1948

113

379

12

57

.274

.307

.451

.758

8

8

2

4

10

12

.470

Klu

1949

136

531

8

68

.309

.333

.411

.743

11

9

3

4

14

13

.521

                                 
                                 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Batting

Fielding

Total

Player

YEAR

G

AB

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

Sievers

1949

140

471

16

91

.306

.398

.471

.869

13

7

1

7

14

13

.507

 

                Sievers, despite the impressive batting numbers, scores only at 14-13, the same won-lost equivalent as Kluszewski.      Sportsman’s Park, which the Browns shared with the Cardinals, was a hitters’ park.   The big thing, though, is defense; Sievers is credited (or charged) with a defensive won-lost contribution of 1 and 7, which drags down his season.   When I saw those numbers I assumed I had a data glitch, because a team’s regular center fielder can’t be scored with a defensive contribution of 1-7.        

                Well. ..actually he can; it’s unusual, but it’s not a data glitch.  The Browns finished 53-101.  The team’s pitchers actually walked a below-average number of opposing hitters, 685 against a league average of 703.   Their home runs allowed, although the league’s high, are not particularly awful given the park they played in; they gave up 112 homers against a league average of 91.   What was horrific was the batting average against the team when the ball was in play.   They gave up 1,583 hits, 145 more than any other American League team; it was the most hits given up by a major league team since the Browns themselves had given up 1,592 hits in 1940.    It’s essentially  one more hit per game than the next-worst American League team.

                As the Win Shares/Loss Shares system sees it, there is very little defensive credit to be given out to ANY member of the 1949 Browns, regardless of what position he played.   Also, when the batting average on balls in play against a team is high, the Win Shares system holds the outfielders on the team more responsible for that than anyone else, because it is my opinion that that is what characterizes teams that allow very high batting averages on balls in play—slow outfielders.    Sievers’ individual defensive statistics are not good; they’re not terrible, but they’re not good.    The conclusion of the system is, nobody on this team played any defense, and that includes the starting center fielder, Sievers.  

                And when you sanity check it, I think that holds up.   Sievers was faster in 1949 than the Roy Sievers I remember from my childhood, but the reality is that Sievers had no business playing center field for a major league team.    In a radio interview taped within the last couple of years, Sievers remembered Paul Lehner as the starting center fielder on that team, himself as the left fielder.   In fact, Sievers played twice as many games in center as Lehner did.    The Browns starting outfielders were Stan Spence, a 34-year-old wartime star, Dick Kokos and Sievers—three left fielders.    Sievers played center field only because the Browns were a terrible team, and while it may be unfair to evaluate him based on the fact that he was asked to do something he lacked the ability to do, the Win Shares/Loss Shares are intended to be a factual description.  It is not unusual for the Rookie of the Year to be really just a .500 player, by the way; that actually is very often true.   

                Joe Adcock joined The Show in 1950.  Adcock played 339 minor league games, Kluszewski 205, Wertz 220, Sievers 276—but the 339 minor league games for Adcock is really not a lot.   It is still one season short of the norm, the norm being the same then as it is now.    He didn’t hit that well his first two minor league seasons, and there was no job waiting for him in the majors; he had signed with the Reds because he thought the Reds, 67-87 in 1946, would offer an open pathway to the majors, but now he found himself trapped behind Kluszewski, and forced to play the outfield because Kluszewski owned first base.    Adcock hit .293 as a rookie, but his defense in the outfield was problematic and his power had not yet come around.    (He had played exclusively first base in the minor leagues.)

                Meanwhile, Sievers opened the 1950 season in the grip of a monstrous slump.    After going 1-for-4 on opening day Sievers was 0-for-5 the second day, dropping his average to .111.   He didn’t reach .200 until May 28, and he was playing every day.   After finally reaching .200 he couldn’t stay there, bouncing over and under .200, staying within a few points of .200 for another five weeks.     On July 2 he was still at .196.   His manager, Zach Taylor, just kept telling reporters that Sievers was too good to fail.  

                I can’t prove that this is true, but I believe that the term "Sophomore Jinx", as a baseball term, originated in part with Roy Sievers.   The term "rookie" was rarely used in sportswriting until the late 1930s, and didn’t become a standard part of the baseball lexicon until the 1940s.    "Rookie" is probably a variation of "recruit", an army expression that left the military and gravitated over to sports.   I don’t think the term "Sophomore Jinx" would have arisen in baseball until the concept of a "Rookie" was well established.   Rookies before 1940 were called "Bush Leaguers", and the term "bush leaguer" didn’t exactly mean the same as "rookie"; "bush leaguer" meant that the player was unproven, that he had come from the minors and had yet to prove that he belonged in the majors, whereas "rookie" meant that a player was new to the majors but was in a certain sense legitimate, if not quite proven.   "Bush Leaguer" was a backward-looking term, that defined the new player by where he had been; "Rookie" was a forward-looking phrase that severed the past and connected the player to his future.  "Rookie" was less harsh than "Bush Leaguer", less judgmental, and I think it may have been preferred because it was less judgmental.

                In any case, I don’t think the concept of a "Sophomore Jinx" would have made any sense in baseball until the term "rookie" had replaced the term "bush leaguer".   Roy Sievers, the first American League Rookie of the Year, fell into such a terrible slump the next year that it necessitated a brief return to the minors, and then the following year Walt Dropo, after driving in 144 runs as a rookie in 1950, the second American League Rookie of the Year, did the same thing, and he also wound up briefly back in the minors.    I believe that it was from this experience, from Dropo and Sievers, that the concept of the Sophomore Jinx arose.   I know that the term Sophomore Jinx was in common usage by the early 1960s, when I became a baseball fan.    More research about this issue might be instructive.

                In any case, Sievers finally started to hit, in July, had a good month and was having a decent August until the Browns, in a move that defines how organizations struggle, decided to move Sievers to third base.   It appears that the "decision" to make this move may have been made in the middle of a game; I do not believe there was any planning or preparation involved.   The Browns had been unable to find a third baseman.   A rookie named Bill Somers had been playing third for them and posted a nice .370 on base percentage, but he wasn’t very good defensively and then he got hurt.   They played Owen Friend at third base for a week, but Friend was worse defensively than Somers, and the Browns were losing every game; by August 25 they had lost ten out of eleven.   On August 26 they were trailing the Yankees 2-0 going into the ninth.    In the top of the 9th the Browns used four pinch hitters, and rallied to tie the score 2-2.   That was good, and surprising, but the Browns had pinch hit for Friend, and there was nobody left to play third base.   The manager, Zach Taylor, told Sievers to go play third base, or else Sievers volunteered; in any case Sievers, with no experience at third base, took the position.

                Fair enough; you have to do that sometimes.   We’ve had to do similar things with the Red Sox in my era; sometimes it just happens.   The Browns lost the game in the bottom of the ninth, and lost the next game, 8-0 to Washington.   Sievers sat out that game.  In the second game of the double header the Browns once again used a string of pinch hitters, and this time rallied to take the lead, 8-6 in the 7th inning.   Sievers again went in to play third base.

                The Browns immediately gave back the three runs they had scored in the 7th . so Washington led 9-8 after seven innings—but Roy Sievers then drove in the tying run with a 9th-inning single and scored the winning run after reaching on an error in the 10th.   That ended a seven-game losing streak.

On August 28 Sievers went back to the bench while the Browns lost 9-3, Friend making his 27th error of the season, one of four Browns’ errors leading to three un-earned.  On August 30, after an off day, Sievers started at third base.   The Browns won the game, 2-1; Sievers walked and scored one of the two runs and handled three plays cleanly at third base.    Roy Sievers was now the Browns’ third baseman.   If you are wondering how any organization could be stupid enough to make Roy Sievers their third baseman after the rookie season he had had. ..that’s how it happened.    Exigent circumstances led to a contingency plan; a tiny bit of success converted the contingency plan into the new reality.    Exactly the same way that an 18-year-old boy finds himself married to a girl he just met, with whom he has not yet had his first fight.  

                So Roy Sievers, who had opened the 1950 season as the Browns’ center fielder, wound up the season as their third baseman.    He had a poor season but salvaged something of it, finishing at .238 with 10 homers, 57 RBI; he hit .284, .240 and .298 over the last three months after hitting no better than .203 in any of the first three.

                While Adcock had a decent rookie season and Sievers struggled, both Wertz and Kluszewski had terrific seasons.   Wertz’ RBI dropped from 133 to 123, but 123 is still a very nice RBI count, and everything else was up:   home runs up from 20 to 27, doubles up from 26 to 37, walks up from 80 to 91, batting average up from .304 to .308, on base percentage up from .385 to .408.   Wertz was tenth in the AL MVP voting both seasons.

                Meanwhile, Ted Kluszewski stepped up to a comparable level, hitting .308 with 25 homers, 111 RBI, also 37 doubles, the same as Wertz.    It’s comparable, but then again it isn’t.   Kluszewski almost matched Wertz in batting average, home runs and RBI, but Wertz drew 91 walks, giving him an on base percentage over .400; Kluszewski drew 33 walks, giving him an on-base percentage of .348.

                Comparing Kluszewski, 1949, to Kluszewski, 1950, the National League scored more runs in 1950 than it had in 1949.    The park effect for Crosley Field (Cincinnati) was 93 in 1949, 112 in 1950.   The Park Effect for Tiger Stadium, on the other hand, went from 115 in 1949 to 87 in 1950. Kluszewski’s increase in his hitting numbers in 1950 is no more than proportional to context.   Wertz’ increase, on the other hand, is much more than proportional to context—so whereas a surface reading of the stats would say that Kluszewski improved substantially in 1950 and Wertz didn’t, a contextual reading reveals the opposite—that Wertz improved substantially but Kluszewski did not.   Or not; depending on how much you trust the park effects, I guess.

                Anyway. . .moving forward to 1951.   I’m fuzzy on the facts here and do not where to go to research it, but I believe there was some sort of de facto redefinition of the strike zone in 1951.    Here’s my understanding of what happened, and I’ll state in advance that I can’t prove very much of this, but. ..I think it started with Eddie Stanky.    Historically, baseball men considered "walks" to be something that the pitcher did, and paid little or no attention to the batter’s role in the walk.    During the war, due to the war-time talent shortage, Eddie Stanky made it to the major leagues—and redefined baseball in that era as much or more, at the time, in the era, as Jackie Robinson had.  Stanky was small, not strong, slow, and had a poor arm—and yet he was a tremendous player.  Leo Durocher, his manager in Brooklyn, was the first man to realize this, and stated it in a memorable phrase, "He can't hit, can't run, can't field. He's no nice guy ... all the little SOB can do is win." 

                One of the main things that made Stanky a tremendous player was that he walked.   A lot.  He walked 148 times in 1945, a National League record that would stand until Barry Bonds broke all of the records.    Stanky came to be a widely admired player, and other hitters started doing what he did—taking close pitches, fouling them off, actively trying to walk.   Throughout almost all of baseball history, the practice of actively trying to take a walk has been scorned by all but a few hitters. . .less than honorable, less than manly, less than kosher.   That’s the way it is now.   A few hitters will accept the role of doing whatever they have to do to get on base, but Real Men Don’t Try to Walk.

                People resist the idea that what is socially acceptable can spin on a dime, but it does.   In 1950 college cheerleaders wore long skirts that swept over their ankles; by 1960 cheerleaders in high school were wearing shorts that exposed their legs to within an inch of their passion fruit.    In the early 1960s Lenny Bruce was repeatedly arrested for using obscenities in his comedy; ten years later George Carlin was selling hundreds of thousands of albums talking playfully about the words you can’t say on television.   In the mid-1940s Roy Cullenbine had been basically driven out of the league because he liked to try to walk; by 1950 it had become the thing to do.   Every team had two or three batters who specialized in trying to work the pitcher for a walk.

