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Back to Back Bonds

By Bill James
May 29, 2008

            In a column posted a couple of days ago I tried to explain why I see the issue of signing Barry Bonds in 2008 very differently than do most of my friends and colleagues in the analytic community.   I think we are making some progress in understanding one another here, so I thought I would pick up the cudgels and go at it again.

            Rick Shaneyfelt’s comment that the Hall is a different discussion, better left for another time, is certainly correct.

            Gary somebody (Gary, Indiana?) posed the question, “What are the criteria that make sense for a team to take on Bonds?” and suggested three criteria:

            1) That it be an over-.500 team, within striking distance of the championship,

            2) That they have a need at positions Bonds can play, and

            3) That Bonds not be obstructing the development of a young player.

            I think that’s right, generally; I think that you have to get past those three gates before you can reasonably discuss signing Barry Bonds, and I would point out that very few teams do.   But I see it differently in this way:  that this argument assumes that Bonds would help that team, given those three conditions.   I’m far from convinced that this is true.   After all, we have a historical example of a team that met all three of those criteria in spades—the 1935 Braves.   They were in position to contend, they had a huge need for power at the corner outfield positions, and they had no young player to fill that role.  They signed Ruth, at a moment when Ruth was exactly where Bonds is now except not under indictment, and it was a monumental disaster.   Doesn’t that give you just a moment’s pause, before you assume that Bonds would help?  If you’re looking at the possibility of a very marginal gain, against the risk of a monumental disaster, doesn’t that lock your knees just a little bit?

            The core of the disagreement is the argument advanced by the tag team of Blackadder (which I think is a pen name for Kevin Towers) and Tangotiger (which, of course, is a pen name for Tiger Woods.)    Let me take Blackadder’s comments, and work in my own responses as if this were a dialogue:

            Blackadder:  According to work by Tom Tango, a typical player ages in expectation .5 wins every year after his “peak” age.

            James:   OK, well. . name two other respects in which Barry Bonds is a typical player.

            Blackadder:  Maybe (you) think he should be aged by something like four wins, but I really just don’t see any evidence for such an extreme discount.

            James:  You would see it if you looked.   Players who are similar to Bonds—and Bonds is the archetype, so this is more true of him than of the group—players who are similar to Bonds typically degenerate, having reached a point comparable to this, at an extraordinary rate of speed.   You’re not seeing that for three reasons.  One, you haven’t looked.   You’re looking at generalities, rather than specific cases.  Two, you’re confusing last year’s stats with this year’s skills.   Three, you’re confusing OPS with ability.  

            OPS is a central skill, certainly, and, putting aside the quibbles with OPS as a measure of offense, let us assume that OPS measures offensive ability.   There is still a variable relationship between OPS and overall ability.  There are other things that are also important, namely defense, baserunning and the ability to play every day.   Some players—Yadier Molina, Adam Everett and Jose Reyes—their OPS represents a fairly small percentage of their value.   Other players—Bonds, Ted Williams in 1960—their OPS has a very high relationship to their overall value.

            Old players whose OPS represents virtually all of their ability age, from that point, very, very rapidly.   In most cases, their ability essentially disappears overnight. 

            Blackadder:  The slots issue is a bit of red herring.   Adam Dunn will face the exact same “slot” issue this offseason, except that he is a worse hitter and fielder than Bonds, and I guarantee that someone will sign him.

            James:   That’s simply not true, for this reason.   Well. . .small point.  Adam Dunn has driven in and scored 100+ runs in each of the last four years, except one year he had 99 and 92 or something like that.   Barry Bonds has not driven in or scored 80 runs in any of the last three years.  

            Moving past that, the team that signs Adam Dunn this winter has a reasonable expectation that Dunn will continue to be the player that he is for another four or five seasons.  

            Perhaps the biggest mistake that you can possibly make, as a major league organization, is to fall into the habit of fixing problems in such a way that you have to fix them again the next year.   A baseball team needs about 16 to 18 productive players to win—9 regulars, 5 starters, 3 relievers, more or less.   Sixteen to eighteen “slots”.   

            Every winter, even if you have a very good team with a very good organization, you’re going to have to solve three or four problems in those 16 to 18 slots.   This is difficult.   If you fall into the trap of solving problems in such a way that they have to be solved again next year, you find yourself heading into the winter with 9 to 12 problems that you need to solve.   This is impossible. 

            The essential problem of Barry Bonds is that he represents the ultimate short-term gamble—and short term gambles are for suckers.  I’m not saying that nobody should sign him.  I am saying that I would be very careful about it. 

            Blackadder: I think the last paragraph of the article is a little misleading.

            James:  What paragraph is that?

            Blackadder:  (reading) “The end came for Babe Ruth, and the end came for Joe DiMaggio, and the end came for Ted Williams, who had the highest OPS in all of baseball in his last year, and the end came for Stan Musial, who had fifth-highest OPS in baseball in his next-to-last year, and the end came for Mickey Mantle, who had a top-25 OPS in his last year, and the end came for Willie Mays, and the end came for George Brett, and the end came for Mark McGwire, who had the highest OPS in baseball one year before he quit, and the end has come for Barry Bonds.   Give the man a round of applause, get off his ass, and let’s move on.”

            James:   Why is that misleading?

            Blackadder:  The guys on that list who still had performance that justified a major league spot, they all left the game because they just didn’t want to play anymore.  I am pretty sure that if Ted Williams had wanted to keep playing, he could have signed a contract.

            James:  Yes, of course he could have.   Mantle could have returned, DiMaggio could have returned, McGwire could have returned, even Musial could have returned if he had wanted to.  It would have been misleading if I had suggested otherwise, but I didn’t. 

            But those players were free to return because they had earned the respect and, to a degree, the affection of their employers.   Bonds hasn’t.   What does that have to do with anything?

            Blackadder:   A player of Bonds’ current calibre being forced into retirement is, as far as I can tell, historically fairly unique.

            James:  Everything about Bonds is unique, and has been for many years.   So what?

            Bonds’ calibre LAST YEAR is not his “current” calibre.   It’s last year.  The point that I was making is this:  that when a player reaches the point where ALL that he does is hit, he is normally very near to the end.   Ted Williams realized this, and walked away after having had a good season.   Stan Musial didn’t realize this, stayed around one year too long, and had a difficult last season.  Bonds, whose understanding of “gracious” appears as if it might be a little bit limited, has not only not understood this, but has resisted it. 

