This article results from a series of discussions in multiple venues, all bearing on related issues.   First, Tom Tango sent me a link to an article on insidethebook.com about converting Linear Weights to Win Shares, one paragraph of which is as follows:

 

          So what does all this give us?  Well, it leads us to believe that there’s not much separating Linear Weights and Win Shares.  That you can make an easy conversion from one to the other.  That any problems that one might have with Linear Weights is easily “corrected” by introducing a second dimension, and that second dimension is very easy to calculate. 

 

            As to the notion that Win Shares and Linear Weights would be about the same if stated on the same scale. . ..any two systems which are attempting to measure the same thing should get about the same results, to the extent that both systems are accurate.   Linear Weights and Win Shares, I would assume, would get largely the same results in evaluting hitters, because both systems work, and any system that is accurate is going to observe essentially the same original facts.   The difference between them is like a picture taken with a Nikon digital camera and a picture taken with a Canon and film.   If the camera works, you should get about the same picture either way.  

            The offensive portions of Linear Weights and Win Shares, I would suspect, would in most cases be almost identical if stated in the same form.  The fielding parts, I doubt it. 

I really don’t know what may have been done with Linear Weights in the last ten years or so to advance their evaluations.   But, speaking of the system at the last point at which I had any understanding of it, which was ten or fifteen years ago, the system didn’t really work, in the sense that it didn’t take an accurate “picture” of the player’s fielding contribution.   Thus, I would strongly suspect that if you compared just the fielding portions of the two systems, you would fairly often find quite large disparities.

 

            A few days after that I was having a discussion at work, when a colleague asked me if I thought that Frank White had been overrated defensively.   It’s a fair question, and I didn’t think that he was overrated defensively, watching him play, but then, the people who watch Omar Vizquel play regularly don’t think he’s overrated defensively, either.   It occurred to me then that Frank White is a really good example of the type of player who would perhaps be rated differently by my defensive analysis than by other defensive systems, perhaps including Linear Weights.  

            Offensively, there are strong parallels between Frank White and Bill Mazeroski.   Mazeroski had 2016 hits in his career and hit .260; White had 2006 hits and hit .255.   Neither player walked, so they had on base percentages of .293 (White) and .299 (Maz).   Maz hit 138 homers, drove in 853 runs; White hit 160 homers, drove in 886.   White had a career OPS of .675; Maz, of .667.  

            Defensively, both players were second basemen.  Mazeroski won eight Gold Gloves; White won eight Gold Gloves.   White played in five All-Star games; Maz played in seven, but in five different years, as he got in on a couple of the multi-game seasons.   There are tremendously strong parallels. 

White was much faster than Mazeroski.   White had the quickness, and throwing arm of a premier shortstop, but was moved to second base simply because the Royals had a good shortstop and needed a second baseman.   Mazeroski did not have the quickness or agility of a top rank shortstop, although he had refined the double play pivot to a high art.

            But Mazeroski has defensive statistics which, translated on a superficial level, look fantastic.   White does not.  Mazeroski led his league five times in putouts, nine times in assists, three times in fielding percentage and eight times in double plays—a total of 25 fielding titles.   White led his league twice in putouts, once in assists, three times in fielding percentage—a total of six fielding titles.  

 

            White’s contemporary and, to an extent, rivals were Willie Randolph of New York and Lou Whitaker of Detroit .  In one book I compared Mazeroski to Randolph , and explained why I thought Randolph would have been a better Hall of Fame selection than Mazeroski—leaving open the question of how he compares to White. 

 

            A day or two after the conversation at work a reader, in the “Hey, Bill” section, posted this also-related question:

 

 

You made a persuasive argument that we shouldn't even talk about Vizquel as a Hall of Famer until Trammell -- a clearly better player -- gets in.   My question: how do you compare Trammell and his longtime double-play mate?   Whitaker obviously has less defensive value but was a better hitter in a career of similar length.  Did he deserve more consideration from the writers too?