                By 1950 the situation was getting out of hand—and at the same time, night baseball was allowing the games to get longer and longer.   Trying to make the pitcher throw pitches was not encouraged in 1930 because the games often started at 4:00, sometimes 5:00, and they had to be over with by dusk.    By 1950 that wasn’t a problem anymore, but by 1950 the games were dragging, and people were complaining about it.  I believe that the strike zone was either officially or unofficially revised after the 1950 season to cut down on the walks.    In any case, the American League in 1951 dropped from 5,418 walks to 4,889—a 10% decline—while the National League walk total also declined by a smaller percentage.   Something happened.

                I’m trying to explain what happened to our Four Sluggers in 1951; none of the four had batting numbers as good in 1951 as he had in 1950, if one fails to adjust for context.  Joe Adcock’s batting average dropped 50 points, from .293 to .243.     Vic Wertz dropped to .285 with only 94 RBI; in context he was still very good, but the numbers don’t look the same.   Ted Kluszewski, after two straight .300 seasons, dropped to .259 with just 13 homers.

                These three off seasons, however, shine like beacons when contrasted with the struggles of Roy Sievers.   Sievers opened spring training playing third base, but one needs to learn how to play third base, and he had skipped that stage.  Hitting .273 on May 15 but without power, Sievers fell into a slump that dropped his average to .225 by June 10, with only one home run.  The Browns, weary of his long slump, sent him to San Antonio with instructions for him to become a real third baseman.   He was doing OK out there, hitting .297, until, on August 1, he dived for a ball and separated his shoulder, ending his season.

                Bill Veeck bought the Browns in 1951.  Backing up a moment. . .Veeck had owned the Cleveland Indians in the late 1940s.     In 1950 Veeck’s marriage broke up, and the divorce forced him to sell the Indians, and left him with half as much money as he had had before.    The Browns, whose attendance was in the range of three to four thousand fans a game, were the only team left that Veeck could afford, so Veeck bought the Browns.

                Bill Veeck was beloved by many people who played for him, and perhaps this story will explain why.    Sievers’ shoulder injury was extremely serious, and it appeared likely that it would end his career.   Under the laws and rules that governed the situation in 1951, Veeck could simply have cut Sievers from the team; he had no legal obligation to him, as he would now.  (Now, when a player gets hurt, the team has an obligation to pay for any surgery that the player needs to try to get back to where he used to be.)   Not so in 1951—but Veeck did pay for Sievers to have an experimental surgery that doctors thought might possibly save his career.

                Not only that, but Veeck continued to carry Sievers on the roster, and continued to pay his salary through the 1952 season, even though Sievers was unable to play until September.  Even after the surgery, Sievers couldn’t throw, and now had no defensive position, so Bill Veeck told him to learn to play first base—and went to the park with Sievers, day after day, to hit ground balls to Sievers, trying to get him ready to play first base.    Veeck would stand at home plate on his wooden leg and try to line the ball past Sievers at first base, shouting encouragement all the time.

                In 1953 Sievers’ comeback began to gain traction.    Playing about half-time, he hit .270 with 8 homers—not much of a season, but the best season he had had since his rookie campaign of 1949.    But I am getting too far ahead with Roy Sievers, and I have left the other three sluggers behind, struggling through the 1951 season.

                Ted Kluszewski in 1952 had what might be considered a clean comeback from his very disappointing 1951 campaign.   He hit .320, a career high at that time, hit 16 homers, and increased his on base percentage to .383, 35 points better than his previous best.   Despite missing some time with injuries, 1952 was Klu’s best overall season to date.

                Joe Adcock had a little better year with the bat in 1952 than he had had in 1951, but his season couldn’t have been considered a success.  Ted Kluszewski’s presence on the team forced Adcock to play the outfield, or at least to attempt to, other than the few weeks when Kluszewski was injured.    Adcock was a large man with large, floppy feet, and he tended to trip and fall down quite a bit when he had to run.    He didn’t have much of an arm, and he didn’t have an outfielder’s speed.   I really don’t think that he was a horrible outfielder, but he was very awkward, and he didn’t look good.  The fans in Cincinnati taunted him mercilessly—as the St. Louis fans did to Sievers—and the newspapers were pretty hard on him.   When Rogers Hornsby took over the team in late July, Adcock decided that he didn’t much like Rogers Hornsby, which, of course, a lot of people didn’t.   By the end of the 1952 season Adcock was publicly demanding to be traded.

                (I believe that Hornsby had also criticized Adcock, in the newspapers, before Adcock demanded to be traded, although I have not seen the specific articles, and I could be wrong about that.  In the early 1950s managers would publicly criticize their players, and the players were supposed to shut up and take it.    It was really Walter Alston, hired in 1954, who changed this.   Alston felt it was inappropriate for a manager to criticize his players in public, and never did.   Within twenty years Alston’s ethic had become universally accepted.   The cycle of change initiated by Alston reached full maturity in 1977, when Frank Lucchesi criticized Lenny Randle in public, and Randle responded by punching Lucchesi in the face.  While Randle was certainly in the wrong, it was also very clearly understood, at that time, that Lucchesi had violated the unwritten rules of the game by publicly criticizing his player.)

                And Vic Wertz, like Adcock, had run afoul of his manager.  If we go back to 1948, all four players were the property of what might be considered floundering organizations.   The Reds, who owned Kluszewski and Adcock, had finished 64-89 in 1948, 62-92 in 1949.  Adcock had signed with the Reds specifically because he thought the team’s lack of talent represented the path of least resistance to the major leagues.    Sievers had signed with the Browns for the same reason.    By the early 1950s neither of these franchises had moved.   The Reds were still winning 60-some games a year, and the Browns were still lucky to get to 60.  Although the Tigers were certainly not a down-and-out organization, they had finished just 78-76 in 1948, and they appeared at that time to be slipping away from the front ranks of the American League teams.

                The Tigers hired Red Rolfe to be their manager in 1949.  Rolfe was a highly intelligent man, and for two years he appeared to be destined for greatness as a manager.  In 1949 the Tigers improved by 9 games, finishing 87-67.   In 1950 they pushed the Yankees to the wire.   It was an astonishing accomplishment, for Rolfe and for the organization.    With a lineup featuring Aaron Robinson, Johnny Lipon, Johnny Groth, Hoot Evers and Don Kolloway, going up against Joe DiMaggio, Yogi Berra, Mickey Mantle, Phil Rizzuto, Hank Bauer and Gene Woodling, the Tigers were tied for first place on September 21.

                And then, with astonishing speed, the organization descended into madness.   I have been a first-hand witness to something very much like this, but it has happened so dramatically only a few times in baseball history.   In 1951 the Tigers finished eight games under .500, 25 games out of first place.   In 1952 they lost 104 games.

                Part of the problem was caused by the fact that the 1949-1950 team had overachieved by a huge margin.   They won a lot of games, but they weren’t really that good.    Another part was caused by the fact that Rolfe, although a brilliant man, did not have the very, very high level of interpersonal skills that are required of a major league manager.   A third problem was that Mickey Cochrane, a popular ex-Tiger manager from the 1930s, was angling to get back into the manager’s job, and was sniping at Rolfe in public and behind the scenes, trying to undermine him.    And in 1951 Billy Evans, the Tigers’ very capable general manager, resigned.   Evans had been the first man to wear the title "General Manager", with Cleveland in the 1920s.   By 1951 he was in his late sixties and his health was failing, and he resigned.   Tigers owner Walter Briggs pressured Charlie Gehringer to take the GM job, mostly because he just loved Gehringer.    Gehringer was very quiet; in all honesty he was, among major league superstars, uniquely passive.   He had been called "The Mechanical Man" because he played the game without any apparent passion.    He was the exact opposite, in this way, of Rogers Hornsby; Hornsby was loud, passionate, and widely despised; Gehringer was quiet, unemotional, and widely admired.   Briggs thought that the universal respect for Gehringer would make him an effective General Manager, but Gehringer never wanted the job, and accepted it only because he was too nice to turn it down.    He didn’t know who the players were, didn’t have a clue how good any other player was, on the other teams, and didn’t have any executive experience or ability.   No one has ever been less qualified to be a major league General Manager.

                In 1950, even 1951, Vic Wertz might have been said to be on a Hall of Fame pathway.    The same age as Kluszewski, he was, in 1951, far, far ahead of Kluszewski in status and career accomplishments.   But as the team went from 95 wins to 104 losses in two years, Wertz was sucked into the vortex of their self-destructive madness.

                In late July, 1951, Rolfe began platooning Vic Wertz.  I wrote something about this situation, about a year ago, and one of you posted a response to the effect that you had done some research and couldn’t find any evidence that Rolfe platooned Wertz.   I remember reading that Wertz fell out with Rolfe because of platooning, so I decided to check it out.    Between July 26, 1951 and August 5, 1951, the Tigers played thirteen games.   Six of the games were against opposition right-handed starters; seven were against left-handers.   Wertz was in the lineup all six games against right-handers, and was not in the starting lineup in any game against a left-hander.   In the last of those games, the second game of an August 5 double-header, the opposing team started a right-hander but switched to a left-hander.   When the opposing team switched to a left-hander, Rolfe pinch hit for Wertz with a right-handed hitting outfielder, Steve Soucheck.   That’s definitive proof of a platoon situation, so I stopped the research at that point.

                Rolfe kept lots of charts, books, notes about the games; he was famous for doing this.   As soon as the game ended he would shut himself in his office and type out his notes about the game.   Rolfe would have realized, based on his personal stat-keeping, that Wertz was not strong against left-handed pitchers, a fact which any other manager might have known in a general way, but not in specific terms.    Rolfe thought he could improve the team by sitting Wertz down against lefties.  

                But Wertz, who was having his third straight outstanding season up to that point, went into a slump as soon as Rolfe began platooning him.     Wertz had hit .325 with 7 homers, 25 RBI in May (1951), .315 with 6 homers, 17 RBI in June, .289 with 3 homers, 17 RBI in July, and he was platooning by the end of July.  As of July 21 his slash line was .303/.402/.532.  In August he hit .222 with only 8 RBI.   

                It’s just my opinion, but it is my opinion that the decision to start platooning Wertz was dumb, dumb, dumb.    Rolfe was focused on percentage baseball.   But in pursuing a percentage—that is, a small, marginal advantage—Rolfe had lost sight of something much larger and much more important.   I come back to this situation, because it illustrates so clearly the difference between managing a Strat-o-Matic team, and managing a real team.  In Strat-o-Matic, you can sit down your cleanup hitter if he is weak against a lefty, and that player will not be hurt or angry or insulted.   He will not begin to question his own ability, and he will not begin to question the competence of the manager in conversations with teammates.   In real life he will.

                Vic Wertz was Rolfe’s starting right fielder and his cleanup hitter, and a perennial All-Star.   From 1949 to 1951 Wertz had driven in more runs than any left-handed hitter in the major leagues except Ted Williams—more than Musial, or Berra, or Duke Snider.  I don’t question that Wertz was a little vulnerable to left-handed pitching, but you just don’t sit down a player like that to get a little edge.   If you want to platoon, you platoon a couple of guys from AAA who are just happy to get the chance to show you what they can do. 

                Rolfe continued to platoon Wertz in 1952.   Wertz, probably pressing to prove that he could hit lefties, batted only 63 times against left-handers in 1952 (for the Tigers), and hit just .143 against them.   Wertz continued to pound right-handed pitchers, posting a .931 OPS against right-handers, and made the All-Star team in 1952 for the third time.    But the Tigers were in last place, seven games behind the 7th-place Browns by early August, and Wertz had demanded to be traded.   On August 14, 1952 Wertz was traded to St. Louis as part of an eight-man trade, the essence of which was Wertz for Ned Garver.    Garver was a star, too; he had won 20 games for the last-place Browns in 1951, also hitting .305.    Wertz took over in right field for the Browns; had Sievers been healthy the two of them would have been the Browns’ corner outfielders and their 3-4 hitters.