            But if you look at old players who have a very high OPS and essentially no other skills, what happens to them is that they suddenly collapse.   They go from “valuable” to “out of the game” or “still in the game, but worthless” in one year.  A few examples, if you’ll indulge my stretching beyond reason the fiction that this is a dialogue.  

            Mark McGwire in 2000 had the highest OPS in baseball.   One year later, he was finished, and he retired.

            Mike Schmidt in 1986 was the National League’s Most Valuable Player, and was still arguably the league’s best player in 1987.   In 1988 he was finished.   He hit .249 with 12 homers in 1988, retired early in the season in 1989, hitting .203. 

            Willie Stargell in 1979 was the National League’s Most Valuable Player.   Like Bonds, he was an old left-handed hitter who was limited to about four games a week, but he could still crush a baseball.   His career totals after that season:  335 at bats, 14 homers.

            Henry Aaron in 1973 was limited to 120 games and 392 at bats, but he had the highest OPS in baseball.  In fact, the experience of Aaron, at the end of his career, is almost as perfect a parallel to Bonds as is Ruth.   The Braves didn’t want him any more.   Like the Giants, they had built around him and built around him, waiting for him to break the home run record, and once that was done they were anxious to get him out of there and get on with their lives. 

            As the Brewers saw it—exactly the same way you see Bonds now—Aaron was still a valuable man.   He had the highest OPS in baseball just one year ago (1973).   In 1974 his OPS was still in the top ten in the National League—and they’re going to give them to us for free!   How can we not do that?  But Aaron was finished, and the Brewers didn’t get better, they got worse.   Their win totals dropped from the 70s to the 60s.

            In 1971 Willie Mays had the fifth-highest OPS in baseball, in large part because he drew 112 walks in 136 games.    In very early 1972 the Giants decided that he was finished and they had to move him out of there—and, in fact, he was finished.   It worked out OK for the Mets, who stumbled into the World Series with 82 wins in ’73, but Mays was a part-time player and not very good.   My point is that the Giants hustled Willie Mays out of town after a season in which he had the fifth-highest OPS in baseball--just as they did Bonds.  

            In 1962 Stan Musial, who had announced his intention to retire that spring, had the sixth-highest OPS in baseball.   He came back for one more year—but all of a sudden, he was finished.

            Ted Williams in 1960 had the highest OPS in baseball—and retired.

            In 1954 Jackie Robinson, batting 386 times, had one of the top ten OPS figures in the National League.   In 1955 he was done.

            In 1950 Joe DiMaggio had the third-highest OPS in baseball.   In 1951 he was finished, and he retired after the season. 

            In 1946 Hank Greenberg led the American League in Home Runs and RBI, had the second-highest OPS in the American League, behind Ted Williams.  That winter he got into a contract dispute with the Tigers, and the Tigers traded him to Pittsburgh because Pittsburgh was the only team that stepped forward to meet his contract demands. 

            It was a disaster.   Greenberg hit .249, although, because of his walks, he still had a high OPS.   Pittsburgh finished last for the first time since 1917.   Greenberg retired after the season. 

            In 1945 Mel Ott had the third-highest OPS in the National League.   The entire rest of his career consisted of 72 at bats, with a batting average of .069. 

            In 1944 Indian Bob Johnson had the highest OPS in the American League.  He retired after the 1945 season.

            Edgar Martinez in 2003 was still a top-level DH.  In 2004, all of a sudden, he was done.   He retired after the season. 

            Jason Giambi in 2006 had an OPS of .971, one of the highest in baseball.  In 2007 he suffered a dramatic dropoff.   He may not be finished; maybe he’ll come back, but. . .it wasn’t a good experience.

            The normal rule, throughout all of baseball history, has been that when you have an aging superstar whose skills narrow to the OPS categories, and particularly when that player has to start taking two days a week off, he goes from “still has a very high OPS” to “finished” in a very, very short period of time.  This is the way it has always been, back to the time of Dan Brouthers and Sam Thompson. 

            Yes, the exact scenario by which this plays itself out is different for Bonds than for many other players—but that scenario is normally painful, and normally controversial for the team.   Babe Ruth’s exit from New York was excruciating, for Ruth and for the Yankees.   Joe DiMaggio in 1951 was ripped in a national magazine—I think it was the Saturday Evening Post—and retired in embarrassment.   Jackie Robinson was traded by the Dodgers to their hated rivals, the Giants, and refused to report.   The Giants were ripped for trading Willie Mays, while Mays himself was humiliated by his inability to play defense in the 1973 World Series.   Aaron didn’t appreciate being pushed out of Atlanta.   Greenberg’s exit from Detroit was a massive controversy, and left everybody unhappy with the outcome—the Tigers, the Pirates, and Greenberg.

            The specific scenario of Bonds’ exit is a little unique, but then, everybody’s is, and everything about Bonds is.   Bonds hasn’t had the grace to walk away with his head held high, as Ted Williams did and DiMaggio did.   He doesn’t have the organizational support to stay on with diminished skills, as Musial did or Mantle did.   He is leaving as a free agent, rather than as a marked-down, discontinued item in trade, as Mays did and Aaron did, because this is the free agent era rather than the era when a player belonged to a team until the team didn’t want him anymore. 

            But a) it has always been extremely common for aging superstars to make a very quick trip from “high OPS” to “out of the game”.  And b) history shows that when players don’t accept that end, and when some team then steps forward to provide a showcase for the superstar to continue his storied career, it turns out to be very disappointing experience for both the player and the team—in fact, I would argue that “embarrassment” and “disaster” are the only outcomes on record for that scenario.   “Mskarpelos” argues that that includes the San Francisco Giants of 2006 and 2007—they provided a showcase for Bonds to continue his personal quest, and it was a disaster for them, as it was for the Braves in 1935, as it was for the Pirates in 1947, as it was for the Brewers in 1975-76.  

            Maybe this time will be different.   Maybe, if you’re the team that steps forward to allow Barry Bonds to continue his career, maybe this time it works out for you.  God bless you, and I hope that flies.   I ain’t lining up to be the test pilot. 