 

         

          A few days after that, Matthew Namee weighed in with his excellent article about overrated and underrated players, in which he concludes that

 

            a) Bobby Richardson was the most overrated player ever,

            b) Bill Mazeroski was the most overrated Hall of Famer other than Luis Aparicio, and

            c)  Luis’ double-play partner, Nellie Fox, was overrated, too.

 

            So we have a complex of questions here about a group of related second basemen—Bill Mazeroski, Frank White, Lou Whitaker, Willie Randolph, Bobby Richardson, Nellie Fox.   I thought perhaps I should run Win Shares and Loss Shares for the lot of them, and see what conclusions we might be able to support.

 

 

But First, a Word from Our Sponsor

 

            The problem with the Linear Weights approach to fielding statistics as I last understood it, and with many primitive systems of Fielding Analysis, is that there is no acknowledgement of team accomplishment.   What would you think of a system which evaluated the average hitter on the 1999 Cleveland Indians (who scored 1009 runs) as being the same as the average hitter on the 2003 Dodgers (who scored 574 runs).   You’d think that was nuts, right?

            What would you think of a system that rated the pitching staff of the 1996 Detroit Tigers, who had a 6.38 ERA, equal with the 2003 Atlanta Braves, who had a 3.13 ERA?  You’d think the system didn’t work, right?

            What would you think of a system that rated good teams—first-place teams—as being overall equal with last-place teams?

            This is, in effect, what Linear Weights does, or did a few years ago.  Since the number of putouts made per game is in essence fixed on the team level, and since each player is rated by the number of putouts that he makes or assists, the rating of the team is fixed in place.   There is some compensation for this in error rates, but that benefit is offset by the fact that Linear Weights gives more credit for assists at some positions—outfield and catcher—where assists are more numerous on bad teams than on good teams.   The result is that bad teams tend to be assessed as superior defensively to good teams. 

            Stating the same thing in a different way:  If one team gives up 1700 hits in a season while another team gives up 1300, that makes no difference whatsoever in many fielding analysis systems, because “hits given up” are not a defensive statistic.   Only putouts, assists and errors “count” from a defensive stanpoint; hits allowed have nothing to do with it.

            But that’s ridiculous; hits allowed have everything to do with it.   Preventing hits is essentially what a fielder is trying to do.   You cannot make an accurate evaluation of a fielder’s defensive play without finding some way to take that into account.

            There are related “failure to adjust” problems in many systems—the failure to adjust assists by infielders for the team’s ground ball rate, and the failure to adjust double play rates for runners on base.    Those things could make Mazeroski look better than he was.   The Pirates in Maz’s time almost always had high ground ball rates. 

 

 

And Now, Back to Our Program

 

 

            Alphabetically:  Fox, Mazeroski, Randolph, Richardson, Whitaker, White.   That puts the two Hall of Famers first, the Yankees in the middle.

 

Nellie Fox      

Career Won-Lost         296-219  .575

Offensively                   201-191  .512

Defensively                     96-  28  .774

Best season:  1957, 29-4.

 

I have Nellie as follows:

 

 

YEAR	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	Avg	OBA	SPct	OPS	Won	-	Lost
1947	7	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	.000	.250	.000	.250	0	-	0
1948	3	13	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	.154	.214	.154	.368	0	-	1
1949	88	247	42	63	6	2	0	21	32	9	2	.255	.354	.296	.650	5	-	10
1950	130	457	45	113	12	7	0	30	35	17	4	.247	.304	.304	.608	9	-	18
1951	147	604	93	189	32	12	4	55	43	11	9	.313	.372	.425	.798	23	-	11
1952	152	648	76	192	25	10	0	39	34	14	5	.296	.334	.366	.700	21	-	13
1953	154	624	92	178	31	8	3	72	49	18	4	.285	.344	.375	.719	19	-	16
1954	155	631	111	201	24	8	2	47	51	12	16	.319	.372	.391	.763	25	-	10
1955	154	636	100	198	28	7	6	59	38	15	7	.311	.364	.406	.770	25	-	10
1956	154	649	109	192	20	10	4	52	44	14	8	.296	.347	.376	.723	20	-	16
1957	155	619	110	196	27	8	6	61	75	13	5	.317	.403	.415	.818	29	-	4
1958	155	623	82	187	21	6	0	49	47	11	5	.300	.357	.353	.710	19	-	14
1959	156	624	84	191	34	6	2	70	71	13	5	.306	.380	.389	.770	25	-	8
1960	150	605	85	175	24	10	2	59	50	13	2	.289	.351	.372	.723	19	-	15
1961	159	606	67	152	11	5	2	51	59	12	2	.251	.323	.295	.618	14	-	22
1962	157	621	79	166	27	7	2	54	38	12	1	.267	.314	.343	.657	17	-	18
1963	137	539	54	140	19	0	2	42	24	17	0	.260	.299	.306	.605	13	-	18
1964	133	442	45	117	12	6	0	28	27	13	0	.265	.320	.319	.639	14	-	13
1965	21	41	3	11	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	.268	.262	.317	.579	1	-	1