                OK, so that brings everybody up through 1952; Ted Kluszewski was the only one of the four who had a good season in 1952, although Wertz’ won-lost contribution still scores at 17-6:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BATTING

FIELDING

TOTAL

YEAR

City

Age

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Pct

1947

Wertz

22

6

44

.288

.376

.432

.809

9

5

2

3

11

8

.587

1947

Klu

22

0

2

.100

.182

.100

.282

0

1

0

0

0

1

.000

 

                           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BATTING

FIELDING

TOTAL

YEAR

City

Age

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Pct

1948

Wertz

23

7

67

.248

.335

.396

.731

9

8

2

3

11

12

.472

1948

Klu

23

12

57

.274

.307

.451

.758

8

8

2

4

10

12

.470

 

                           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BATTING

FIELDING

TOTAL

YEAR

City

Age

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Pct

1949

Wertz

24

20

133

.304

.385

.465

.851

15

10

6

2

21

12

.638

1949

Klu

24

8

68

.309

.333

.411

.743

11

9

3

4

14

13

.521

1949

Sievers

22

16

91

.306

.398

.471

.869

13

7

1

7

14

13

.507

 

                           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BATTING

FIELDING

TOTAL

YEAR

City

Age

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Pct

1950

Wertz

25

27

123

.308

.408

.533

.941

19

3

5

3

24

6

.801

1950

Klu

25

25

111

.307

.348

.515

.863

13

9

2

4

15

13

.540

1950

Adcock

22

8

55

.293

.336

.406

.742

7

9

2

3

9

12

.421

1950

Sievers

23

10

57

.238

.305

.395

.700

5

12

2

4

6

16

.282

 

                           

 

 

                           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BATTING

FIELDING

TOTAL

YEAR

City

Age

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Pct

1951

Wertz

26

27

94

.285

.383

.511

.894

15

6

4

3

19

9

.683

1951

Klu

26

13

77

.259

.301

.387

.688

10

15

5

4

15

19

.444

1951

Adcock

23

10

47

.243

.288

.380

.668

5

13

3

3

7

16

.309

1951

Sievers

24

1

11

.225

.303

.303

.606

1

3

0

1

1

4

.183

 

                           

 

 

                           

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BATTING

FIELDING

TOTAL

YEAR

City

Age

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Won

Lost

Pct

1952

Klu

27

16

86

.320

.383

.509

.892

17

3

2

5

20

7

.727

1952

Wertz

27

17

51

.246

.352

.498

.851

9

3

1

3

10

6

.653

1952

Wertz

27

6

19

.346

.444

.523

.968

6

-1

0

1

6

0

.928

1952

Adcock

24

13

52

.278

.321

.460

.781

9

7

2

3

11

10

.524

1952

Sievers

25

0

5

.200

.226

.300

.526

0

1

0

0

0

2

.095

 

                The two lines for Wertz are his performance with Detroit (10-6) and his performance with St. Louis (6-0).   When you add them together the wins round up to 17.

                The 1953 season was a turning point for all four players.    In 1953 Joe Adcock was traded to Milwaukee, became a first baseman, became a regular, and began to reach his potential.    In 1953 Roy Sievers, whose career had appeared for three years to be in a death spiral, began to get his feet under him.    In 1953 Ted Kluszewski became a real power hitter, hitting 40 home runs after averaging 15 a year up to that point.

                Adcock, having demanded a trade, was traded to Milwaukee as a part of a crazy, four-cornered trade in which each team gave up one player and acquired one player, with one extra player and some cash also changing hands.   Cincinnati gave up Adcock and acquired Rocky Bridges, a trade which seemed reasonable at the time although it didn’t work out.   Milwaukee gave up Earl Torgeson, a first baseman, and acquired Adcock and Jim Pendleton, a utility player.

                In Ernie Lombardi’s time Crosley Field had been very much a pitcher’s park, with listed dimensions of 339 to left field and 366 to right.   The left field line was shortened to 328 in 1938, and the right field line was shortened to 342 in 1942, but then moved back out to 366 in 1950.   There must have been some temporary bleachers or something; I checked several sources but nothing really explains it.

                In 1954, anyway, the right field distance went back to 342 feet.    Ted Kluszewski noticed.    Kluszewski’s "road" numbers actually went down in 1953.   In 1952 Kluszewski had hit .329 on the road, with 12 homers, 51 RBI; in 1953 he dropped off to .295, with 13 homers and 40 RBI.   In Crosley Field, however, Kluszewski in 1953 went from 4 home runs to 27.

                Kluszewski from 1953 to 1956 was basically Lou Gehrig.   Gehrig was a left-handed hitting, left-handed throwing first baseman, a former college football player who, in his day, was the strongest man in baseball.  From 1953 to 1956 that was Kluszewski, and Kluszewski in that four-year period had Gehrig-type numbers.

                While Adcock, Klu and Sievers’ careers took turns for the better in 1953, Vic Wertz began to flounder.    In and out of the lineup with injuries, he was not the same player in St. Louis that he had been in Detroit.  The Browns were the same team as always; with Wertz and often Sievers in the lineup but neither having a big year, they lost 100 games.

                The Browns in that era—like the Kansas City A’s of the next decade—were the American League’s party team.    With no realistic chance to win, the players to a certain extent embraced losing, and committed themselves to enjoying the ride.   When a Browns player showed potential, as many of them did, they were traded to better teams, often to the Yankees, where Casey Stengel, Ralph Houk or Hank Bauer would greet them with a stern lecture to the effect that it was fine to go out and have a couple of beers after the game, but when somebody yelled "Play Ball" you had damned well better be ready to play.

                In 1953 Bill Veeck had more or less gone to war with the other American League owners.   The details are off topic for us, but Veeck was attempting

                a)  to drive to the Cardinals out of St. Louis, and

                b)  to make the Browns one of the powerhouses of the American League.

                Basically, he was trying to make water run uphill.    He came closer than you might imagine to succeeding on the first point.   The Cardinals’ owner, Fred Saigh, was convicted of tax evasion, and it was clear Saigh would have to leave baseball, right at the moment when baseball teams, after a half-century of exceptional stability, were beginning to jump from city to city like grasshoppers.   The Cardinals, however, were purchased not by out-of-town interests but by Anheuser-Busch.    Realizing he had no chance to defeat the Cardinals with Anheuser-Busch money behind them, Veeck negotiated a deal under which he would move the Browns to Baltimore, sell off 60% of the stock, but remain the principal owner of the team with a 40% holding.

                The other American League owners, however, refused to approve the deal, essentially because Veeck had behaved badly in his dealings with the other American League owners.   The upshot of it was that the Browns did move to Baltimore and did become the Orioles, the deal that Veeck had negotiated—but without Veeck.

                Giving the team a fresh start, the Orioles cleaned house, trading away or releasing essentially every player on their roster in a period of a year.    Right at the start of spring training, 1954, Roy Sievers was traded to the Washington Senators in exchange for an outfielder of modest skills.    At first Sievers was devastated, in part because a player is often devastated the first time he is traded, unless (like Adcock and Wertz) he had asked to be traded, but also in part because the Washington Senators already had a very good first baseman, in Mickey Vernon.   Mickey Vernon was the Keith Hernandez of his time.  

                Arriving in Washington, however, Sievers was amazed to discover that his new manager, Bucky Harris, actually wanted him there and intended to keep him in the lineup.  Roy Sievers’ struggles had reached an end.  "You know I can’t throw?" Sievers asked Harris.

                "I know you can’t," Harris said, "but I need your bat in the lineup.   Just get rid of the ball as quickly as you can."

                Sievers would throw the ball sidearm to the shortstop, and the shortstop would make a play if he could.  I told you all earlier that I got interested in this story on noticing that Roy Sievers’ nickname was "Squirrel", which seems like an odd nickname for a Carlos Lee/Jermaine Dye type of player.   But another reason I was looking at Roy Sievers is that a lot of people have been asking me about Grady Sizemore, about his chance of getting his game back after several years of injuries and struggle.   There are very few players in major league history who have done what Roy Sievers did.   After having a terrific season as a rookie in 1949, Sievers battled for four full seasons with a tsunami of failure, injuries and frustration—and came out of it on top.   Find another player who did that.   You can probably find one, but you’ll realize that it’s not easy to find one.

                And actually, it’s a little bit more remarkable than that, in that, in the season in which he was finally able to break out of his tailspin, Sievers hit in absolutely terrible luck.   Sievers drove in 102 runs in 1954 despite hitting just .232, which was the lowest batting average ever for a player with 100 RBI, at that time and until Dave Kingman would break the record almost 30 years later.   It is still one of the lowest batting averages ever for a 100-RBI season. 

                But it’s a fluke.  Striking out only 77 times and obviously hitting the ball hard, Sievers batting average on balls in play was .230, second-lowest among American League regulars in 1954.    The very low batting average on balls in play was the last little shard of the broken mirror that had plagued Sievers since 1950.

                But he overcame that; it is a mystery to me how Bucky Harris could have been so sold on Sievers that he would keep him in the lineup, after he hadn’t hit for years and and couldn’t throw and obviously was hitting in tough luck, but somehow he did.   And Sievers hit just .198 in his first 24 games in 1954.   Somehow, Harris just knew that Sievers was eventually going to break out of this—and he did.

                Sievers’ 24 home runs in 1954 were a franchise record for the Washington Senators.   He broke that record the next year, with 25, broke it again in 1956, with 29 homers, and broke it again in 1957, with 42 homers.   And very nearly broke it again in 1958, winding up that season with 39 homers, 108 RBI.

                While Sievers and Kluszewski were emerging as two of the top power hitters in baseball, Vic Wertz had taken on Roy Sievers’ curse; perhaps his locker was too close to Sievers, when they were teammates in St. Louis in ’52 and ’53    Hitting just .202 through the end of May, 1954, and losing playing time to younger players, Wertz was traded to Cleveland in very early June, part of the same house-cleaning process that had sent Sievers to Washington.  

                To this point in his career Wertz had been playing right field.     I have described these men as four first basemen, which I think is fundamentally what they are, but here is a chart of their career games played, by position:

 

1B

3B

LF

CF

RF

Ted Kluszewski

1481

 

 

 

 

Vic Wertz

715

 

105

4

783

Roy Sievers

888

30

676

163

4

Joe Adcock

1501

 

310

 

 

 

                Kluszewski was a pure first baseman.   Joe Adcock was a pure first baseman and a minor league first baseman, but had to play the outfield for the first three years of his major league career because he was Kluszewski’s teammate.   Sievers was really a first baseman, but played left field for several of his best seasons because Mickey Vernon was in possession of the first base job.    Wertz was the best outfielder among the four, but this isn’t really saying much; he was more Giancarlo Stanton than he was Shane Victorino.

                Traded to Cleveland in 1954, Wertz finally made it to first base.    Cleveland had traded for him because they needed a first baseman.   After platooning for seven weeks, Wertz took over as the Indians’ first baseman on July 21.  The Indians, of course, were having a historic season, winning 111 games.  

                You all know the story of the monster drive Wertz hit in the World Series that fall, caught by Willie Mays; I won’t get into that.   What you  might not know:  Wertz hit .500 in that four-game series, 8-for-16, with an OPS of an Ortizian 1.493.     Had Mays not made that phenomenal catch, Wertz’ drive would have been a triple; he would have hit .563 in the series, five of the nine hits for extra bases, OPS of 1.611.   But he had a good series, actually one of the best World Series that any hitter has ever had. 

                In 1955 Wertz developed polio.   There are two kinds of polio, apparently, one of which paralyzes you and leaves you an invalid, and the other of which just cripples you for a few months and then leaves you alone.   Wertz had the good kind of polio, the kind that only cripples you for a few months.    In and out of the lineup with polio and lesser injuries, Wertz drove in 55 runs in 74 games—almost exactly the same RBI rate, per at bat, that Wertz had had in 1949, when he drove in 133 runs.

                In 1956 Wertz hit 32 homers, a career high for him, and drove in 106 runs.   And wasn’t even a complete regular; he batted only 481 times.    In 1957 he would have about the same season, 28 homers, 105 RBI, but we have left Joe Adcock far behind us, and I’d better go back and move him forward.

                If you Google Joe Adcock, one of the things that will turn up is "Joe Adcock—racist".    This is based on some awkward moments between Adcock and Henry Aaron, his most famous teammate.    I don’t doubt that Adcock had issues regarding race.   He was born in the South in 1927; it would be quite remarkable if he wasn’t burdened by racist attitudes.  