 
 

COMMENTS (43 Comments, most recent shown first)

Kev
You like Bonds, right? OK, let's do this slowly:
1.Do you or don't you associate Bonds with POSSIBLE steroid use?
2.This isn't a court of law, but basically an opinion situation.
3.Based on questionable circumstantial evidence, speculation, and legal process as applied so far, please offer an opinion on whether Bonds took steroids or not.
4. Most people would certainly answer "yes", as the legal process drags on, and Bonds acts more and more like he has something to hide.
5. Can you suggest any other reason for the spectacular spike in Bonds' hitting numbers at a statistically improbable time in his career?
But here's the point: steroids are unquestionably harmful to the human body; other sports (football) and activities (professional wrestling) demonstrate this. The only question is to what degree, and that answer likely shows up after one's career is over, but crippling and death can result. If we accept the almost certain uasage of steroids by Bonds and others who had similar miraculous changes in their numbers, we cannot say (as I first thought: "who cares, if they want to take the chance, let them".) And the reason why we can't advance this choice is because we are saying to anyone from Little League to MLB that in order to compete on a level playing field, YOU MUST PUT YOUR HEALTH AT RISK. No one, I'm sure, would endorse that. And as more and more athletes from other sports come forward the case against steroids will hopefully receive greater examination than a study of HR hit by a flock of cheaters, and science can benefit society. But not when we "like Barry Bonds". If he didn't care about the message he was sending, we should. In this context, it is impossible to like Barry Bonds unless one uses blinders.

You like Bonds, right? Bill, count to ten and think again. Bonds isn't the issue; the HOF isn't the issue. The higher good is being ignored in the squabble over a pompous brat who almost certainly used steroids to juice his numbers.

And finally, purely hypothetical, I believe you would answer "yes"to the question 'did Bonds use steroids." You don't have to answer; no one can force you to. But considering the larger issue involved, wouldn't you answer, and wouldn't you say "yes"? My fear is that we are studying steroid use for the wrong reasons, baseball reasons, glory reasons. What will it take to see the light?
Thanks.
2:16 AM Jan 21st
 
bheikoop
I question why 'last years' caliber cannot be tied in with this years talent, or at least expected talent. You relate Bonds to Ruth, which is fine, except you mention over and over that Bonds is a case of his own.

And he is, Bonds had a peak that was 10 years later then the average player. However, he has had back to back seasons of numbers that were fairly identical to the peak years he 'should' have been experiencing.

Thus, to suggest that because like Ruth, Bonds dropped 100 points in batting average in a 5 year span that his 'final' season would be negate the previous comments that Bonds is a special case.
3:53 PM Jun 20th
 
mtortolero
I would like to know, in a practical way, how Bonds will hurt a team as Cleveland in this right moment. A bat for hire for three months in a team with serious doubts about if his DH will be playing again this season and that could be dealing his superstar CY in few days but are still, in some way, with some chances to make a run for the postseason with his depth rotation.
10:39 AM Jun 20th
 
Richie
'Move on?' Did you say 'move on'? Nobody moves on till we say 'move on'! Did we - did we move on when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor? Hail no!

Having gotten that out of my system, I would suggest there was no evidence that Ruth and Aaron had totally lost it either. Mays, the Mets didn't think so, else they wouldn't have added him to a contender. (a la a darn weak one)

So it appears to me we have a pretty exact 3 element data set saying "really aged walkin' stars given up on by their teams sure have totally lost it immediately". You're questioning its applicability here by citing a much less exact but much bigger data set showing they don't necessarily do so, and saying this should be applied to prognosticating Bonds rather than the smaller but more exact one.

Having hogged the last word, I will move on unless anyone tries to hog it back, or I think of another line from 'Animal House' worth channeling.
3:06 PM Jun 5th
 
tangotiger
Richie: mostly it's that I've done a lot of research already here, and I want to move on already.

Secondly, the sample size, already an issue, will be further dwindled. As well, there's a difference between a team dumping a player because (a) they don't think he has "it" any more (despite his performance numbers), and (b) they carry baggage they don't care for (despite his performance numbers).

If Bonds did not have the peripherals, would the Giants have not reupped? This is unlike the other comparisons being made of players switching teams. The switching teams is really used as a proxy for the option a) above, as an inference. But, in our case here, Bonds almost certainly exhibits option b), not a). Teams IBB him 42 times last year... that doesn't sound like a player that the league thinks has suddenly lost it.

I think it's time for others to do more work here, to define their parameters, and find some answers.
2:36 PM Jun 5th
 
tangotiger
And, I did clearly say "I don't know" about the effect of the peripherals. I can't be any clearer.
11:09 AM Jun 5th
 
Richie
What I'm positing is "has just been dropped by his long-time team" is a valid selection criteria. In fact, 1 of the 2 mandatory ones if we're looking at "really old walkin' dudes who've just been absolutely dumped by their current team". To repeat Bill's conclusion:

"But a) it has always been extremely common for aging superstars to make a very quick trip from “high OPS” to “out of the game”. And b) history shows that when players don’t accept that end, and when some team then steps forward to provide a showcase for the superstar to continue his storied career, it turns out to be very disappointing experience for both the player and the team—in fact, I would argue that “embarrassment” and “disaster” are the only outcomes on record for that scenario."

Selection criteria b) up above is totally clear. None of your studies have included "some (other) team then step(ping) forward", i.e., old walkin' dude having just been dumped by his long term team. Is that because you feel it's inapplicable to Bond's case? Due to small sample size or something else?
11:05 AM Jun 5th
 
tangotiger
"Are you positing that aspect of it's extraneous?"

I'm following the evidence and asking the questions. The selection criteria I use tries to limit as much as possible selection bias. Clearly, you cannot use future knowledge as your selection criteria.


10:40 AM Jun 5th
 
Richie
Ayways, real reason folks won't sign Bonds is financial, in terms of anticipated marginal revenue. Signing a guy 50%+ of your fans have decided they absolutely HATE!!! is an awful way to sell tickets and commercials. Unless the team DID win, everyone would blame Bonds for poisoning the clubhouse whether he did or not, the GM's head would be on the chopping block for doing it, with fans ticked off season tickets sales and TV/radio ratings would go down some with the help of a local media blaring about what jerks the management guys are for signing Bonds. If 'image' didn't translate into the bottom line, none of our stadia would have corporate names on them.

For the same (reversed) reason signing Aaron WAS a good move for the Brewers for the 1975 season. (Milwaukee born-and-bred) The team stunk little worse than they did the year before, goodness knows the Brewers had no one worth worrying about blocking, and we Milwaukee people were all quite happy they brought good ol' Henry back. Folks definitely felt better about the team, and spent a few more $$$ on it.
7:47 PM Jun 4th
 
Richie
Not clear that Evans belongs, as you do suggest in your note about his fielding ability.

