In the National League in 2009, for the first time in history, there were more than seven strikeouts per nine innings pitched. Prior to 2009 the record for a league was 6.99, by the National in 2001 and again 2008. All hail Mark Reynolds; we’ve shattered the seven strikeout barrier. The magic seven.
In the first year of the National League (1876) the league averaged 1.12 strikeouts per nine innings. In the 133 years since then the strikeout average has gone up 73 years, down 60. The average gains are slightly larger (0.26) than the average losses (0.21). In the American League the data is similar. Since 1901 the league strikeout rate has gone up 61 times, and down 47 times, with the gains being slightly larger than the losses.
In recent years these increases have been larger than normal. In both leagues, the league ERA in 2009 was about the same as it was in 2005. But in the American League in those years, the strikeout rate has increased from 6.06 to 6.76. In the National League, it has increased from 6.57 to 7.09.
Strikeout rates have increased in the majors in every decade since 1920, except for the 1970s. The first league to average 5.00 strikeouts per nine innings was the National League in 1958; the first to average 6.00 was the American League in 1964. Strikeout rates went down in the 1970s—but they went up in the 1960s more than twice as much as they went down in the 1970s, so that the 1970s rate was still much higher than the 1950s. In the 1980s the major league strikeout rate was 5.38 per nine innings. In the 1990s it was 6.18, and, in the decade just completed, 6.63.
We have here a trend line which
a) Has been in motion for 130-plus years, and
b) Has tremendous momentum at the present time.
Such a trend is not likely to stop suddenly. I think we have to expect strikeout rates in the next ten years to average over 7.00 per nine innings, and there is a very real possibility that, by the end of the coming decade, we may be near 8.00.
Why does the strikeout rate always go up? Essentially for this reason. If you look at pitchers, strikeout pitchers are successful. Strikeout pitchers are more successful than non-strikeout pitchers.
But if you look at batters, the obverse is not true. Batters who strike out are NOT less successful than batters who don’t strike out. They are, if anything, a little MORE successful.
This unusual asymmetry in the game creates asymmetrical pressures on the strikeout rate. Teams are always looking for strikeout pitchers—but there is very little or no pressure to find batters who strike out less often. We accept strikeouts for hitters, value them for pitchers. This drives strikeout rates up. It always has.
Is there any end to this in sight?
Well, yes, depending on how you define “in sight”. Strikeouts are not a practical negative for hitters because they correlate with power. Hitters who strike out tend also to hit home runs. When you increase your bat speed you increase your home runs, but you also increase your strikeouts. But this depends on there being a variation in home run rates. If every hitter had the same home run rate, then strikeouts would certainly be a negative.
We will never reach the point at which every player has the same home run rate—but the variation in home run rates is contracting a meaningful pace. In 1954 Ted Kluszewski led the major leagues in Home Runs and RBI with 49 and 141. In 2008 Ryan Howard led the majors in the same two categories, with almost the same totals—48 and 143. In 2009 the leaders in those categories had 47 and 141.
But in 1954, 39% of major league regulars (450 or more at bats) hit less than 10 home runs, and 62% hit less than 15 home runs. In 2009, only 22% of major league regulars (450 or more at bats) hit less than 10 home runs, and only 39% hit less than 15 home runs. We are transitioning to a game in which everyone is a power hitter, more or less.
In 1960 Mickey Mantle and Roger Maris led the American League in home runs, with 40 and 39. In 2009 Carlos Pena and Mark Teixeira tied for the American League lead in home runs, with 39 each.
But in 1960, an average American League team hit 136 home runs. In 2009 the average was 183. As before, the totals for the top players are back where they were decades ago—but the team totals are very different, because there are many more players hitting home runs.
If we were to reach a point at which every hitter was in the same range of power, then the advantage would go to the one who struck out less often. We will never reach the point at which all players’ power is the same, but we are moving in that direction—and have been moving in that direction since 1920.
Eventually, this trend would kill off the other one. In a world in which every player was a power hitter, strikeouts would be as bad for hitters as they were good for pitchers. That’s the good news.
The bad news is, we’re at least 50 years away from the point at which that trend negates the other one, maybe 100 years away.
Strikeouts, observed that great philosopher Crash Davis, are boring—and they’re fascist. Strikeouts minimize the need for defensive play, thus taking the fielders out of the game. If we want to live to see the end of the Dave Kingman generation, we need to take deliberate actions to bring about the end of it. Tomorrow, I’ll talk a little bit about how that could be done.