                Joe Adcock, as many of you know, would compile perhaps the most remarkable list of singular achievements and odd events of any player in baseball history.    This started on April 29, 1953, his first month in a Braves uniform, when he hit a home run into the center field bleachers at the Polo Grounds.   The Polo Grounds at that time were configured as they had been since the 1920s; it was 483 feet to the center field bleachers, and no one had ever been able to reach them.   Adcock became the first; this was later done by two Hall of Famers.

                In 1954 Adcock hit four homers and a double in one game; the 18 total bases in a game was a major league record until the steroid era.    The double was a line shot off the top of the wall, and was said by most everyone to have been the hardest-hit ball of the day.

                That was against the Dodgers.   Adcock tortured the Dodgers in a way that few other players have ever abused a team.    In 1954 Adcock played 11 games in Ebbets Field, hitting .436 with 9 homers, 17 RBI.  The 9 home runs in an opponent's park was a major league record at the time.  In case you thought that was a fluke, in1956 he played only 8 games in Ebbets Field, but hit 7 more home runs there; against the Dodgers in 1956 he played in 17 of the 22 contests, averaged .421, hit 13 homers and drove in 23 runs.  His 13 homers against the Dodgers in 1956 tied the National League record for home runs vs. and opponent.   In his career Adcock hit 270 National League home runs, 47 of them against the Dodgers.  

                Adcock has many other famous hitting feats, but I am not here to talk about that kind of stuff, and this article is rather long, anyway.    (On July 6, 1954, Adcock had only one at-bat in a game, but drove in 5 runs.   He hit a 3-run homer and drew two bases-loaded walks.   On the day before the 4-homer outbreak against the Dodgers, Adcock had had 3 hits including a double and a homer, so in the space of two games he hit 5 homers, 2 doubles and a single.   Against the Giants in 1956 Adcock went 4-for-4 with 8 RBI.    He hit 7 homers in 7 games in 1956.    He had two two-homer games against the Dodgers in 1961, and he was constantly hitting two homers in a game against the Cubs.   He had five multi-homer games against the Cubs.)

                Most famous of these, of course, is the game in 1959, but that’s too far ahead.    I compared the players head to head through 1952; let’s move that forward now to 1957.    From 1953 to 1955 Kluszewski was the best of these four players, with Adcock generally the second-best:

 

               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1953

Klu

40

108

.316

.380

.570

.950

19

4

2

6

20

9

.686

1953

Adcock

18

80

.285

.334

.453

.787

14

11

5

4

18

16

.537

1953

Wertz

19

70

.268

.376

.466

.842

11

7

3

4

14

11

.551

1953

Sievers

8

35

.270

.344

.407

.751

5

7

1

3

7

9

.418

                             
                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1954

Klu

49

141

.326

.407

.642

1.049

22

1

3

4

25

5

.839

1954

Adcock

23

87

.308

.365

.520

.885

17

4

4

3

21

7

.742

1954

Sievers

24

102

.232

.331

.446

.777

13

11

2

6

15

17

.475

1954

Wertz

15

61

.257

.330

.422

.752

9

8

3

2

13

10

.557

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1955

Klu

47

113

.314

.382

.585

.967

21

4

3

5

24

9

.731

1955

Sievers

25

106

.271

.364

.489

.853

16

6

1

6

17

12

.572

1955

Adcock

15

45

.264

.339

.469

.807

7

6

1

3

8

9

.489

1955

Wertz

14

55

.253

.332

.475

.807

6

5

2

2

8

7

.536

                             

 

In 1956 all four players were really about in the same place, more so than at any other time:

               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1956

Adcock

38

103

.291

.337

.597

.934

15

4

3

3

19

7

.734

1956

Klu

35

102

.302

.362

.536

.898

16

5

3

4

19

9

.684

1956

Wertz

32

106

.264

.364

.509

.874

15

6

3

3

18

9

.676

1956

Sievers

29

95

.253

.370

.467

.838

14

10

1

5

15

15

.500

 

                And in 1957 Roy Sievers, hitting 42 homers for Washington, jumped to the head of the pack, in part because Kluszewski and Adcock were both injured, but also in part because Sievers was one of the best hitters in baseball:

               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

City

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1957

Sievers

42

114

.301

.388

.579

.967

22

1

1

6

22

7

.768

1957

Wertz

28

105

.282

.371

.485

.857

16

6

1

5

18

11

.624

1957

Adcock

12

38

.287

.351

.541

.891

7

2

1

2

8

3

.724

1957

Klu

6

21

.268

.301

.465

.765

2

3

0

1

3

4

.428

 

                Roy Sievers and Vic Wertz were first and second in the American League in RBI in 1957.   Kluszewski in 1957—actually in 1956—began having back trouble, as very muscular men often will playing a sport that requires flexibility.  The back trouble never left him, and after four brilliant years he was finished as a top-flight player.

                What happens to players as they age, of course, is that their injuries become more frequent and their recovery time increases.   By 1957 these four sluggers had reached the second halves of their careers—Sievers and Adcock halfway through, Wertz and Kluszewski a little more than halfway through.

                From mid-May to mid-June, 1957, Joe Adcock was out of the lineup most of the games with an injury to his right knee.   Returning to the lineup for a double header on June 23, Adcock got through one game healthy.   In the second game he drew a walk, slid into second base and felt—and heard--something snap in his right leg.   He was carried off the field on a stretcher, the fibula broken about three inches above the ankle.   He didn’t get back in the lineup until September. 

                In 1958 it was Vic Wertz’s turn; Wertz broke his ankle at the very end of spring training (March 30, 1958).   He didn’t start a game until August 16, and batted only 43 times (although even then, he drove in runs at his usual brisk pace.)    1958 in summary—Sievers was superb, as he had been in 1957; the other three were injured.  Sievers in 1958 also appeared in a movie, Damn Yankees.   When you see Tab Hunter in the batter’s box, crushing a pitch, that’s actually Roy Sievers.

                In 1959, after five healthy seasons, the injury owl found Roy Sievers; nothing big, just a series of nagging injuries that ruined his season.    Vic Wertz was traded to Boston, where he platooned with Dick Gernert (a right-handed slugger) and battled injuries; Wertz batted only 247 times in 1959, although he had the same borderline phenomenal RBI rate that he always had, driving in 49 runs.    Projected to full-time play, it’s 120 RBI.    Compare Sievers to Wertz in 1959; Sievers batted 130 more times, had a higher slugging percentage, hit three times as many homers, bested Wertz in Total Bases 175 to 102—and they drove in the same number of runs. 

                In 1959 Ted Kluszewski got his chance to play for Bill Veeck; Veeck had purchased the Chicago White Sox, and steered them to the American League pennant in 1959.    Although Kluszewski could no longer reach the seats consistently he hit .297 for the White Sox in 1959, and .293 for them in 1960, and was THE hitting star of the 1959 World Series, hitting .391 with 3 homers and 10 RBI.    There were only 44 runs scored in the 1959 World Series; Kluszewski drove in almost a fourth of them.

                That was a big a story, but the most interesting story of the 1959 season, among these four, was Joe Adcock.   Adcock got the most famous hit of the season, a homer that became a single that became a double.   On May 26, 1959, Harvey Haddix pitched 9 perfect innings against the Braves, but the score was tied 0-0.   Haddix pitched a perfect 10th inning, but the score was still tied, and then a perfect 11th, but the score was still tied, and then a perfect 12th, but the score was still tied.   Haddix pitched one of the greatest games in baseball history, if not the greatest, at least by the lights visible to the public in 1959.

                In the bottom of the 13th the Braves’ leadoff hitter reached on an error, the first baserunner for the Braves.   Eddie Mathews bunted the runner to second and Henry Aaron was intentionally walked, bring Joe Adcock to the plate with one out and two men on.  Haddix, in the 13th inning, was still working on a no-hitter.   Adcock hit the ball over the fence in right center, obviously ending the game, but in the confusion and excitement everybody forgot how to play baseball.   Henry Aaron, thinking the ball was in play, played it halfway, played it cautiously, and Adcock passed Aaron on the basepaths.   The umpire ruled that Adcock was out and the ball was only a single, so that the historic game ended 2-0, Aaron being allowed to score, but then the next day the league president (Warren Giles) overruled the umpire, for reasons that I don’t understand, and awarded Adcock a double but said that the game ended when the first run scored, so the final score was 1-0.   Adcock’s hit at various times was a homer, a double and a single and he had at various points had been given 1, 2 and 3 RBI on the hit.

                Adcock was with the Milwaukee Braves in 1959.   The Braves lost the pennant in a playoff; the Braves and Dodgers both finished the season 86-68, tied for first; the Braves lost the playoff in two straight.   I have ranted about this many times before so I will keep it short here, but it is my opinion that:

                a)  No manager in the history of baseball ever had a worse year than Fred Haney, manager of the Braves, in 1959, and

                b)  In the entire history of baseball there is no other case of a team as weak as the 1959 Dodgers beating a team as great as the 1959 Braves.

                The 1959 Braves had a fantastic lineup, with Henry Aaron having his greatest year (.355 with 39 homers, 123 RBI), Eddie Mathews having one of his best years (.306 with 46 homers, 114 RBI), surrounded by players like Johnny Logan, Del Crandall, Bill Bruton and Wes Covington—all having very good seasons.    The team should have won 100 games, and they should have rolled Chicago in the World Series.    I have several complaints about Haney’s handling of the team, but these are the three critical points:

                1)  Although he had on his staff many outstanding young pitchers, Haney refused to trust the youngsters and refused to let them pitch, preferring instead to work to death his three veteran aces, Warren Spahn, Lew Burdette and Bob Buhl.    Spahn and Burdette won 21 games each but lost 15 apiece; Buhl was limited to 15-9 by a midseason injury that kept him out of action for several weeks.    While Spahn and Burdette were 1-2 in the majors in innings pitched, the Braves got very little out of Joey Jay, Juan Pizarro and Carlton Willey, and nothing at all out of pitchers in their high minors like Don Nottebart (18-11 for Louisville), and Terry Fox (9-3 with a 2.70 ERA for Sacramento.)  

                2)  Unable to find a second baseman that he was happy with, Haney switched endlessly among second basemen, and wound up getting worse performance from his eight second basemen than he could reasonably have expected to get from any one or two players at the position.   His second basemen hit .208 on the season with a .550 OPS, also committing 25 errors at second base and turning only 89 double plays—whereas the Dodgers got 112 double plays and 10 errors out of their second basemen, Pittsburgh 121 to 16, Cincinnati 100 to 19, and St. Louis 107 to 20.

                3)   Haney platooned Joe Adcock at first base with Frank Torre, which I believe was just silly.

                Look, I kind of understand what Haney was thinking, or I believe I do.    "We have lots of power on this team," he was thinking.   "We have great left-handed power with Eddie Mathews and Wes Covington; we have great right-handed power with Henry Aaron and Del Crandall.   Adcock is a right-handed power hitter, but. . .we don’t have a critical need for more power hitters.    Torre is a left-handed line drive hitter, a better fielder than Adcock and a better baserunner.    He balances the lineup better, against a right-handed starter, than Adcock does, and we were able to win the NL in 1957 and 1958 with Adcock out of the lineup with injuries much of the year, Torre playing first." 

                That’s all true—but it doesn’t add up to a reason to sit Adcock down against right-handed pitchers.   The other way of looking at it—the better way of looking at it—is this:

                a)   The fact that you have four good power hitters in the lineup is no reason at all that you can’t use a fifth, if the fifth is a good all-around hitter (rather than a low-average basher.)   What, when you score three runs in a game, you don’t need four?   When you score five runs in a game, you don’t need seven?   Regardless of how much power you have, you still need to put your best lineup on the field.

                b)  You platoon players who are relatively even in their skill level, to get the maximum combined output out of the two.   Frank Torre at his best just wasn’t anywhere near the hitter that Joe Adcock was.   He was left-handed, yes, but he wasn’t good.   You don’t platoon a good hitter with a bad one.  