I am open-minded as to how likely it is that really old walkin' dudes will collapse. Which means by definition that I see the point as 'not proven' (nor 'dis-'). Here with Bonds, there's still the issue of his long-time team totally giving up on him. A la the Yankees with Ruth, the Braves with Aaron and the Giants with Mays. And being 'boyohboy were they right' on it. Aside from Ruth, Aaron and Mays are there any other examples out there? Are you positing that aspect of it's extraneous?
7:27 PM Jun 4th
 
tangotiger
Since Bill used 38 year olds, I will as well. The players who have their value tied mostly to their homeruns plus walks, aged 38 years old: Aaron, 1972; Palmeiro, 2002; Ruth, 1933; Frank Thomas, 2006. Darrell Evans is also on this list, but he's a (good fielding) 3B. Aaron was excellent in 1973. Palmeiro was good in 2003. Ruth was great in 1934. Frank Thomas was very good in 2007. Plus of course, we have the case of Bonds himself defying the "collapse" scenario every year.

I don't see this drop off of guys who are heavy in HR+walks, and are 38 years old.

Among 39 years old, only Hank Aaron is a good comp in 1973, and he was pretty good in 1974. Then there's the famous Ruth collapse as the next best comp in this age class, and Darrell Evans again.

Among 40 year olds, only Darrell Evans (again). Hank Sauer in 1957 if you drop the threshhold low enough (he was good in 1958).

Among 41 year olds: Darrell Evans.

So, I basically don't see it, this collapse among players who have most of their value tied into HR+Walks. Even if they are more prone to collapse, we are not talking about a good chance of that happening. Your overall expectation should still be pretty good here.

And, so far, I've only seen two quantified forecasts in our discussions: me in these threads, and Bill in the BJ08 Handbook. Both would argue for high quality hitting. All naysayers have yet to provide any estimate of his hitting value, and his overall value (coming into the 2008 season). Rather, all I see is overall summary conclusions.

Age: season minus birth year. Note Bonds was born Jul 24, meaning we really should find guys born within 6 months of him to classify him as the same age for that season. Season minus birth year works pretty good here.

ValueRatio: 3*HR+0.7*(BB-IBB)/(1B+1.6*2b+2.2*3b)
4:30 PM Jun 4th
 
Richie
I didn't say "and legs going out on him" or anything of the sort. Not particularly germane, except I don't want to get the rep of a 'condition pig'.

Heck, I'll defend Sabean some. He had 3 directives from Magowan (sp?). 'Keep Bonds. Try your best to win while he's here. Oh, and here's your pretty tight budget.' He eventually failed at the middle one, but looks to me alot like being ordered to the craps table with the command to turn ten dollars into ten hundred dollars.

Given constraint #3, seems to me signing one cheap geezer after another in hopes of pulling off what the Cardinals did in 2006 was his least laughable alternative.

Given the ingermanity (still a cool word even if not a real one) of this to the topic, if the thread policeman takes it out that's fine with me.

4:13 PM Jun 4th
 
tangotiger
Richie said this:
- I don't see where either of you state 'yes, there is some non-negligible cost to employing obnoxious people'.

I have already said this:
- If you think his "peripherals" will cost 5 million$ or more, then, ok don't sign him.
- I don't know what his "peripherals" are worth.
- The plain of it is that we have no idea what "chemistry" does to a team, who benefits, who is hurt, and whatnot.

So, I'm saying that I don't know. If someone is saying "yes, I know", well then, provide your estimate for this. How much are you quantifying this effect? Even if you can't quantify it, by making a decision to not agree to sign a 5 million$ player, you are in effect deciding that the cost is at least 5 million$ (or you have no room for him).

"Give me inductive data regarding those 2 specific issues, and yes I'll be very interested in seeing what it says."

Fair enough, and agreed. You also want "and legs going out on him", though that's probably implied by the old age. As Fifth OF said, it would behoove others to also conduct their own study. Baseball-Reference makes it quite easy for everyone.

Fifth OF said:
- I refuse to let Sabean's judgment factor into my own.

Amen.


3:11 PM Jun 4th
 
Richie
No defensive value, no speed on basepaths, a batting average heavily goosed by his home runs, and of course the relevant comparison would be the average batting average of starting leftfielders. Not that we go much on batting average in these sabrmetric parts anyways, or so I thought.

I also don't see where taking 'side A' of a discussion rather than 'side B' constitutes complaining. Mr. James did a study up there regarding very aged stars switching teams.

As to Sabean's alleged idiocy, it appears the smartest franchise in baseball may have suddenly developed a Bonds-fillable opening. Hmmmm?

(possible currently-going phone call? 'Theo: James, take down those darn Bonds columns before we sign him!!! Bill: Sir, Yes Sir!')
4:07 PM Jun 3rd
 
tommeagher
Richie, why are you complaining instead of conducting your own study? How is Ruth, whose batting average was .288 (league .279) in 1934 a player whose value was limited to HR and BB? And why should we give any weight to the fact that a lousy organization/GM has let Bonds go? I refuse to let Sabean's judgment factor into my own.
3:12 PM Jun 3rd
 
Richie
Induction: Crunching whatever numbers you have in front of you to see what pops out. Deduction: Taking some portion of those numbers and reasoning out what makes sense from them. Using either approach in isolation: Bad, bad analyst. Go into your corner for a timeout. And no taking any gizmos with you.

I don't see where either of you state 'yes, there is some non-negligible cost to employing obnoxious people'. Not all do believe that. So I'm not assuming any 'pro sign Bonds' folks do buy that. (given Bonds' rep, I am assuming any 'con sign Bonds' person does believe it, perhaps overly so)

And the Ruth case is clear. It's not just a 'real old but still effective guy'. It's a 'real old still effective guy whose effectiveness is incredibly walk+homer based and whose long-time team has just tossed him in return for squat, just to get rid of him'. I don't much care about the broader studies you guys cite with respect to general aging curves. The 2 arguments here are 'really old walks+homer guys have an incredible collapse rate' and 'teams that toss such guys to the curb have been historically shown to really have known what they were doing'. Give me inductive data regarding those 2 specific issues, and yes I'll be very interested in seeing what it says.
11:51 AM Jun 3rd
 
djhanen
I like that Tango and I are "inductivists". What does that make Bill, s soothsayer?
11:17 AM Jun 3rd
 
tangotiger
I haven't lost sight of a single thing. Thanks...
9:58 AM Jun 3rd
 
Richie
You inductivists are losing sight of EXACTLY what the parameters are here.

1. Very old superstar who has now been kicked to the curb by the team that knows him far better than anyone else does. Rules out Bonds last 2 years, Williams 58-59, plenty of your other counter-examples.

