1.  Dividing Lines

            When I started writing about baseball in 1975, it was fairly easy to divide baseball history into eras.   There was the 19^th century (1876-1899), the Dead Ball Era (1900-1919), the Era Between the Wars (1920-1945), the Post-War Era (1946-1960), and the Expansion Era (1961-1975).

            But the expansion era is now too long to be simply an era, and. . .where do you divide it?    The DH rule is a natural dividing line, but it makes the early expansion era too short (1961-1972).   The coming of free agency is a dividing line, but. . .same problem.   What works?

            I’ve given up on it.   I’ve started dividing baseball history into 20-year groups—19^th century (1876-1899), the Dead Ball era (1900-1919), the Babe Ruth era (1920-1939), the War and Post-War era (1940-1959), the early expansion era (1960-1979), the early free agent era (1980-1999), and the 21^st century (2000-2009).   Anybody have a better idea?

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2.  Exhausting Expansion

            How long does it take for an expansion team to be no longer an expansion team? 

            At least 40 years.

            The thirty major league teams can be divided into 16 “original” franchises and 14 expansion teams.    The overall record of the 14 expansion teams, in their first seasons of play, is 849-1412, a .375 percentage (average 61-101).    It takes eleven years for expansion teams, on average, to reach .500:

            Up to that point there is regular progress.   After the eleventh year, however, expansion teams go back under .500 for most of the next thirty years:

            There are ups and downs, and the data is open to some interpretation.     From years 31 to 35, however, the overall winning percentage of expansion teams is just .463, and in years 36 to 40 expansion teams are still more than 100 games under .500, at .492.  

            There are ten expansion teams which have histories of at least 32 years, eight which have been around 40 years, and four which go beyond 40 years.  There isn’t enough data there to give a rock-solid interpretation of it, but my interpretation is this:  that expansion teams remain expansion teams for at least 40 years, because it takes at least that long to develop a mature fan base.  

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3.  Lou Brock and Johnny Damon

A reader asked me to compare Johnny Damon to Lou Brock, suggesting that their numbers were similar up to Damon’s current age.
            OK. . ..Damon reached the majors late in the season at age 21, with the Kansas City Royals.    Brock reached the majors 34 years earlier or a year later, at age 22.   At ages 23 and 24, the players had seasons of very comparable value:

            Damon, with more playing time, was ahead at this age; Damon was 47-50, and Brock was 26-30.     Both were essentially .500 players at this early stage of their careers.

            Brock started slowly in 1964, aged 25, and was traded to the Cardinals early in the season.   His career caught fire the instant he was traded—but Damon also had a good season at that age.   Both players at age 25 hit .300 for the first time in their careers, each player hit 14 homers, and their stolen base totals and OPS are similar:

            At age 26, again, both players had similar seasons:

            In a Win Shares/Loss Shares comparison, Damon is still ahead through age 26, 85-73 vs. 67-59.  

            Over the next four years, however—the prime years of ages 27-30—Brock substantially outperformed Damon:

            At age 27 Brock’s numbers are just better.   At ages 28 to 30 the raw numbers are about the same, but Brock was performing in an environment where one run had much more impact on the game than was Damon.   In 1968 the National League ERA was 2.98.  In 2003 the American League ERA was 4.53.   Brock’s .746 OPS trumps Damon’s .750.   By the age of 30, Brock’s career won-lost record was 164-106; Damon’s was 163-129.   Brock was 12 games ahead.   In their early 30s the two players were close, but Brock has gained an additional two games:

            Brock, playing in a speed era, regularly led the league in stolen bases.  Damon, playing in a power era, has de-emphasized base stealing as he has aged, and concentrated on hitting for some power—which Brock certainly could have done, just as Damon certainly could have stolen more bases.  Through age 34 Brock had a career won-lost equivalent of 249-161; Damon is 235-175.   Brock is 14 games ahead.

            At the age of 35 Lou Brock stole 118 bases, which was a major league record at the time, and finished second in the NL MVP voting.   Damon, at age 35, is also off to a red-hot start, moving into double figures in home runs in mid-May.   After age 35 Brock’s career went into a normal aging decline pattern, and he finished with a career won-lost equivalent of 325-245:

            Strictly as offensive players, Brock rates a significant edge:

            Lou Brock on offense:  268-163  .622

            Johnny Damon on offense:        193-136  .587

            Lou Brock through age 34:       206-104  .665

            But gives back some of it on defense:

            Lou Brock in the field:     56-  82  .407

            Johnny Damon in the field:           42-  39  .519

            Lou Brock through age 34:         42-  57  .426

            Lou Brock was not a good outfielder.   This is the primary reason the Cubs got rid of him.   They had Billy Williams in left field; they wanted Brock to play center.   Brock didn’t read the ball off the bat well, didn’t get good jumps, and didn’t finish the play well.   Damon, despite his infamous throwing arm, is a better outfielder.  