                Because there weren’t a lot of top left-hand pitchers in the National League in 1959, the platoon situation essentially meant that Frank Torre started almost every game early in the year, until it became apparent that he wasn’t going to hit at all.   Adcock in 1959 hit .292 with 25 homers, 76 RBI in just over 400 at bats, .874 OPS; Torre batted 263 times, hitting .228 with 1 home run, .625 OPS.   Torre wound up the season starting 63 games at first base for the 1959 Braves, and the Braves went just 32-31 in those games.    They were 54-39 in the games that Torre didn’t start.   (Adcock also started some games in the outfield, and Mickey Vernon also started seven games at first base.)  

                But Adcock’s 404 at-bats in 1959 were actually the most among our four sluggers; injuries limited Sievers to 385 at bats, Wertz to 247 and Kluszewski to 223.    They were all past 30 now, and it might have seemed that the end of the road was nearer than it was.   In 1960 three of the four players posted strong comebacks.   Joe Adcock, freed from the yoke of platooning by Haney’s dismissal, returned to near-regular status and hit .298 with 25 homers, 91 RBI.    Roy Sievers, traded back to Bill Veeck’s care in Chicago, hit .295 with 28 and 93.    Vic Wertz batted only 443 times for Boston—but drove in over 100 runs.   Sievers and Wertz, who had been 1-2 in the American League in RBI in 1957, this time were 3rd and 7th. 

                Wertz hit .282; the other three were all in the .290s, as Kluszewski, backing up Sievers in Chicago and occasionally taking his turn at first base, also played well.   I started to say that Kluszewski played as well as Sievers, but he didn’t; Sievers’ OPS was a modestly sensational .930—but Kluszewski’s OPS, .789, was the highest it ever was after his back went bad in ’57.  Let’s catch you up through 1960:

               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1958

Sievers

39

108

.295

.357

.544

.900

19

4

1

5

20

9

.692

1958

Adcock

19

54

.275

.317

.506

.823

9

5

2

2

11

7

.616

1958

Kluszewski

4

37

.292

.348

.402

.750

8

5

2

2

9

7

.560

1958

Wertz

3

12

.279

.354

.512

.866

1

0

0

0

1

1

.643

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1959

Adcock

25

76

.292

.339

.535

.874

13

4

4

2

16

6

.720

1959

Sievers

21

49

.242

.333

.455

.788

9

8

2

3

12

11

.505

1959

Wertz

7

49

.275

.337

.413

.750

5

5

1

2

6

7

.470

1959

Kluszewski

4

27

.278

.319

.404

.723

4

5

1

2

5

7

.439

                             
                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1960

Sievers

28

93

.295

.396

.534

.930

16

3

3

3

19

6

.773

1960

Adcock

25

91

.298

.354

.500

.854

17

4

3

4

20

8

.721

1960

Kluszewski

5

39

.293

.364

.425

.789

5

3

1

1

6

4

.603

1960

Wertz

19

103

.282

.335

.460

.796

10

9

1

5

11

14

.438

 

 

                Sievers and Adcock, the younger of the four players, had become the better of the four players as the other two had begun to fade—but this is not a full explanation.   Sievers and Adcock also aged better than Wertz and Klu.  Vic Wertz still drove in 100 runs, but in all honesty he was no longer a good player, driving in 103 runs but scoring only 45—one of the most lop-sided run ratios in baseball history.

                Kluszewski went to the expansion Angels in 1961, hit 15 homers in half-time play in the Angels’ bandbox park and then retired, finally accepting that the back would never let him play freely again.    Wertz hit just .260 as a half-time player, although I will point out that even hitting just .260 with 11 homers, he still drove in runs at a pace of 113 RBI per 600 at bats.   Wertz was traded back to the Tigers in late 1961, and in 1962 was the top pinch hitter in the American League, hitting .324 with 5 homers in 105 at bats.   That was his last hurrah.   He was released early in 1963, drove a truck for a few weeks, decided to try to get back in baseball.   He signed with the Twins and pinch hit for them for a couple of months, but without success.

                Sievers had one more good season, almost exactly matching his 1960 stats in 1961.  Roy Sievers was remarkably consistent as he aged.    The usual rule is that a player is consistent when he is young; when he gets older, what he loses is not the ability to produce but the consistency of his production.    He starts to mix .230 seasons in which his normal .280 seasons.

                Sievers, however, was completely inconsistent when he was young, but remarkably consistent as an older player.   He was consistent, really, after 1954, other than the 1959 season when he had injuries and didn’t produce.   But from 1960 to the end of his career he slipped away a couple of knots a year, but always producing as much as one could reasonably have expected him to produce:  .295 with 28 homers, 93 RBI in 1960, .295 with 27 homers, 92 RBI in 1961, .262 with 21 homers, 80 RBI in 1962, .240 with 19 homers, 82 RBI in 1963.   In 1964 he slipped to .180, but still hit 8 homers in 178 at bats, and 1965 he hit just .190 with no homers in just 21 at bats.

                Roy Sievers was friendly with Ted Williams, and he would say after his career that he always wanted to play for the Red Sox.    In his career he hit .327 with 25 homers, 87 RBI in Fenway Park, 110 games, with a career OPS in Fenway over 1.000.    He always thought that the reason he couldn’t get traded to Boston was that Calvin Griffith, Washington owner, was the father-in-law of Joe Cronin, who was General Manager of the Red Sox, and Griffith didn’t want to be accused of letting his son-in-law steal his star player.

                Joe Adcock had only two seasons in his career in which he got more than 514 at bats.   One of those was 1961.  Batting 562 times, Adcock drove in 108 runs, a career high, drew 59 walks, a career high, and hit 35 homers, which was his second-best total.    While Adcock had good numbers, however, the Braves faded to 83 wins.   Adcock in 1962 found himself competing for playing time with Tommie Aaron, Henry’s little brother, and also fighting another round of injuries.    Although he finished third in the National League in home run percentage, behind Mays and Aaron, Adcock’s ten years with the Braves came to an end after the 1962 season.

                Adcock played four more years in the American League, hitting moderately well, and crushed 18 home runs in just 231 at bats in his final season in 1966:

 

 

               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1961

Sievers

27

92

.295

.377

.537

.913

16

4

3

3

19

7

.736

1961

Adcock

35

108

.285

.354

.507

.861

17

7

4

4

21

11

.660

1961

Wertz

11

61

.260

.336

.424

.760

7

7

1

2

8

10

.448

1961

Klu

15

39

.243

.303

.460

.764

5

7

1

2

5

9

.386

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1962

Sievers

21

80

.262

.346

.455

.801

13

7

2

4

15

11

.577

1962

Adcock

29

78

.248

.333

.506

.839

10

8

3

2

13

10

.563

1962

Wertz

5

18

.324

.357

.486

.843

3

1

0

1

3

2

.625

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1963

Sievers

19

82

.240

.308

.418

.725

11

9

2

4

13

13

.500

1963

Adcock

13

49

.251

.320

.420

.740

7

6

1

2

7

8

.480

1963

Wertz

3

7

.122

.218

.306

.524

0

2

0

0

1

3

.169

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1964

Adcock

21

64

.268

.352

.475

.827

13

3

2

3

15

6

.707

1964

Sievers

8

27

.180

.271

.348

.619

2

6

1

1

3

8

.290

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1965

Adcock

14

47

.241

.315

.401

.716

8

8

2

2

10

10

.506

1965

Sievers

0

0

.190

.320

.238

.558

0

1

0

0

0

1

.280

                             
               

Batting

Fielding

Total

YEAR

Player

HR

RBI

AVG

OBA

SLG

OPS

W

L

W

L

W

L

Pct

1966

Adcock

18

48

.273

.355

.576

.930

8

2

1

2

10

4

.718

 

                Comparing the players age to age, all of them came to the majors at age 22.   Sievers was the best player in the group as a rookie, but then Vic Wertz was by far the best player in the group from ages 23 to 27, while Sievers, in that age range, fell far behind the other four:

 

 

 

 

Season

         Career

YEAR

City

Age

W

L

Pct

W

L

Pct

1949

Sievers

22

14

13

.507

14

13

.507

1947

Wertz

22

11

8

.587

11

8

.587

1950

Adcock

22

9

12

.421

9

12

.421

1947

Kluszewski

22

0

1

.000

0

1

.000

 

 

 

 

 

Season

         Career

YEAR

City

Age

W

L

Pct

W

L

Pct

1948

Wertz

23

11

12

.472

21

19

.524

1950

Sievers

23

6

16

.282

20

29

.406

1948

Kluszewski

23

10

12

.470

10

12

.456

1951

Adcock

23

7

16

.309

16

28

.361

                 
                 

1949

Wertz

24

21

12

.638

42

31

.575

1949

Kluszewski

24

14

13

.521

24

25

.492

1952

Adcock

24

11

10

.524

27

38

.414

1951

Sievers

24

1

4

.183

21

33

.385

                 
                 

1950

Wertz

25

24

6

.801

66

37

.640

1950

Kluszewski

25

15

13

.540

40

38

.510

1953

Adcock

25

18

16

.537

45

54

.456

1952

Sievers

25

0

2

.095

21

35

.375

                 
                 

1951

Wertz

26

19

9

.683

85

46

.649

1954

Adcock

26

21

7

.742

66

61

.519

1951

Kluszewski

26

15

19

.444

55

57

.490

1953

Sievers

26

7

9

.418

28

45

.385

                 
                 

1952

Wertz

27

17

6

.733

102

52

.662

1952

Kluszewski

27

20

7

.727

75

65

.535

1955

Adcock

27

8

9

.489

74

70

.515

1954

Sievers

27

15

17

.475

43

61

.412

 

                Kluszewski had a power surge at age 28, while Wertz began to have his injury troubles, so by the age of 30 Kluszewski had taken over as the best player in the group:

 

 

 

 

Season

         Career

YEAR

City

Age

W

L

Pct

W

L

Pct

1953

Wertz

28

14

11

.551

116

63

.646

1953

Kluszewski

28

20

9

.686

95

74

.562

1956

Adcock

28

19

7

.734

93

77

.548

1955

Sievers

28

17

12

.572

60

74

.447

                 
                 

1954

Wertz

29

13

10

.557

128

73

.636

1954

Kluszewski

29

25

5

.839

120

79

.603

1957

Adcock

29

8

3

.724

101

80

.559

1956

Sievers

29

15

15

.500

75

89

.457

                 
                 

1955

Kluszewski

30

24

9

.731

144

88

.621

1955

Wertz

30

8

7

.536

136

80

.629

1958

Adcock

30

11

7

.616

113

87

.564

1957

Sievers

30

22

7

.768

97

95

.504

                 
                 

1956

Kluszewski

31

19

9

.684

163

96

.628

1956

Wertz

31

18

9

.676

154

89

.634

1959

Adcock

31

16

6

.720

129

93

.580

1958

Sievers

31

20

9

.692

117

104

.529

 

                Kluszewski’s lead over Wertz was thin, however, so once Kluszewski’s back began to act up, Wertz returned immediately to the top of the group.   By the age of 35, all four players really were about the same in terms of career value:

 

 

 

 

Season

         Career

YEAR

City

Age

W

L

Pct

W

L

Pct

1957

Wertz

32

18

11

.624

172

100

.633

1957

Kluszewski

32

3

4

.428

166

100

.623

1960

Adcock

32

20

8

.721

149

101

.596

1959

Sievers

32

12

11

.505

129

116

.527

                 
                 

1958

Wertz

33

1

1

.643

173

100

.633

1958

Kluszewski

33

9

7

.560

175

107

.620

1961

Adcock

33

21

11

.660

170

112

.603

1960

Sievers

33

19

6

.773

148

121

.549

                 
                 

1959

Wertz

34

6

7

.470

180

107

.626

1959

Kluszewski

34

5

7

.439

185

114

.605

1962

Adcock

34

13

10

.563

183

122

.600

1961

Sievers

34

19

7

.736

167

128

.566

                 
                 

1960

Wertz

35

11

14

.438

190

121

.611

1960

Kluszewski

35

6

4

.603

186

118

.612

1963

Adcock

35

7

8

.480

190

130

.594

1962

Sievers

35

15

11

.577

182

139

.567

 

                Joe Adcock, however, was easily the best OLD hitter in the group, so in the closing stages of the race, Adcock moved to the front:

 

 

 

 

Season

         Career

YEAR

City

Age

W

L

Pct

W

L

Pct

1964

Adcock

36

15

6

.707

205

136

.601

1961

Wertz

36

8

10

.448

198

131

.602

1961

Kluszewski

36

5

9

.386

192

127

.602

1963

Sievers

36

13

13

.500

195

152

.562

                 
                 

1965

Adcock

37

10

10

.506

215

146

.596

1962

Wertz

37

3

2

.625

201

133

.603

1961

Kluszewski

(Out of the game)

192

127

.602

1964

Sievers

37

3

8

.290

198

160

.554

                 
                 

1966

Adcock

38

10

4

.718

225

150

.600

1963

Wertz

38

1

3

.169

202

135

.599

1961

Kluszewski

(Out of the game)

192

127

.602

1965

Sievers

38

0

1

.280

199

161

.553

 

                So in the end, if we ask "which of these four players had the best career?", my answer is "Adcock".   But they’re all kind of the same.   I rank them 1. Adcock, 2. Wertz, 3. Kluszewski, 4. Sievers.   Fangraphs also has Adcock and Wertz 1-2 in this group, but has Sievers ahead of Kluszewski.