2. Very old superstar whose still-gaudy OPS is OVERWHELMINGLY walk+homer related. Tango/BlackAdder, shouldn't be hard to mandate those 2 factors into your inductive studies. Well?

3. Not directly related, but then there is the organizational cost of working with people like Bonds. He refused to take part in hitters' meetings in Frisco, a brilliant hitter with brilliant insights, but unlike all the rest of his teammates he kept them to himself so they wouldn't someday get back to the opposing pitchers. Orel Hershiser, for goodness sake, called him out on ESPN, said while he appreciated how nice Barry was to Orel's children, he just cringed seeing how Barry treated clubhouse attendants, bell boys, etc.

Working with people like this does impose a cost on all employees who do have to work with them. You'll find that in organizational science textbooks, you'll find that in human resource scholarly articles, all the scholarly researchers in these fields accept that as fact. Doesn't wipe out the things such difficult people do bring to the table. But in a now-marginal case of Bonds 2008, yes that factors in there too.
12:42 AM Jun 3rd
 
djhanen
By the way, I should mention that I was talking about signing Bonds over the offseason, not bringing him in right now. It is possible that given his age and lack of prospect of a contract, he has allowed his physical skills to atrophy somewhat. On the other hand, as MGL points out on The Book Blog, a lot of his hitting skills don't seem as dependent on athleticism, so it may not matter as much as long as you only use him as a DH.
12:29 PM May 31st
 
wovenstrap
I don't think you're responding to me, there.
10:42 AM May 31st
 
tangotiger
Because of his 42 IBB (just one less than the number of non-IBB by Vlad!) likely being treated as a regular walk, my deliberate pessimistic forecast called for all those to vanish, and with it 1.2 wins or so. Right, I was trying to be as pessimistic as I could to get him all the way to a 1 WAR player.

As for Martin's point, today, and as every day goes by, it makes it extremely unlikely that Bonds can be signed, simply because his body requires the competition far more than Raines in 1987 did. (What an achievement. That, and Guy Lafleur's comeback after a 3-yr layoff in his 30s. And Gordie Howe. Gordie would be Bonds' best comp!)

We're going to have this same discussion with Junior in December, who is, now, a worse hitter than Bonds, and likely a 1 WAR player already. If not, then it's the peripherals talking.
7:52 AM May 31st
 
djhanen
I would also like to add some remarks on Bonds’ expected performance (which, as I argued in the previous comment, is all that matters from a baseball perspective). Tango draws up one very pessimistic probability tree and gets Bonds at $2.5M of expected performance. I want to illustrate just how pessimistic that is, by using the sort of analysis Tango does for his Wins Above Replacement (WAR) arguments. Last year, Bonds was +4.3 Palmer Batting wins, +4.5 non-park adjusted WPA/LI (over at fangraphs). So he was about 4.5 Wins above average with the bat. On defense, Dewan had him at -6 plays, Chris Dial's zone rating at -9.3 runs, and Dan Fox's Simple Fielding Runs at -12 runs. Let's say he was -1 win on defense last year. Replacement level for left fielder is 1.5 wins per season (+2 for average over replacement, -0.5 for a defensive position), but Bonds only had 477 PA, instead of a "full" 650, and 477/650*1.5=1.1 wins. Taking into account a negative run or so of baserunning, the defense and baserunning cancels the replacement level and he is 4.5 Wins Above Replacement (just his batting wins) last year. He was at a similar level in 2006; slightly worse hitting, but his defensive numbers are similar.

Ok, so Bonds, over the last two years, is a 4.5 WAR player. Now, look at Tango's numbers a few posts up. He has Bonds' upside, which Bonds only has a 10% chance of reaching, of $12M. At $4.4M per win, that comes out 2.7 wins above replacement. So in Tango's (deliberately pessimistic; I am not holding him to it's conclusions!) model, Bonds' highest upside—the best one could reasonably hope for—is a 33% decline on his last two years! His example is basically a complete collapse scenario, with Bonds having no chance of avoiding a steep decline, and he still had Bonds valued at $2.5M. I suggested in my first post aging Bonds a full year in expectation—twice the normal aging—and if that doesn't seem like enough, you can age him a full two wins, down to 2.5 WAR. That would imply, in expectation, that he will lose almost half of his value next year; that is a tremendous discount, more than I really think you should use, but I can see being just that worried about Bonds being completely useless as to discount him as such. A 2.5 WAR expectation player is still worth $11M, which is about what I think Bonds would sign for if his on the field performance were the only issue. In fact, if I were actually Kevin Towers, and there was a competitive market for his services, that is about what I would have paid him to play on my team; and Bll, in all likelihood, would now be blaming my teams poor performance on the Bonds signing.

12:36 AM May 31st
 
djhanen
Wow, if I had known that I would be quoted at such length, I would have taken the time to make sure it was better written! I’ll focus on what I take to be the main issues.

Babe Ruth in 1935 is not "THE most parallel situation in baseball history,” much less “beyond any question." The most parallel situation in baseball history is…Barry Bonds in 2007. The second most parallel situation in baseball history is Barry Bonds in 2006. We are talking about Barry Bonds' body here! Every argument that has been adduced against Bonds this year would have applied just as well to him before the last two years, when it would have been horribly, manifestly wrong. The Ruth analogy seems poor. While Ruth was in pretty good shape when he was young, by 1935 he was a fat alcoholic slob more likely to be found at a strip joint than a batting cage. As other commenters have noted, his baseball production hadn’t obviously expired. Nor, of course, were Babe Ruth's 28 mediocre games in 1935 somehow responsible for the Braves dropping 40 games. Bonds, on the other hand, is obsessed with maintaining his physical abilities (indeed, he may have been a little too obsessed). He has already been the best post-40 position player in baseball history by far. He is, as James says, unique.

James raises non-Ruth examples. Of course, everyone in baseball history eventually reaches the point where they can't play anymore; the problem, as Jack Klompus points out, is knowing beforehand when that point is coming. Plenty of players looked “done”, by Jamesian criteria, but were not. The most obvious is, of course, Barry Bonds the last two years. But take Ted Williams. From age 38 to 40, his OPS+ went from 238 to 177 to 110. His batting average fell all the way to .254, the first in his career he was below .300. James would have concluded, quite reasonably, that Williams was finished. Instead, Williams recorded an OPS+ of 190 and then retired. Or take Stan Musial. His batting average dipped below .300 from his age 38 to 40, but then at age 41 he hit .330/.416/.508. He wasn't finished yet. Or take Hank Aaron. At age 38, coming off a career high in home runs, he maintained his power and discipline, but his batting average declined to .265, and he played in the fewest games since his rookie year. The next year, he posted an OPS+ of 177.