            So. . .Johnny Damon vs. Lou Brock is not a crazy comparison.   I see Lou Brock as being a little bit better, 14 games better through age 34, and that’s a meaningful separation, considering that Brock is not an overwhelming Hall of Famer to begin with.  But we estimated after last season that Johnny Damon had a 38% chance to get 3,000 career hits, and nothing’s happened yet this year to cause us to say that that’s too high.

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4.  Dave Parker vs. Dwight Evans

            I keep getting letters from somebody who asks if I can compare Dave Parker to Jim Rice.   Well, no, actually, I can’t.  I work for the Red Sox.   Figure it out.

            I can however, compare Dave Parker to Dwight Evans, which is actually a better comparison.   Dave Parker and Dwight Evans were both born in 1951.  Both were right fielders.   Dwight Evans came to the majors in 1972, and played through 1991.  Parker came up in 1973, and played through 1991.   Evans hit 385 homers; Parker hit 339.  Evans scored 1,470 runs in his career and drove in 1,384.   Parker drove in 109 more (1,493) but scored 198 less (1,272).  

            Evans was in the majors in 1972 and a quasi-regular in 1973/74, while Parker didn’t become a regular until 1975, so Evans started out ahead:

            Evans’ career record through 1974 is equivalent to 25-22; Parker, to 10-9.  Like Damon and Brock, they started out as more-or-less .500 players.  

            Over the next five years, however, Dave Parker was very much a better player than Evans.   In those five years Parker won an MVP Award (1978), finished third in the MVP voting twice (1975 and 1977), and was mentioned in the MVP voting every year.   Evans, in this era, was never mentioned in the MVP voting.   Parker won two batting titles in this era, won three Gold Gloves, and was the MVP of the All Star game. He ran well and threw well, and in the late 1970s was often cited as the best player in baseball. 

            By the end of 1979 Parker had a career won-lost equivalent of 132-44, a stunning .748 percentage, while Evans was a little over .500 at 95-78.  

            In 1980, however, Evans (for the first time since 1974) out-played Parker, albeit by a narrow margin:

            Parker still out-hit Evans by almost 30 points and drove in more runs, but Evans’ on-base and slugging percentages were better, and his OPS was 57 points better.   In 1981 the thin margin between them suddenly became a chasm:

            Parker by the early 1980s was getting heavily into cocaine use and, perhaps more damaging to his career, was also putting on weight.   Unlike Evans, who was—and is—extremely trim, Parker was always a big man, with a very large torso.   Over the next three years Evans had his best seasons, while Parker’s career hit the rocks:

            In 1979, Parker was 35 ½ games ahead of Evans.   Evans cut that to 34 games in 1980, to 25 games in 1981, to 16 ½ games in 1982, to 15 games in 1983, and to eight games in 1984.  By the end of 1984 Evan’s career won-lost record was 192-125 (.606), while Parker’s was 189-106 (.641).

            By 1983 Parker’s career appeared to be nearly over.  He was past 30, and he had been a sub-.500 player for four years—with a weight problem, bad knees, a drug habit in his past and not the best reputation as a teammate.    Not a lot of careers can get beyond a combination like that.

            Parker, however, was a phenomenal talent, and, back home in Cincinnati, he rallied.  He drove in 125 runs in 1985, and 116 more in 1986:

            Parker’s triple-crown numbers were all better than Evans’, and, in that era, that was what most people focused on.   But Parker by 1986 was slow.  He was 5 for 18 as a base stealer in 1985, and 1 for 7 in 1986.  He grounded into 26 double plays in 1985, and 18 more in 1986.   Evans by now was much faster—and drawing twice as many walks.   Evans made fewer outs and scored more runs.  Despite driving in 116 runs in 1986, Parker was in fact nothing more than an average player—and Evans was still gaining on him.   In 1987 Parker and Evans more or less traded triple-crown statistics—while Evans kept his other advantages:

            This put Evans ahead of Parker in the career won-lost equivalent, 254-156 for Evans, 243-155 for Parker.

            From there on out, Evans outplayed Parker in every year except 1990:

            Dave Parker’s final career win shares and loss shares are 289-212, .577—while Evans’ are 310-196, or .610.   Parker meets neither of the standards that represent a Hall of Famer, 300 career Win Shares or 100 plus-wins, while Evans clears both of those benchmarks.

            Now, let’s note a couple of things.   First, Dave Parker’s Peak Value is higher.    Parker’s best four seasons (1975, 1977, 1978 and 1979) score at 24-8, 27-6, 26-4 and 25-7.   Evans, who lost his best season to the strike in 1981, can’t match those seasons.  

            And second, there may be a problem with our defensive evaluations of right fielders.   We credit Parker with a career defensive won-lost record of 43-68, a .388 percentage—but Evans hardly any better at 48-70, a .407 percentage.  

            Parker won three Gold Gloves.   Evans won eight.   I could give you reasons for the evaluations we have, but fans of the two players will not accept that these men should be rated as below-average defensive players.   And, in truth, the reasons I might give you are probably not all that persuasive.    We’ll work on it.

            But that has to do with Evans and Parker versus the world, not with Evans versus Parker.   Dwight Evans at his best was never the player that Parker was in the late 1970s—but over the course of his career, he was better.