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Aging Research

May 30, 2008

            This is a very short study of an issue that arose in the context of the Barry Bonds discussion.   I was wondering what the relevant aging rate for Barry Bonds is.  

            I decided to measure the declines in value in terms of Average Season Score, mostly because that’s what I can do with the data I have organized the way that I have it. 

Bonds has had Season Scores the last three years of 38, 305 and 287, creating an Established Performance Level of 267 (Established Performance Level being here defined as .60 times the most recent season score, plus .30 times the previous season, plus .10 times the season before that.)    I took all players in history (non pitchers) who had Established Performance Levels between 200 and 335, intending to create a group with an average performance level near Bonds.  

            I miscalculated a little bit. . .obvious reason.   Since there are many more players in the bottom of that range than in the top, the average Established Performance Level of the players in the group was not 267, as I had intended, but 252.   Anyway, there were 3,757 players in the group, whose average performance in their most recent season was this:

 

G

AB

R

H

2B

3B

HR

RBI

BB

SO

SB

Avg

OBA

Slg

OPS

140

531

89

159

29

6

17

84

60

62

14

.299

.374

.474

.848

 

            I then sorted those players by age, and looked at their losses in Average Season Score over the next two seasons.    For example, the 27-year-old players in the group (of whom there were 380) had an Average Established Performance Level of 249.   The next season they averaged 211 (down 15%), and the season after that 197 (down 21%).   These numbers are entered in the chart below as –15 and –21. 

 

 

Age

+1

+2

   

   

Age

+1

+2

20

+26

+50

   

   

31

-22

-35

21

+32

+32

   

   

32

-24

-36

22

+9

+12

   

   

33

-23

-37

23

+6

+4

   

   

34

-24

-42

24

-4

-3

   

   

35

-29

-45

25

-2

-6

   

   

36

-36

-58

26

-9

-17

   

   

37

-42

-58

27

-15

-21

   

   

38

-32

-56

28

-16

-23

   

   

39

-40

-68

29

-15

-23

   

   

40

-43

-74

30

-17

-29

   

   

Over 40

-36

-76

           

 

            Players over 40 who performed in this range typically lost 76% of their value over the next two seasons.   Much of this evaporation was caused by the retirement of many of the players.  However, players over age 38 who didn’t retire almost uniformly took a tremendous step backward in performance over the next two seasons. 

            It is also interesting to note that the older players in this study resembled Bonds in that they tended to have higher walks and power, but less playing time than younger players.   The 27-year-old players in this study had an on-base percentage of .359, slugging percentage of .452, OPS of .810, but averaged 142 games played, 541 at bats.   The 40+ players averaged 120 games, 403 at bats, .424 on base percentage, .496 slugging, .920 OPS.   Of course, the 40+ players in the study were very small in number, but the 38- to 40-year olds, who were more numerous, showed the same pattern.

            Of course, we then get into the issue of what is “value”?   It may be that the players I am comparing are of comparable Season Scores, but not truly of comparable value.   The older players in the group, one could argue, had less playing time but more “value” because they were much better hitters.

            Could be.   It could also be that they merely had a different shape to their value, which I couldn’t really measure because the data base I am using doesn’t include defense.   Very likely. . well, certainly. . .the older players in the study had much less defensive value than the younger players.   But it may well be that their marginal value as hitters was much higher.  

            I then focused on the issue of players who had “old players skills” vs. “young players skills”.   For this portion of the study I eliminated the players who had played before 1920, reducing the total number of players in the study from 3,757 to 3,059.   I sorted those players based on what I called “old bases” and “young bases”.   Young bases were defined as

 

            2 * doubles, plus

            5 * triples, plus

            3 * stolen bases

 

and “old bases” were defined as

 

            3 * home runs, plus walks.

 

            The weights were set so that old bases and young bases more or less balanced for the group as a whole.   The five “youngest” players in the group were:

 

 

Player

YEAR

G

AB

R

H

2B

3B

HR

RBI

BB

SO

SB

CS

Avg

AGE

OBA

SPct

OPS

Willie Wilson

1980

161

705

133

230

28

15

3

49

28

81

79

10

.326

24

.357

.421

.778

Edd Roush

1924

121

483

67

168

23

21

3

72

22

11

17

13

.348

31

.376

.501

.877

Lou Brock

1974

153

635

105

194

25

7

3

48

61

88

118

33

.306

35

.368

.381

.749

Sam Rice

1920

153

624

83

211

29

9

3

80

39

23

63

30

.338

30

.381

.428

.809

Lou Brock

1968

159

660

92

184

46

14

6

51

46

124

62

12

.279

29

.328

.418

.746

 

            While the six “oldest” players were:

 

Player

YEAR

G

AB

R

H

2B

3B

HR

RBI

BB

SO

SB

CS

Avg

AGE

OBA

SPct

OPS

Darrell Evans

1985

151

505

81

125

17

0

40

94

85

85

0

4

.248

38

.356

.519

.875

Hank Aaron

1972

129

449

75

119

10

0

34

77

92

55

4

0

.265

38

.390

.514

.904

Mark McGwire

1995

104

317

75

87

13

0

39

90

88

77

1

1

.274

31

.441

.685

1.125

Jason Giambi

2005

139

417

74

113

14

0

32

87

108

109

0

0

.271

34

.440

.535

.975

Harmon Killebrew

1964

158

577

95

156

11

1

49

111

93

135

0

0

.270

28

.377

.548

.924

Mark McGwire

2001

97

299

48

56

4

0

29

64

56

118

0

0

.187

37

.316

.492

.808

 