You can play with examples all day, but until you get systematic, you know little. Could Bonds completely collapse? Of course he could. Could Bonds OPS 1.400 again? It ain't likely. Could Bonds be pretty much the same player he was the last two years? Sure he could. We don't know what he would do this year. But we don't need to know. Players are, and should be, signed on the basis of their expected performance. The variance will be larger for Bonds than for other players, because he is old and otherwise unique. If you think teams are, or should be, very risk-averse with respect to highly variable performance players, then you can argue that this decreases Bonds' value. However, I see very little reason for most teams to be so risk averse, especially for one year deals where the monetary downside is so limited (for a contrast, see the Barry named Zito). (If anything, teams just below the playoff threshold should be risk-loving: there is a greater chance they will catch lightening in a bottle and make the playoffs. Teams just above the bubble, for the same reason, should be risk-averse.)
I am kind of sad to see James so risk-averse. I think Red Sox fans should be glad that he, presumably, did not have a similar attitude in the 2003 off-season. That year, the Sox signed to short, risky deals two fat, injury-plagued DH types who had had limited success at the plate but were hardly elite hitters. One of them, Jeremy Giambi, quickly flamed out. The other was David Ortiz.

12:34 AM May 31st
 
wovenstrap
The more the dissenters write, the less persuasive they get. The position of the dissenters is ipso facto collusion, call it groupthink-collusion. That thesis only works in the absence of a compelling rationale for inaction. Bill has provided that. That the dissenters are hard to convince is actually immaterial; that's what I meant when I said that Bill met the prima facie level. You cannot argue groupthink-collusion as you once could, because the inaction now has a plausible rational basis. Your opinion that it's irrational has nothing to do with it.
12:27 AM May 31st
 
tangotiger
A Barry Bonds / Frank Thomas platoon arrangement would have been very cool. Imagine a manager, contemplating switching his reliever, knowing that he'll never get the platoon advantage. The only thing he could do is force the switch, so that he can (possibly) get the platoon advantage for his next reliever at the end of the game.
4:27 PM May 30th
 
tommeagher
Also, cutting Gary Sheffield to DH Bonds in Detroit makes a pretty good deal of sense. I would platoon them but I'm guessing that those two are not on good terms at this point.
2:53 PM May 30th
 
tommeagher
Bill, I think your '35 Braves argument is total BS, and you need to flesh it out before you parade it around. Ruth's 92 PA of .181/.359/.431 at age 40 is far from compelling evidence that he was "done." When did you start judging players on 92 PA?

The Braves lost 40 games in the standings but only 22 wins in pythagorean record. Maybe the impact of the "distraction" meant that they lost a lot of close games, but I'd like to see some evidence of that.

Is Babe Ruth responsible for Fred Frankhouse and Ed Brandt having their worst seasons, each tossing more BB than K? Is he responsible for the acquisition of Danny MacFayden? Did he make sure Huck Betts was just as "done" as he? Is he responsible for Billy Urbanski following up his career year with his lousiest season? Buck Jordan's slight drop-off?

Maybe the Ruth signing was a distracting disaster, but if the exact same thing happened with a team in 2008 after signing Bonds, you would not find me in the camp believing that the entire performance of the team could be used as evidence against Bonds.
2:42 PM May 30th
 
rpriske
My real problem with Bill's argument is that when his 'opponent' brings up some sort of example of a 'norm', Bill says that you can't look at those norms because Bonds is unique.
Then he pulls out a bunch of examples to try and show the Bonds is likely done.

If Bonds is too unique for their examples, then he should be too unique for yours as well.


I happen to think Bonds IS done, but that is because he hasn't been playing. If someone had signed him at the start of the year, he woudl be performing at a level close to last year, and that would help quite a number of teams.
1:47 PM May 30th
 
tangotiger
Hmmm... I guess that should be more like: 12MM, 5MM, 1MM, 0MM = 2.5MM, under that illustration.

***

By the way, I'm quite enjoying this!
12:15 PM May 30th
 
tangotiger
Martin, you said this: "This argument is going to get me into trouble, considering the stuff that passed for MLB "wisdom" in decades past, but ... those teams aren't stupid, and they are especially not stupid when it comes to assessing factors that might benefit their multi-million-dollar media conglomerations."

So, you are right, it will get you into trouble. I did not just cite WFB, but several players. And really, I could go on all day about some of the silly signings and acquisitions that these multi-million dollar teams (with the 5-cent head) are doing. My point is simply that you cannot take as a given that these teams know what they are doing.

***

The point remains that the BJ08 Handbook has Bonds listed as the #1 player in MLB for OPS. I cannot believe that his lack of fielding, baserunning, and anything else you want to add, is enough to turn that into a valueless player.

If Bill's argument is one of "instant collapse", then his (presumably mean, not median) forecast should show that.

What are you suggesting then, that Bonds has a 10% chance of being BONDS, 20% chance of being average, 30% chance of being replacement, and 40% chance of being useless? Giving him 100 games (and I'm always talking about Apr 1, not today), then that's worth what... 12MM, 8MM, 4MM, 0MM? That's a weighted average of $4MM.

If you want to argue that a team can't stomach a 40% chance of getting zero return, that's fine. I can accept that. Do you mean to suggest that all 30 teams are in this boat? Maybe.

I would like others to put pencil to paper and come up with a valuation here. My original approach came up with 4.4MM, and this very loose one here says 4MM. If we are agreeing that this forecast is reasonable, then the question simply becomes who wants the high risk/reward potential.

Nobody? No team with million-dollar education behind them is able to craft a contract with incentive bonuses for such a player?

12:12 PM May 30th
 
wovenstrap
Tango: OK, but Willie Bloomquist is cherry-picking too. Most of the things MLB teams do actually do withstand intellectual scrutiny. Again, the problem being addressed is why teams haven't signed Bonds -- Bill has given an explanation that passes all the prima facie tests. Given that the teams are behaving this way (a big given), Bill's approach is very persuasive. In the meantime, your figure of $4.4mil/season is just a bit of napkin calculation -- one that now has to withstand Bill's entirely plausible argument of instant collapse. Before this week, I could have looked at that figure and said, "Huh. Bonds's OPS has value X, interesting." Now I am obliged to imagine that the number might shrink to zero in a month of play. Anecdotal evidence still has credibility of some kind.