                Baseball Reference, on the other hand, rates them 1. Kluszewski, 2. Adcock, 3. Wertz, 4. Sievers, so Fangraphs rates Kluszewski last among these four sluggers, but Baseball Reference rates him first.  Baseball Reference Elo Rater, on the other hand, ranks them 1. Adcock, 2. Kluszewski, 3. Sievers, 4. Wertz.  

                Comparing them purely as hitters, their winning percentages are about the same, but Adcock’s career is a little longer than the others:

Player

Won

Lost

Pct

Adcock

181

102

.639

Sievers

175

99

.638

Kluszewski

161

80

.667

Wertz

165

91

.644

 

Comparing them as fielders,

a) None of them was very good, but

b)  Sievers was behind the others:

 

Player

Won

Lost

Pct

Adcock

43

47

.478

Wertz

37

44

.455

Kluszewski

30

46

.397

Sievers

24

62

.280

 

                As to whether this defensive rating is "fair" to Sievers, I will note that:

                a)  Baseball Reference and Fangraphs, with their disparate WAR systems, both rank Sievers as by far the werzt defensive player in the group, and both rank Adcock as the best defender among the four.

                b)  Within the last year Sievers was interviewed by David Spada and Elliott Harris for something called Talk Zone, and this interview is available on Youtube.   In that interview Sievers essentially acknowledges, several times, that he was not a good outfielder. 

                But this is also unfair to Sievers, in another sense, because Sievers was asked for several years to do something he lacked the ability to do, which was to play the outfield.    Had Kluszewski been forced to play the outfield, or had Wertz been asked to continue to play the outfield after 1954, their defensive winning percentages would be like Sievers’.

                If you search the internet, you can find players making Hall of Fame arguments for all of these men except perhaps Wertz; I don’t know that anybody is out there making a Hall of Fame argument for Wertz, although Wertz was as good a player as the other three.    The fact is that none of these four men had a Hall of Fame career.

                However—and this is what unites them, and this is the backbone of this article—it is my opinion that, given a full career, each of these four men not only might be a Hall of Famer, but would be.    Any of these four men, you give him good health, a couple of good breaks—he’s in Cooperstown.

                Ted Kluszewski was playing at a Hall of Fame level, 1953-1956, until his back stopped him.   (Kluszewski was on target for 40 homers again in 1956 and was red hot in the first week of September, until he began having back trouble.)    Kluszewski is probably the easiest Hall of Fame-caliber argument among the four, since it is obvious that he was playing at a Hall of Fame level in his prime, and Kluszewski did better in Hall of Fame voting than any of the other three.  

                Vic Wertz  drove in 100+ runs five times in his career, despite all of the things that happened to him—despite the polio, despite the broken ankle and the other injuries, despite the platooning.     If a player has nine 100-RBI seasons, basically he’s a certain Hall of Famer, unless there is a steroid issue or something.    With eight 100-RBI seasons, he’s in good shape; eight seasons; that’s Ernie Banks, Jim Rice, Johnny Mize, Dave Winfield, Harry Heilmann.    I think if Red Rolfe doesn’t decide to start platooning Wertz in ’51, if he doesn’t get polio, he makes it easily.

                Roy Sievers, there are people who will argue that he should be in the Hall of Fame, despite the four-year infarction in the middle of his career.   Sievers was the rookie of the year in 1949, hit 42 homers in 1957, 39 homers in 1958—and he wasn’t any .250 hitter; he was a .290 hitter.   He hit .295 or better four times as a regular.   You give him back those four years that started with a foolish, mid-game decision to see if he could play third base, I think he’s an obvious Hall of Famer.  

                And Joe Adcock. . .Joe Adcock was a teammate of Henry Aaron for nine years, 1954-1962.    For those nine years, Adcock homered 8% more often, per at bat, than Henry Aaron.    Think about that; that is serious power, when you out-homer Henry Aaron for nine years, that’s some serious power.    After he was traded to Cleveland in 1963, Adcock continued to hit home runs at a very impressive pace for Cleveland.

                Adcock in his career hit 137 home runs in his "home" parks, 199 on the road—one of the largest "home park home run short falls" in baseball history.    I say that if Adcock comes up on a team that doesn’t try to put him in the outfield for three years, if he gets to play in a better park, he easily clears the Hall of Fame standard.

                It’s not like these are the only four players in baseball history who would clearly be Hall of Famers if a few things had broken right for them; there are probably a few dozen players about whom you could say that.    But it’s not like those guys are falling off the trees, either.    There are many players that you think maybe this guy could have been a Hall of Famer; there are not very many players that you say that there is no doubt that this guy is a Hall of Famer, given a couple of better breaks.   All four of these guys are in that group, and that’s why I decided to write about them.

                There are some other guys who could be in our group, and let me touch briefly on them:

                Mickey Vernon is another first baseman of the same era, and one can say about him also that it is obvious that he’s a Hall of Famer if he gets a few better breaks.  But Vernon was a very different kind of player than these four sluggers, and he was six years older than the oldest of these men, so I decided that he didn’t belong in the group.

                Eddie Robinson was another first baseman of the same era, and he was a similar player to our four sluggers, and it is possible that he could have reached Hall of Fame stature, with a few better breaks.   Possible, but not certain; in my opinion it is clear that Kluszewski, Wertz, Sievers and Adcock had Hall of Fame ability.   Eddie was a really good player.  

                Walt Dropo was another first baseman in that era, and Dropo drove in 144 runs as a rookie in 1950, won the Rookie of the Year Award the year after Sievers’ did.    But Dropo, despite the monster numbers that one year, and he did drive in 96, 97 runs a couple of other years. . . .it’s a real reach to project him up to a Hall of Fame level.    Even in 1950, when his numbers look so good, Dropo was really just about a .500 player.  

                Steve Bilko was another first baseman from that era, and he was a similar type of player, and Bilko is also like these four men in that injuries and bad luck and questionable managerial decisions gave him much less of a career than he could have had.   In 458 at bats with the Angels in 1961 and 1962, Bilko hit 28 homers and drove in 97 runs.   

                In the Pacific Coast League in 1956 Bilko hit .360 with 55 homers, 164 RBI, 104 walks; back in the same league the next year he hit 56 homers, 140 RBI, 108 walks.   A Hollywood producer liked his name, and gave it to Phil Silvers for a TV show.   Bilko was a fun player and a legitimate power hitter who could have had a very good major league career, but he’s not at the same level as these other four guys.

                Luke Easter was almost certainly a Hall of Fame caliber talent, and was a first baseman in the same era and was a similar player to these other four, but his story is just very different.

                Hank Sauer was a similar player to these four and was probably a better hitter than any of the four, I’m guessing, and he also was quite certainly a Hall of Famer had some things broken differently for him.    Sauer, however, was an outfielder and was several years older than our group, and so I decided that he did not belong with the crew.

                Gus Zernial is kind of a poor man’s Hank Sauer.   Again, Zernial was a hell of a hitter, and he was just one year older than Kluszewski, and he might have had a Hall of Fame career with some better breaks.   But he’s an outfielder and it’s not quite certain that he’s at the same level, so I left him out.

                Behind those guys you have players like Dick Gernert, Dale Long, George Crowe and Marv Throneberry, who are similar players and who had their moments, but they’re another step down the ladder.  Gentile is similar, but he’s later, and Don Mincher is similar, but he is later AND a step down the ladder.

                Upon retiring from baseball, Vic Wertz bought a beer distributorship.    He was the only one of the four who didn’t try his hand at coaching or managing.    He became very active in charity efforts, founded Wertz Warriors to raise money for the Special Olympics, and also was publicly involved in—and gave money to—the Easter Seals, the March of Dimes, and the Boys and Girls Club.    He suffered a heart attack on July 7, 1983, and died on the operating table the next morning, as doctors were performing heart bypass surgery.

                Ted Kluszewski coached in the minors for a few years, and became Sparky Anderson’s hitting coach on the Big Red Machine, a job he held until Sparky was fired in November, 1978.   The firing of Sparky was partly over Sparky’s loyalty to Kluszewski and his other coaches.   Reds’ General Manager Dick Wagner wanted to shake up the Reds’ coaching staff.   Anderson refused to go along with the dismissal of his coaches, and this led to his leaving the organization.   Kluszewski became the Reds’ minor league hitting coach, which he remained until he also suffered a massive heart attack in 1986.   He had coronary bypass surgery as well, survived that but died on March 29, 1988.

                Joe Adcock moved directly from the playing field to the manager’s chair, playing for the Angels in 1966, managing the Indians in 1966.   As a player Adcock was very well liked, perceived as a friendly, upbeat person who wasn’t shy about telling you what was on his mind if you needed to hear it.    As a manager he became grouchy and unpleasant, and was fired after one season.   He managed a couple of years in the minor leagues, and retired to his 288-acre ranch in Coushatta, Louisiana, where he lived for the rest of his life, raising horses.   He developed early-onset Alzheimers, and died of Alzheimers in 1999, only 71 years old.

                Roy Sievers in 1966 coached for the Cincinnati Reds; he was actually the Reds’ major league hitting coach, for a while, while Kluszewski was coaching in the minors.   The Reds had a bad year and everybody got fired.     Sievers managed in the minors for a couple of years, but he was only making about $8,000 a year, and decided to leave baseball.   Sievers’ wife was from Springfield, Illinois, so he returned to Springfield and went to work for Yellow Freight.   He worked there for eighteen years, was fired, and retired at that time, moving back to St. Louis.   He is still alive, now 87 years old, still lives in St. Louis and is in good health.

 
 

COMMENTS (50 Comments, most recent shown first)

MidnighttheCat
What, no Norm Cash?
8:06 AM Jul 21st
 
trn6229
Hi Bill, Nice article as usual. What I know about Roy Sievers is that he was known for being exceptionally nice. Larry Hisle had a Roy Sievers type career. He had a nice rookie year in 1969 for a terrible Phillies team, had a poor season in 1970, went back to the minors for a few years then came back with the Twins and had better and better years, then signed with the Brewers and had a big year in 1978 then his playing time declined.

Take Care,
Tom Nahigian
11:59 PM Apr 22nd
 
the_slasher14
1. Joe Adcock was also the only man ever to hit a ball over the left field roof in Ebbets Field. I was there that day and will always remember the ball rising off the bat, while the left and center fielders (Hodges and Snider) didn't move or even look up. It was still rising when it cleared the fence at around 340 feet.

