The Integration Adjustment

            OK, let’s take on the issue of integration, and its effects on league quality.  We have two problems here:

1)     How do we calibrate the progress of integration in baseball, one league vs. the other, and

2)      How do we integrate (no pun intended). . .how do we integrate that data into our study?

I decided to chart the progress of integration by counting the number of Black REGULARS in each league each year.  Of course, that means that we have to decide Who is black and Who is a regular.  My rules were:

1)     The only issues about who is black have to do with Latin players, of course.  My rule was that a player was only counted as Black if he was dark enough that he HAD to be counted.   Ruben Gomez and Chico Carrasquel. . .not black.  They could have passed and played before integration, at least possibly.  Roberto Clemente. . . .no way.

There are many other people who have documented the progress of integration in baseball, and I used their lists to help sort it out.  The only player that I departed from the other experts on is Vic Power.  For some reason, the lists of players who broke the color line never include Vic Power, but I don’t see how anyone can possibly exclude Power.  The Yankees had Power and Moose Skowron.  Both had great seasons in the American Association in 1953.  The Yankees pretty clearly chose Skowron over Power for 1954 because they weren’t ready to break the color line—or, I guess, that Power wasn’t the right player to do it with.  Power wasn’t Yankee image.  He was a showman, a center-of-attention guy.  The Yankees didn’t really like guys like that no matter what color they were.    Power talked frequently about being disadvantaged by racial discrimination in the US—thrown out of restaurants, etc.—and it was a frequent topic of conversation that Power liked to date white women.   I don’t see how anyone could not consider him to be black athlete.  Also, the business of deciding who was black enough to be considered black in the old days is kind of creepy.

2) As to who was considered a regular, my rules were that as long it was reasonable to list a player as a regular, I would list him as a regular.   I decided that, for purposes of my study, there were 8 regular position players and 5 pitchers on each team who should be considered the regulars.  If a player COULD be put on that list without creating a situation in which the team had 14 regulars, then I would list him as a regular.   In other words, if there’s a call that could go either way reasonably, this guy or that guy, then I’d count him as a regular.  But if including the player would force you to count 14 men as regulars, then I wouldn’t count him. 

So then, we have counts of the number of Black Regulars in each league in each year beginning in 1947 until the league is considered to be fully integrated.  The National League has:

1 Black Regular in 1947

2 in 1948

4 in 1949

6 in 1950

7 in 1951

5 in 1952

6 in 1953

12 in 1954

14 in 1955

16 in 1956

14 in 1957

20 in 1958, and

23 in 1959.

The standard that I decided to use for "full integration" was 20% of the league’s regulars or more being players of color.   In an eight-team league, that means 21 regulars.  13 regulars per team, 8 teams, 104 regulars in the league, 20% is 21.   21 regulars, we consider the league to be integrated, so in 1959—and for every year after 1959—the National League is considered to have completed the transition from segregation to integration. 

Here's a fact that surprised me:  in 1952 there are as many black regulars in the American League as in the National, five in each league.   An out-of-line fact, but. . .that’s the count. 

In the early years of integration, the American League was really just one year behind the National, or one year and one step, let’s say.  It was after 1953 that the gap really opened up.  The American League had

No Black Regulars in 1947, but

1 in 1948,

1 in 1949,

2 in 1950,

4 in 1951,

5 in 1952,

3 in 1953,

5 in 1954,

7 in 1955,

8 in 1956,

7 in 1957,

7 in 1958,

7 in 1959, and

8 in 1960. 

            The American League expanded to ten teams in 1961, which raises the standard for integration to be considered reasonably complete from 21 regulars to 26.  (10 X 13 is 130, times .20 is 26.) In 1960 the American League was only 38% of the way toward being considered fully integrated. 

            In 1961 the number in the American League jumped to 18, in part because of expansion, but mostly NOT because of expansion; mostly just because the resistance was crumbling.  The numbers went up in Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Minnesota and Kansas City, mostly just up by one per team.  So. .

            18 in 1961,

            20 in 1962,

            19 in 1963,

            20 in 1964,

            22 in 1965,

            24 in 1966,

            24 in 1967, and

            26 in 1968.

            So the National League reached the standard of complete integration in 1959, the American League not until 1968. 

            Now, how do we integrate this information into our analysis? 

            Let us ask this question.  Suppose that there are two teams in a team, otherwise equal, but one team limits itself by refusing to use black players, while the other team does not.   How much of an advantage does this give to the second team? 

            It is not reasonable to suggest that this is One to Nothing (1.000 to .000), because the integrated team would not have a winning percentage of 1.000, and the segregated team would not have a winning percentage of .000.  But what WOULD the difference be? 

            The numbers have to work with the analysis I am going to explain in a moment, but there are different sets of numbers that would work.   We have to choose numbers that work, and we have to choose numbers that are reasonable. 

            The numbers I chose are .450 and .55738.    This is what I am saying.  First of all, we establish to what extent each league is considered to be fully integrated.  In 1949 the National League had 4 black regulars.  We will consider that to be 19% integrated. 

            The standards we are using are .450 and .55738, a gap of .10738.  We apply the 19% (.190) to the gap of .10738, and we have .0204.   Add that to the .450 base, and we have .4704.  We thus conclude that the "integration Strength Index" for the National League in 1949 is .4704. 

            What we are saying, in plain English, is that every segregated league in history, every league in which there are no black regulars, has a presumptive strength index of .450.   Every fully integrated league—the National League since 1959, and the American League since 1968—has a presumed strength index of .557.   In the transition era, each league’s strength index is determined by the extent to which the league is integrated.  And that creates the following numbers for the transition era:

            In 1958, when the National League had 20 black regulars and the American League 7, this creates a presumptive strength index of .552 for the National League, .486 for the American.  In all other years, the margin is less than that.    The average for all leagues over time is .50000.

            The key question is, are those numbers reasonable?  They seem reasonable to me; that’s the only defense for them.  They seem reasonable to me.   We are saying that any league post-1968 is presumed superior to any league up to 1946 by a margin of .557 to .450.   That seems reasonable to me.  It’s 22 years; the league gets stronger over time. 

            There is an argument that the numbers should be one and zero (1.000 and .000).   The argument is "Yes, no team is going to play 1.000 baseball against any other team, but this is merely one indicator out of. . ..let us say 35.  We’re not GOING to get to 35, but in theory, that’s the system. . . .a large number of small indicators.  The other indicators will dilute the impact of the segregation index.  But limiting it to .107, rather 1.000, is twice-diluting them, thus reducing the impact to near-zero.

            But I don’t believe that that’s the right logic.   IF the integrated leagues are in fact superior to the segregated leagues. . . .I have no doubt that they are. . .but IF they are, then the other indicators should be able to recognize and give credit for that fact.   If the other indicators don’t show the post-1968 leagues to be superior to the pre-1947 leagues, then we’re claiming an advantage for the integrated leagues for which the only evidence is the presumption that an integrated league must be stronger than a segregated league.  I don’t think we should rely on that assumption more heavily than we need to.  

            These are the league comparisons for the years 1947-1968, using all three of the indicators that we have created so far, and weighting them all equally:

            So we still show the National League as becoming the superior league in 1953, and remaining the superior league throughout most of this era, with a couple of out-of-line seasons.  The margin peaks in 1965, at .546 to .481, or 65 points. 

            Thanks for reading.