Jack: It seems to me that your argument of "How could contemporaries know?" is fallacious, i.e. Bill has addressed it -- when OPS approaches 100% of an old, slow player's value. Frank Thomas isn't there yet, it might be the fine distinction between 90% and 99%, which is a big difference in an argument about extreme cases. Your saying that Bill's argument is all hindsight is certainly undercut by Bill's willingness to discuss Bonds, which is not a hindsight case.
11:42 AM May 30th
 
djhanen
This article's proposition – that old players face a great risk of sudden and profound collapse once they lose every ability but hitting – adds nothing valid beyond the general truth that old players decline and derives from a faulty use of hindsight. It parades former stars who eventually got too old to be productive. Of course they did. Everyone ages to the point of no return. The question is: when is a contemporary, living at that time, to tell? How old is too old? Losing non-hitting abilities isn't it. By that standard, teams should have passed on Barry Bonds for years now (had he been a free agent), when he's been outstandingly productive; the Red Sox probably should release David Ortiz; Frank Thomas should have collapsed years ago; and so on. (Also, it's not obvious how far general tendencies should dictate our thinking on Bonds. The man is a freak of nature, a great among greats.)

The slots argument is indeed a red herring. It doesn't distinguish Bonds. Every player fits a very limited number of slots on major league teams owing to their ability to play few defensive positions and the competitiveness of the player market. This consideration shouldn't afflict Bonds any more than it impacts other players as a fact of MLB life. If anything, Bonds's ability play left field, where displaced fielders could move elsewhere in the outfield or DH, might give him a "slotting" advantage over infielder free agents. Now to Bill, Bonds's offensive productiveness is in grave risk of sudden and profound collapse, so Bonds doesn't deserve a slot. But if you, like me, would project Bonds's offense this year to be only slightly worse than his offense last year, several contending teams would prosper by slotting Bonds over a current player. The Rays could make him DH in place of the mediocre Jonny Gomes or platoon him with Gomes and the outfielders not named Crawford. Same for the Indians (Hafner, Gutierrez, Dellucci), who could really use hitting. The A's could have chosen Bonds over Thomas. The Blue Jays – goodness. The list probably goes on.
10:44 AM May 30th
 
tiller88
Maybe I'm misreading Tangotiger, but it seems to me that he's ignoring Bill's position that it is possible that Bonds could indeed put up a productive offensive season, similar to Mays in '71 or Williams in '60. The problem is that there doesn't seem to be any indicator of exactly when the end comes for aging superstars until after the fact, which of course by then it's too late.

It reminds me of the old Branch Rickey adage that it's better to trade a player a year too early than a year too late. Bonds' case is further compounded by the rather limited job opportunities available and the perception that Bonds' salary demands would be excessive. Tangotiger has placed a value on Bonds' 2008 performance of $4.4 million, but fails to specify if that is for a 162 game season or for the rest of 2008.

I am not aware of Bonds stating what his salary demands are for this season, but considering that his 2007 contract was around $15.5 million, I am skeptical that Bonds would accept a deal in Tangotiger's price range, especially since $4.4 million prorated for a theoretical return date of 15 June would amount to around $2.6 million.

If we assume that Bonds would indeed take such a deal, then it becomes a matter of who would have an open spot for him. The A's have already taken on Frank Thomas, but Toronto is on the hook for the entire contract less the prorated share of the Major League minimum Oakland is responsible for since they claimed him off waivers. That is around $270 K, ten times less than Bonds' theoretical number. Bill's argument against Seattle is to me valid - they would be much better off giving those DH at bats to Clement than either Bonds or Vidro, because they never really were a contender to begin with (88 wins last year and being outscored by 19 runs means they were really closer to being an 80 win team than a 90 win team).

So where is the actual market for Bonds, even if he is willing to play for such a reduced dollar amount as Tangotiger suggests? Because going team-by-team in both leagues, I can't find it myself.
10:40 AM May 30th
 
tangotiger
Re: Mariners, Mets, Jays, A's. They must all have believed (not as wishful thinking, but really believed), at the start of the season, that there were all above .500 teams. For the M's specifically, the acquisition of Bedard and Silva certainly points to their belief.

For the Rays, the basic point holds that you don't want to bring in Bonds here, since you don't want to block the path of your up-and-comers. The above 4 teams (I'm sure there must be a few others) all have the mindset of teams looking for the guy like Bonds (minus peripherals).

***

For examples, I've already offered this initial list:
http://www.bb-ref.com/pi/shareit/meJv

That's the list of the players with the highest OPS+, aged 39 and older. It includes some of the 39yr old players you mentioned (Stargell, Ruth, etc). But, it also includes other 39yr old players who had at least one more great year in them (Edgar, Williams, Mays).

At the same time, your own forecast points to someone who was still in the Pujols/Howard class of hitters. I don't go that high, but I certainly have him very high.

The selection of players must happen with their future unknown. So, if you've decided that your selection criteria will include 39 year olds, then you must include all 39 year olds, without the knowledge of how well they did at age 40 and 41. If you decide to select only 40 yr old and older (thereby removing Ruth, Stargell, but now including guys like Fisk, Evans, etc), then again, that must be done without future knowledge.

Now, if the additional condition is that the team that they were playing on, for which they were hitting great, released them (signifying that they knew something more that the numbers weren't telling us), then you certainly have a point. And it's on that basis that you can knock out guys like Edgar and Williams from my comp list.


10:16 AM May 30th
 
bjames
Well, if I'm cherry-picking examples, let's hear some counter-examples. The Babe Ruth in 1935 example is THE most parallel situation in baseball history, beyond any question. The Henry Aaron, 1975 example is the next closest anyone can come. The '35 Braves got 40 games worse when they tried this. Show me the case where somebody tried it and got 40 games better. OK, scratch that, but if you've got a list of cases where teams took on 40-year-old superstars to enable them to continue their careers and it worked out great for everybody, let's hear them.
9:36 AM May 30th
 
bjames
Bonds value to Seattle is zero, since it makes no conceivable difference whether Seattle wins 78 or 76 games this season.
8:21 AM May 30th
 
tangotiger
You find Bill's list of players devastating and I find it underwhelming. Like I said, it is cherry picking, if he also doesn't show all the 39-and-older seasons where the players also excelled. I've given two lists so far.