2. Bill notes that the 1959 Dodgers were probably the weakest team ever to win the Series, a position I have long held. Gil Hodges hit cleanup for that team. And then went on to manage the 1969 Mets to 100 wins and the championship with only two players having over 405 ABs, which has to be some kind of record. I don't know about mystique as discussed below, but I find it fascinating that the same guy was a key part of two massively over-achieving teams.
1:35 AM Apr 22nd
 
JimPertierra
Roy sievers, one of my all time favorites dating back to spinning the spinner in the Ethan Allen baseball game in 1959.

Great article Bill.
Best/Jim
5:13 PM Apr 21st
 
Fireball Wenz
I would make a distinction, and do in my personal life, between prejudiced people of goodwill who harbor old or stupid ideas but have no meanness to them, and people who back up their prejudices with meanness and hatred. I think most people make this distinction, and it's why Bobby Bragan is treated differently than Ben Chapman in the retellings of the Jackie Robinson saga.
1:17 PM Apr 12th
 
bjames
From my standpoint, there can't possibly be anything for which we have less need than more hand-wringing about the racism of the past. From my standpoint, to acknowledge the racism of the past without dwelling on it is not only AN appropriate treatment, it is the only possible appropriate treatment.
11:45 AM Mar 31st
 
Rcrout
A great piece of thought, research and writing. However, it's marred by, on the one hand acknowledging Adcock's racism and then dismissing it. I think the piece would have been much better served by either ignoring it completely, or telling it like it was. There is little doubt that Adcock was a racist. Hank Aaron certainly considered him one.
9:35 AM Mar 29th
 
MarisFan61
(dam, I did it again...)
That's, HOW about we take it there. :-)
And I guess also I hope we do, rather than continuing here.
10:10 PM Mar 28th
 
MarisFan61
JDW: Hope about we take it to Reader Posts....
10:08 PM Mar 28th
 
jdw
So what you're saying is that Gil's leadership is why Jackie was such a good hitter, such a good defender, such a good base runner, and such a fiery competitor. That these weren't things he flashed at John Muir, Pasadena City College, and UCLA. Nor in the Negro League, nor in the minors before coming up. Gil Hodges is the reason that Jackie was X% better than he'd shown growing up.

Same goes for Duke, Pee Wee, Campy, Newc, etc.

The problem is that there were *many* players on that team who have similar "leadership" bullshit tossed around. And that's why I was asking you to quantify just how much of it comes down to Gil's Mystical Inspirational Leadership Qualites and how much of it comes down to those same qualities of everyone else... and then to the fact that the all were also really good Baseball Players.

To which you can't. Worse, you give onto Gil special credit while refusing to acknowledge that it because an extremely small "value" if you're forced to give similar "value" to everyone else on the club.

As far as the Manager nonsense, we all know there have been plenty of managers who were crap in terms of being inspirational leaders of both their teammates and later their players. Seriously, no one liked Bobby Valentine all the way back to Texas. There's very little record that in either his time as a player with the Dodgers or Angles that a slew of players thought he really helped them win because he had Mystical Inspirational Leadership Qualites. What they thought it that he was a great prospect, then he got hurt, then be became a crappy major league player.

You might think I'm pointing to Valentine because he's the only example. No, he's just the easiest. Go around the majors looking at all 30 managers and let me know which ones had during their playing days reputations for being Great Mystical Inspirational Leadership Quality Players. Why don't you start with John Farrell and his time as a player with the Indians, Halos and Tigers. He had the amazing Leadership ability to turn those teams into .450 clubs in his time with them.
2:56 PM Mar 28th
 
MarisFan61
(Clarifying something from the post below: When I talked about stealing a line from Bill, I didn't mean that Bill said it about that specific thing. I said earlier what I think was the context where he used it.)
12:35 AM Mar 27th
 
MarisFan61
JDW: About the Hodges 'leadership/intangible/whatever' thing:
We have different belief systems on this. :-)
Which means, I don't expect there's a high chance that the way I see this will have any meaning to you.

It seems that you assume that those qualities operate outside of the concrete things like offense, defense, pitching, etc. You assume it so much that you didn't feel you even needed to state it.

I see them as existing (when present) within those things. To whatever extent a player like (let's say) Gil Hodges helped his team with things like leadership, inspiration, role-modeling, and teaching, I say that those things were reflected IN the stats of his teammates, not just in addition to them.

Can I prove or demonstrate it? No. Does that bother me? Not at all. Sorry, but it's a thing that I feel confident enough about, just on the basis of everything else that we know about human functioning.

I mean the confidence only with regard to the general phenomenon and how it would operate; I wouldn't propose to be nearly so confident about any given player, Hodges or anyone else. But, as I put it (stealing a concept from Bill), I think that when we're talking about a player who later became a manager, it's a heck of a lot more likely to be right if we assume it than if we don't assume it. You're right that others on that Dodger team very likely had such qualities too. But Hodges' later future makes me think it's likely he was one of the top ones -- and that this had value. Since he's a guy who's a solid borderline Hall of Famer anyway, he doesn't need much extra value to put him across that border, and for me, this is enough.
12:29 AM Mar 27th
 
Steven Goldleaf
And Bill, of course, gets credited with first developing this analogy of the 50s Dodgers and the 70s Red, in a brilliant article in an early 1980s Abstract showing the parallels between these players and, better, between the teams, as they rose (so to speak) and fell.
5:50 PM Mar 26th
 
enamee
I wasn't suggesting that Hodges and Perez had similar statistics. But they're obviously similar players -- steady first basemen, 100-RBI men, overshadowed by their more famous teammates but nonetheless beloved as core players for legendary teams. In terms of WAR, or career numbers, I agree that Hodges and Foster compare better; that's obvious.

None of it matters, really, so I don't want to make anything more of it, but Perez really was the Hodges of the 1970s, and Hodges the Perez of the 1950s.
2:05 PM Mar 26th
 
jdw
"MarisFan61

Something I pretty much assume as a valid thing: A player who later becomes a manager probably had valuable qualities as a player beyond what showed up in the numbers."

I seriously think your 80% is a wild overstatement. Bobby Valentine? It's not like he's unique.

But beyond that, look at the Boys of Summer and the players who *didn't* become managers. You don't think they didn't also have some similar "valuable qualities"?

Duke
Jackie
Pee Wee
Campy
Amoros
Gilliam
Furillo
Erskine
Podres
Newcombe

Etc

This is the problem of trying to give unto someone like Hodges special Mystical Powers as a member of the Boys of Summer: it's a team full of players with similar Mystical Powers. How do we start dividing up things?

The 1955 Dodgers won 98 games, then 4 in the World Series. So how would you split up the credit for the Wins and Losses between:

Offense
Pitching
Defense
Manager
Coaching
General Management
Ownership
Mystical Player Powers
Fan Support
Dumb Ass Luck

Then for each of those things, how would you parcel them out for each player / manager / coach / front office person?

It's fine to talk about Mystical Player Powers, but how many wins did it add? Was Gil worth 2 wins a year just on Mystical Player Powers? Jackie another 2, Duke another 2, Campy (who everyone thought was their MVP when healthy) 3? Pee Wee 2?

Then how many for Alston being able to push all the buttons? 4?

When one actually tries to go down this path they quickly find that the Boys of Summer were an 80 win team without the stuff not accounted for in Offense, Defense and Pitching.

Except...

98-55 Real Record
95-58 Pythagorean W-L

They frankly are pretty damn close to their Pythag. So somehow all these Mystical Powers of various players (of which there were more than usual with those Dodgers) and the manager and the coaches and the front office actually ended up being reflected rather well in their Runs Scored (Offense) and Runs Allowed (Pitching & Defense).

So... uh... yeah. This was an argument made back in the early 80s. Time hasn't made it a lot better.
1:17 PM Mar 26th
 
jdw
On Foster-Hodgers, they actually are very similar to each other. The most similar player for each:

Hodges
Norm Cash (930)
George Foster (926)
Tino Martinez (918)
Jack Clark (911)
Boog Powell (899)
Rocky Colavito (897)
Joe Adcock (895)
Lee May (892)
Willie Horton (887)
Derrek Lee (885)

Foster
Gil Hodges (926)
Willie Horton (923)
Tino Martinez (919)
Raul Ibanez (918)
Jermaine Dye (916)
Jack Clark (916)
Del Ennis (911)
Joe Adcock (911)
Rocky Colavito (909)
Fred Lynn (908)

Tony isn't really similar to Hodges. He also had his prime as a 3B rather than on the 1B/LF end of the spectrum like Tony and George.

The Furillo comp is pretty funny, since Furillo's peak MVP seasons weren't 1-2-3-6, or even close to that level. Then again... neither were Hodges.
1:00 PM Mar 26th
 
tangotiger
Among non-pitchers born 1919-1929 (Hodges was born in 1924), Hodges is 11th among non-pitchers in WAR (according to Baseball Reference).

Among non-pitchers born 1959-1969, in 10th through 12th place are: Tim Raines, Edgar, and Kenny Lofton. With Ryno, Alomar, Biggio following them.

***

You also have the issue of deciding whether you want to compare to contemporaries, without paying attention to the rest of history. And then deciding whether the increased number of teams means you want to honor even more players (so that 11th back then is more like 17th or something today).

***

So, you can make a strong argument for Gil Hodges under one perspective, and a strong argument against him with a different perspective.

It's the same kind of argument you can make for and against Jesse Owens.
12:33 PM Mar 26th
 
MarisFan61
....sorry, that link doesn't work.
How about this (and apologies in advance if this is no better):
https://www.deanscards.com/p/12447/1958-Topps-170-Vic-Wertz
10:50 AM Mar 26th
 
MarisFan61
Wertz's polio was one of the first sports-medical things I ever knew, because it was mentioned on the back of his 1958 Topps card:
https://www.deanscards.com/images/actual_images/1958/Topps/170/1298802b.jpg
10:47 AM Mar 26th
 
CharlesSaeger
"I wrote something about this situation, about a year ago, and one of you posted a response to the effect that you had done some research and couldn’t find any evidence that Rolfe platooned Wertz." I'll take blame, but also point out that I had sent you a comment where I took that back and agreed that, in the time frame you mentioned, Wertz was platooned. I don't expect you to publish every remark to Hey Bill, but I did send the amendment.
8:09 AM Mar 26th
 
evanecurb
Over in the Reader Posts section, some of us have attempted similar comparisons. They are really fun. There was one a few years ago, about the time Jim Rice and Andre Dawson were elected to the Hall of Fame, that compared 1970s outfielders who didn't make the Hall to those two: Parker, Evans, Singleton, Lynn, Oglivie, Amos Otis, a few others (Griffey, Sr. maybe? not sure). Not similar players, but certainly contemporaries who were All-Stars. As I recall, Evans emerged as the clear number one, and Otis and Oglivie were at the bottom, with Parker, Singleton, and Lynn fairly close together.


11:53 PM Mar 25th
 
Rich Dunstan
Regarding Wertz's polio as a human interest story, I remember being well aware of it some years later, as a pre-teen baseball fan around 1960.
11:19 PM Mar 25th
 
MarisFan61
About Hodges for the Hall of Fame:
We always look for things to enhance our knowledge of a player, hopefully objective things, but heck, we take what we can get. :-)

Something I pretty much assume as a valid thing: A player who later becomes a manager probably had valuable qualities as a player beyond what showed up in the numbers.

Admittedly, in order to believe in this, you have to believe that things like leadership, attitude, inspiration, role modeling, teaching..... whatever it is that manager-type people can contribute as players that go beyond what shows up in their own numbers ..... you have to believe that those things are important. You have to believe that they help other players do well, they help with teamwork, team morale and focus. I don't see how those things wouldn't be significant, and I think having such players on the team would tend to help. I don't at all mean that these players help to "manage" the team; I'm talking only about the general effect of such a player on the team.

I realize that even assuming all of that, it's not 100% valid to think that future managers have these qualities and these kinds of effects. But I'd bet it's at least 80% valid. I think it's almost certain that they tend to have these qualities more than the average player, and probably much more. Stealing a line from Bill (he said it when justifying an aspect of Win Shares, I think about defensive credit for catchers on good teams), it seems a lot more right to assume it than not to assume it.