            I was trying to form a focus group of players who were like Bonds, in that all they really did was walk and hit homers.    I then divided the players into ten groups, based on their “young bases” vs. their “old bases”.   These are the performance norms for the ten groups:

 

 

Player

G

AB

R

H

2B

3B

HR

RBI

BB

SO

SB

CS

Avg

OBA

SPct

OPS

Youngest

143

569

95

181

33

11

8

74

47

45

27

9

.319

.374

.457

.831

2nd Youngest

145

566

92

176

33

8

11

78

55

53

18

6

.312

.375

.459

.834

3rd Group

143

551

91

168

33

7

14

81

57

58

14

6

.305

.373

.469

.843

4th Group

143

548

90

164

32

6

17

84

58

68

13

5

.299

.369

.473

.842

5th Group

144

545

87

163

32

5

19

87

61

71

9

4

.299

.370

.482

.852

6th Group

145

541

86

159

30

4

22

90

63

77

8

4

.293

.368

.486

.854

7th Group

143

530

84

154

30

3

23

90

64

81

6

3

.291

.370

.492

.862

3rd Oldest

142

519

83

148

27

3

25

92

67

84

5

3

.285

.369

.493

.861

2nd Oldest

144

521

84

147

26

2

28

94

74

90

4

3

.282

.373

.502

.875

Oldest Group

139

486

80

133

20

1

31

93

80

93

2

2

.274

.378

.511

.890

 

            And these are the value retention rates over the next two years:

 

Group

E Sc

Sc +1

Sc +2

   

Youngest

250

226

206

90%

82%

2nd Youngest

246

210

191

85%

78%

3rd Group

252

219

191

87%

76%

4th Group

249

217

197

87%

79%

5th Group

251

215

192

86%

77%

6th Group

252

214

203

85%

80%

7th Group

253

200

186

79%

74%

3rd Oldest

250

204

183

82%

73%

2nd Oldest

260

217

180

84%

69%

Oldest Group

252

203

179

80%

71%

 

            The players with “young skills” tended to retain somewhat more of their value over the next two seasons, although it is unclear to what extent they did this because of their skills, and to what extent they retained more of their value because they were actually younger.     The player with the “youngest” skills—about 300 of them—averaged 28.3 years of age, whereas the players with the oldest skills averaged 30.5.

 

            The “oldest group” in the study above, however, still had much “younger” skills than Bonds.   Bonds’ “skill profile” is in the oldest 10% of the oldest 10%--the oldest 1%.   There are 30 players in this percentile, whose average performance is this:

 

G

AB

R

H

2B

3B

HR

RBI

BB

SO

SB

CS

Avg

OBA

SPct

OPS

134

441

77

116

15

0

35

91

90

100

1

1

.263

.392

.538

.930

 

            These players retained, on average, 67% of their value in the following season, and 54% in the season following that.    Bonds’, of course, is even more extreme than this 1% “most extreme”. 

            Bonds is such an extreme and atypical player that it is difficult to model or predict his career based on anyone else.   It is difficult to truly set aside the issues of Bonds being a troubled and troublesome person.   It remains my belief, however, that

            a)  as a player ages, his skills tend to build, but narrow,

            b)  the last skills remaining tend to be power and control of the strike zone,

            c)  when a player loses his speed, when he loses everything except his power and his control of the strike zone, there generally isn’t very much  left of his career.

 
 

COMMENTS (3 Comments, most recent shown first)

tangotiger
When I look at what happens at the first chart, in the first season, the players aged 36 and up all have the similar aging pattern: lose around 35-40% of their "season score". It's pretty flat.

(The second year is a bigger drop, but no one is arguing to sign him for 2 years right now.)

One main issue with this approach is the aggregating of rate stats with playing time. The older players will suffer in terms of attrition, and so regardless of what their rate stats are, if you multiply that by 0 PA, they get 0. Bonds, now, has added to his age class as looking like a monumental decline, when in fact, he simply didn't play. A guy with a .300 OBP and .400 SLG (and 200 PA) will come out better than Bonds will in terms of the production for his age class.

This is why I prefer to show the decline in terms of rate stats and in terms of playing time.


11:24 AM Jun 2nd
 
meandean
So, if what I got out of this is correct... the people in Bonds' percentile (i.e., the players most comparable to Bonds, insofar as anyone is comparable to him at all) start off as much better players, but they lose a higher percentage of their value.

That makes sense to me and, I'd imagine, to everyone else. The flip side of that, of course, is that it wouldn't actually be *better* to have a player who lost a lower percentage of his value... but had less value to begin with! That, to me, is the key point here.

If Bonds after factoring in the decline is still better than Jose Vidro, Garret Anderson, Jacque Jones, etc. -- I understand that we are limiting ourselves to teams that are concentrating on this season, and that you don't want to bench a promising kid; still, if you look, there are a lot of potentially replaceable LF/DH out there -- and if Bonds is asking for a reasonable salary, then it makes sense to sign him. And I would argue that, even factoring in decline, Bonds still is in fact a better bet than those guys.

(I don't think collusion is involved, BTW; I think it's easy for each of the relatively few teams that could benefit from signing him to individually rationalize that their guy is bound to turn it around, and why get involved in all the Bonds heartache.)
4:09 PM May 31st
 
Trailbzr
Good analysis, agreed. But as an aside...
The elephant in the room is that Bonds was, well, perhaps on the roster last year for a reason other than winning today's game. A reason that has suddenly disappeared. Like Pete Rose, is there any way/reason to examine the way keeping a guy on the roster for non-performance reasons affect the patterns we see?
7:40 PM May 30th
 
 
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