He specifically has in his Handbook Bonds' forecast, which is league-leading. His forecast for 2008 is not noted in any of his essay. I tell you exactly how much his on-field performance is worth. He doesn't. He concludes that, including his "peripherals", that he's a net negative. I don't know what his "peripherals" are worth.

Last year, the Giants were a -37 in run differential. This year, all we hear about is how much looser they are. And they have a -44 run differential. And we're only one-third of the way through the season. The plain of it is that we have no idea what "chemistry" does to a team, who benefits, who is hurt, and whatnot.

As for the teams not being stupid, I don't accept that as a given at all. Willie Bloomquist now has over 1200 MLB PA on his resume, the epitomy of the replacement level player. Juan Pierre was signed to a star contract. Carlos Lee is considered a premier player. Barry Zito was signed to the biggest contract out there, even though his fastball speed has dropped each year for the last few years. A good portion of the teams have no idea how to value players.

All I can conclude is that the teams are afraid of the media, and they'd rather give up free wins if they think everyone else is also foregoing those same wins, just so that they don't have to deal with the second-guessing. Much like managers' in-game tactics.

(I had no issue with your previous post, and I took it in its best spirit, as I would hope any of my posts are.)

6:29 AM May 30th
 
wovenstrap
Looking over my last post, Tangotiger, the vagaries of Internet communication (you get one crack to make your case at this moment) got the better of me -- and I stated things in a way that implied you were not being rigorous. That wasn't my point, and I didn't mean anything like that. I just mean that Bill's "case" can be taken to be an explanation for why something happened, not some attempt to explain why they should do something they are not likely to do. The standards are a little different -- that's all I meant.
2:03 AM May 30th
 
wovenstrap
Yes, but your perception of the rationality of your argument and the irrationality of Bill's argument bumps up against the reality that 30 major-league teams agree with Bill, and zero of them agree with you. That's not just something you can wish away by calling for more rigorous science from the person agreeing with all of MLB. In effect, you are asking Bill to get more rigorous about proving why the sky is blue when your calculations clearly demonstrate it to be hot pink. The burden of proof is on you, here.

Now, groupthink is a real thing. MLB might be wrong. But the trick of on whom the burden falls remains the same. This argument is going to get me into trouble, considering the stuff that passed for MLB "wisdom" in decades past, but ... those teams aren't stupid, and they are especially not stupid when it comes to assessing factors that might benefit their multi-million-dollar media conglomerations. The strong form of Bill's argument is that Bonds would not help any team under any circumstances. The weak form is that the benefit he would provide would be outweighed by negative mojo, PR, and the like. The perceived benefit cannot, ergo, be very high, since mojo and PR are unstable and subjective factors, some teams might even like negative PR. But they still don't sign Bonds.

With all that in mind, Bill's "anecdotal" approach of discussing the fates of many high-profile stars is more compelling with your statistical approach. Indeed, it is rebutted by the simple fact that Bonds is willing to play for less than that, and has not been signed. QED.

Another topic: Bill: Is the weird end to Rickey's career relevant here? He wanted to keep playing, and appeared to have positive statistical value, but nobody wanted him. Groupthink, or an instance of the Curse of the Babe?
1:50 AM May 30th
 
tangotiger
Martin, you have your opinion, Bill has his, and I have mine. I have no problem with Bill presenting whatever he wants, however he wants; that's his editorial prerogative. I have no problem rebutting his arguments if I support my statements; that's my editorial position. In short, I see no issue here.

On page 442 of the 2008 Bill James Handbook, Bonds is forecast for the 2008 season as having the highest OPS of all major league players (including Pujols and Howard). That does not sound like someone who needs to be begging for a job to me.

Regardless, I think expecting a forecast of 125 OPS+ for him is very reasonable, and I've got the most pessimistic forecast for him of all forecasters around, including the BJ Handbook. (Entering the 2008 season anyway... not right now of course, since he's not Tim Raines, circa May 2, 1987). I've handled all aspects of the on field play to come up with a valuation of 4.4 million$. Again, I see no issue here with anything I've said or done. If you think his "peripherals" will cost 5 million$ or more, then, ok don't sign him.


9:07 PM May 29th
 
wovenstrap
Honestly, Tangotiger, the presentation of Bill's argument as presented in the "Hey Bill" section was not very convincing (to me). The presentation of the same argument here is pretty devastating. I think Bill's within his rights in not treating this as an analytical exercise to establish something scientific.
8:00 PM May 29th
 
tangotiger
This is called cherry-picking. You simply cannot select players, after-the-fact, to support what could happen to Bonds. You have to select players, as if you didn't know how their careers ended, first. Then, you can look to see how their careers ended. I used OPS+ (which is OPS adjusted for the league OBP, SLG). You could use anything really. Win Shares, Linear Weights, or whatnot. You can limit it to OF/1B/DH. Once you've got that list of players, then you can see how they did. Perhaps you did that, but your selection process is not noted.

The Hank Aaron example seems reasonable to me. If I had set the query back to select players aged 39 and above, he would have come out as #2 in the comp list. He went from an OPS+ of 177 at age 39, and then was an OPS+ of 128. Ted Williams also shows up with an OPS+ of 179 (#1 on the list) at age 39, with a 114 at age 40 and 190 at age 41 (both between 300 and 400 PA). Babe Ruth age 39 also shows up, and he's the disaster you noted. Mays as previously posted went from 158 to 131. Edgar aged 39 is #5 (excluding all incarnations of Bonds) with a 139 OPS+, and he followed that up with a 140 OPS+. Willie Stargell is next with an OPS+ of 139 which he followed up with an OPS+ of 129 (in only 230 PA). Except for the disaster of Ruth, all players performed as above average hitters. Calling Bonds a 125 or so OPS+ hitter here seems perfectly reasonable to me. That would make him +2 wins above average, per 162 games. Of course, his fielding/position/baserunning knocks that by over 2 wins, so that, overall, he's slightly below average. His diminished playing time knocks him even more, to something like a 1 win above replacement level.

That's Bonds' value, outside of his peripherals: $4.4MM. If the Mariners didn't have Vidro, and they were committed to an over-the-hill player as a DH, then Bonds would fit the bill. (Junior next year.) If the A's go for Frank Thomas, then they could have gone for Bonds. The Jays, with Thomas/Stairs also fit a similar bill. Mets with Alou/Delgado.

It's possible that the existing teams entering 2008 simply didn't provide the spot for Bonds because of existing contract committments, that if this was some other time period, that Bonds would have fit better.

11:03 AM May 29th
 
 
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