So, especially when we're talking about a player who was on a successful team, I take the fact that he later was a manager as an intangible but probable plus on what he was as a player. And to me, it takes Hodges from 'borderline' to 'absolutely' -- not because I'm giving him extra credit for his managerial accomplishments but because of what his later being a manager tells me about him as a player.
11:01 PM Mar 25th
 
enamee
Oh, and of course, Campanella and Bench.

Matthew
4:25 PM Mar 25th
 
enamee
Not to quibble, but Hodges was pretty obviously the Tony Perez of the Boys of Summer, not the George Foster. Foster would be... well, probably Carl Furillo.

Actually, those two dynasties are fairly comparable -- Hodges & Perez, Jackie & Morgan, Reese & Concepcion. Both had a jack-of-all-trades guy (Gilliam and Rose). Both had a big-time slugger (Duke Snider and Foster). Both had a good-but-often-overlooked right fielder (Furillo and Griffey). Newcombe and Erskine kind of correspond to Gullett and Nolan.
4:25 PM Mar 25th
 
hotstatrat
I loved this - especially the tangents (Stanky, Allston, etc.) of such significant history.
3:04 PM Mar 25th
 
jdw
rgregory: I'm not entirely sure why Hodges is a HOFer when (i) he's not in the HOF, and (ii) it's not like we're talking about an Arky Vaughan level player who is not in the HOF waiting for the Vet to vote him in. We're talking about a player who was essentially the George Foster of the Boys of Summer, except people in 1976-81 thought more highly of Foster than people in 1949-56 thought of Hodges.​
1:23 PM Mar 25th
 
tigerlily
Nice article. Thanks Bill. Regarding Wertz's polio - does anyone know how much of a human interest story it was at the time? If something similar happened to a player nowadays it would be a major story.​
7:49 AM Mar 25th
 
bjames
1) My error. . .I see that I have Mantle with the Yankees in 1950. He was not, of course.

2) I take the thing about Bilko's military service to be a Sergeant Bilko joke? Bilko was never in the service.
1:47 AM Mar 25th
 
tdwalla
Actually, Calvin was Cronin's brother-in-law. Mildred Cronin was Clark's niece.
1:31 AM Mar 25th
 
tdwalla
(Psst. Clark Griffith was Joe Cronin's father-in-law. Calvin was Clark's nephew.)
1:28 AM Mar 25th
 
OldBackstop
It’s not like these are the only four players in baseball history who would clearly be Hall of Famers if a few things had broken right for them; there are probably a few dozen players about whom you could say that.

Just typed out a long response and of course...

Anyway, there aren't many times I reel back from a statement of Bill's but I would think there were hundreds of players you could say this about, from years lost at war (Hodges), due to injury (Tommy John, Nomar). Guys that got caught up in an era with great competition for their HOF slot (Dwight Evans, Ted Simmons). Guys that developed drug problems that hurt their numbers (Dave Parker). Guys that got caught doing stuff that many HOFers have probably done (Shoeless Joe, the PEDers). Guys that were outshined by PEDers during their best years (McGriff) And I had a whole list of examples I ain't typing in.

But it would be interesting to establish parameters and discuss it.


1:19 AM Mar 25th
 
shthar
In Bilko's defence, he did lose quite a bit of time to his army service.
10:44 PM Mar 24th
 
MarisFan61
ROBINSONG: I wasn't particularly referring to your post. You were indeed very clear about that, including that Hodges was different.
10:05 PM Mar 24th
 
jemanji
A vintage Bill James article. What a pleasure to read.
…..

Bobby Fischer said, "To get good, you gotta love the game. I'm not so sure the Russians do."

This 'research' seems to have been written out of sheer curiosity and enjoyment of the sport. I mean, what question is going to be answered by tracing the career arcs of four old-timers? This isn't a piece that sets out asking, "Is Ubaldo Jimenez likely to be underpaid or overpaid," and then uses advanced math to propose an answer about how good Jimenez is compared to Matt Garza.

I don't even know if it began out of a desire to fit in Bill's normal paradigm - to find out how baseball works.

Even so, using this "simple love for the game" angle to just noodle around and explore, we run into a great "illustration" from Wertz' 1951 -- that ballplayers aren't Strat-O-Matic cards. And that sabermetricians need increased respect for the complexity of the problems.

This idea has come a long way in the last few years. Many, many sabermetricians are aware of the fact that algebra fails to capture every analytical angle that bears on a question like, "Should you platoon Joe Shlabotnik and Sidd Finch? A LOT of guys are less dogmatic than they used to be.




9:56 PM Mar 24th
 
rgregory1956

Gil Hodges is a HOFer.....he just hasn't been elected yet. It is almost inevitable that he'll get in. Maybe even this winter. The last time (2011) the Golden Age Veterans Committee met, Santo was elected with 15, Kaat had 10, Hodges and Minoso each had 9, Tony Oliva had 8, and then a bunch of guys with 3 or fewer votes. It is not inconceivable that Hodges will pick up the necessary 3 additional votes, either in 2014 or 2017 or 2020.


9:51 PM Mar 24th
 
jdw
The tricky thing about Klu's potential candidacy is trying to figure out how high he needed to get, and who the similar players to Potential Klu are that got into the HOF. On the surface one can separate Klu from from of the other "Hodges Family" of hitter (like Colavito, Boog, etc) is that Klu hit for BA that HOF voters loved as much as HR and BA. Through 1956 he was a .303 hitter with 245 HR, plugging away at 40+ HR a year when the back injury changed his career. He had 7 .300+ seasons at that point, in addition to the 5 100+ RBI seasons and 3 40+ HR seasons. Gil had two .300+ seasons, Boog had 1, Rocky had 1.

But...

Klu was 129 HR away from Rocky's 374. That wasn't impossible to get to if he were healthy, and perhaps even in his normal decline he could have kept his career BA above .290 to top Gil (.273) and Rocky (.266) by a wide margin.

Here's where it gets tricky:

Duke
* .295-407-1333 Career
* 5 .300+ BA
* 5 40+ HR
* 6 100+ RBI
* Better MVP results
* CF on the Boys of Summer

It took Duke 11 years on the ballot to get in the HOF, which is pretty mind boggling to think of now.

There's a base of a HOF career to Klu, but he also was 32 at the end of 1956 and when looking at most of the players of his type in that era, most not surprisingly hit the wall.
9:38 PM Mar 24th
 
greg1990
Hi Bill, greatly enjoyed the article. According to Crosley Field by Greg Rhodes and John Erardi, the right field seating area was first installed in 1946, and the Reds removed it in the middle of the 1950 season (could a team even do that now?). The section was re-installed prior to the 1953 season and nicknamed "The Goat Run". When I was attending games at Crosley the right field seats were referred to as the Sun or Moon Deck, depending on whether it was a day or night game. Dave Concepcion gave Klu much credit for his development as a hitter and his statue was the first one to be installed at Great American Ballpark. Thanks.
8:36 PM Mar 24th
 
bjames
Sorry about the double post. . .glitchy system.
7:48 PM Mar 24th
 
bjames
Hodges and Sievers. . .Gil Hodges in his best season, 1954, hit .304 with 23 doubles, 5 triples, and 42 homers; Sievers in his best season, 1957, hit .301, also with 23 doubles, 5 triples and 42 homers. Both players had a slugging percentage of .579. Sievers had 76 walks; Hodges drew 74, although Sievers’ On Base Percentage was quite a bit higher (.388 to .373), mostly because Hodges hit 19 sacrifice flies, which I believe is still the major league record for sacrifice flies in a season. The unusual sac fly total kept his average over .300, but count against his on base percentage. Hodges had 225 plate appearances with runners in scoring position—a huge total.
7:48 PM Mar 24th
 
bjames
Hodges and Sievers. . .Gil Hodges in his best season, 1954, hit .304 with 23 doubles, 5 triples, and 42 homers; Sievers in his best season, 1957, hit .301, also with 23 doubles, 5 triples and 42 homers. Both players had a slugging percentage of .579. Sievers had 76 walks; Hodges drew 74, although Sievers’ On Base Percentage was quite a bit higher (.388 to .373), mostly because Hodges hit 19 sacrifice flies, which I believe is still the major league record for sacrifice flies in a season. The unusual sac fly total kept his average over .300, but count against his on base percentage. Hodges had 225 plate appearances with runners in scoring position—a huge total.
7:48 PM Mar 24th
 
Robinsong
Marisfan -
My point about Hodges was that even if these four had been as consistent as Hodges, they might not have made the HOF. Hodges at his 3-year peak was better than any of these over the course of a full season (at least according to bb-ref), and was durable and consistent, yet did not make the HOF.
7:43 PM Mar 24th
 
MarisFan61
I love the article too, partly because these were guys who were playing when I started following the game, which also means they're all in the 1958 Topps set which I happily reacquired, decades after my mom (of course) threw them out.

About HODGES: I wouldn't at all see him as an additional member of this "group," for two big reasons:

-- He was a much better defensive player than any of them.
-- The up-and-down, on-and-off-ness is a major aspect and similarity of the careers of these 4 guys. Hodges' career was the total opposite: Utter continuity and consistency.​
4:57 PM Mar 24th
 
enamee
I also immediately thought of Gil Hodges. I seem to recall seeing a Win Shares-Loss Shares analysis of his career at some point on this site, but I just did a search and didn't find anything. Hodges was five months older than Klu, 10 months older than Wertz. Baseball Reference sees him as quite a bit more valuable than all of these four guys, but he's the same general type of player in exactly the same era.
4:17 PM Mar 24th
 
evanecurb
I enjoyed this article very much. I'd like to see more of this type of comparison. Star players with similar attributes who were contemporaries. As you stated, the interesting thing about these four men is that each had Hall of Fame type ability but for one reason or other, didn't have a HOF career.
4:00 PM Mar 24th
 
jdw
I want to say that Bill did run the Hodges numbers once, but the searchy is a little inconsistent in bringing stuff up. I had a problem a week or so ago looking up the Yaz-Williams article via the searchy, despite (i) it being recent, and (ii) the last name of one of those players being unique. :)
2:48 PM Mar 24th
 
tangotiger
As an aside, my version of Individualized Won-Loss records (The Indis), using Baseball Reference version of WAR, has them as:

68-51 Adcock
60-44 Kluszewski
63-49 Wertz
61-57 Sievers

Thesea are pretty much in-line with Win Shares (if you divide all of Bill's numbers by 3).
2:38 PM Mar 24th
 
Steven Goldleaf
Just looked Skowron up--he hung on longer than I thought, retired in '67, one year after Adcock, not before. Adcock was GREAT in his final year in my 1966 Strat-o-Matic set.
11:23 AM Mar 24th
 
Steven Goldleaf
Hodges was, like Klusewski, born in 1924, and was a big man with tremendous physical strength. Moose Skowron, like Klu, was a college football (Purdue, I believe) and another slugging 1bman, albeit one born a bit later. (Also Polish.) Skowron and Hodges both retired before Adcock did, and before Sievers, which puts them in this category of slugging 1b men who retired in the early-to-mid 1960s.
11:07 AM Mar 24th
 
Robinsong
I really enjoyed the article, but I am not completely convinced that these were HOFs with better luck. I would love to compare the Win Share/Loss Share of Gil Hodges, a contemporary first baseman who had great health and played for a great team with good management, though the start of his career was slowed by service in the war. According to bb-ref, he had the three best seasons of any of the players except for Klusewski's best year and was more consistent, yet he is on the outside of the Hall looking in. Admittedly, one of the reasons that he does well compared to the four here is that he was a much better defender, which the HOF does not value much in most cases. In particular, his average was lower than Klusewski and Wertz in their best years. Still, I think that these players, even in luck, would have been on the bubble, like Hodges and Mattingly and Perez, and, in several cases, been hurt by playing for bad teams. [ One side note: Bonds broke the NL walk record in '96, and McGwire held it for 3 years, with Bagwell also beating Stanky and Wynn tying him (back in 69).]
10:15 AM Mar 24th
 
 
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