 

            Fox got around 190 hits a year, with an excellent strikeout to walk ratio and an above-average on base percentage, in what was generally a pitcher’s park.  I note that Lee Sinins’ RCAA (Runs Created Above Average) evaluates Fox as a slightly below-average offensive player, but I have his offensive won-lost at 201-191, or slightly above average.  I do not know why there is this discrepancy.

            Gold Gloves were first given in 1957, after Fox had already been in the league for ten years.   He won the first Gold Glove at second base in 1957 (a two-league competition), then won Gold Gloves again in 1959 and 1960.   We have to assume that, had the award been given earlier, he would have won several more. 

            I have suggested setting the standard for a Hall of Fame player at “300 Win Shares or 100 more Win Shares than Loss Shares.”   Fox narrowly misses 300-W standard, and comes reasonably close on the other.  In my view, there are many less-qualified Hall of Famers.

 

 

Bill Mazeroski

Career Won-Lost         245-211  .538

Offensively                   135-203  .401

Defensively                   110-8      .932

Best season:  1960, 21-10

 

YEAR	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	Avg	OBA	Slg	OPS	T WS	-	T LS
1956	81	255	30	62	8	1	3	14	18	24	0	.243	.293	.318	.611	6	-	9
1957	148	526	59	149	27	7	8	54	27	49	3	.283	.318	.407	.725	16	-	13
1958	152	567	69	156	24	6	19	68	25	71	1	.275	.308	.439	.747	21	-	13
1959	135	493	50	119	15	6	7	59	29	54	1	.241	.283	.339	.621	11	-	19
1960	151	538	58	147	21	5	11	64	40	50	4	.273	.320	.392	.712	21	-	10
1961	152	558	71	148	21	2	13	59	26	55	2	.265	.298	.380	.678	18	-	15
1962	159	572	55	155	24	9	14	81	37	47	0	.271	.315	.418	.733	22	-	12
1963	142	534	43	131	22	3	8	52	32	46	2	.245	.286	.343	.629	19	-	13
1964	162	601	66	161	22	8	10	64	29	52	1	.268	.300	.381	.681	19	-	17
1965	130	494	52	134	17	1	6	54	18	34	2	.271	.294	.346	.641	16	-	13
1966	162	621	56	163	22	7	16	82	31	62	4	.262	.296	.398	.694	23	-	14
1967	163	639	62	167	25	3	9	77	30	55	1	.261	.292	.352	.644	17	-	20
1968	143	506	36	127	18	2	3	42	38	38	3	.251	.304	.312	.616	15	-	15
1969	67	227	13	52	7	1	3	25	22	16	1	.229	.298	.308	.606	7	-	7
1970	112	367	29	84	14	0	7	39	27	40	2	.229	.283	.324	.607	10	-	12
1971	70	193	17	49	3	1	1	16	15	8	0	.254	.303	.295	.599	5	-	6
1972	34	64	3	12	4	0	0	3	3	5	0	.188	.217	.250	.467	1	-	3

 

            Even after adjusting everything that I can find to adjust for and placing everything in context, Mazeroski’s defensive record remains brilliant,  easily the best of the six players discussed here, and perhaps the best of any player in the history of baseball.   He is the Babe Ruth of fielders.   I credit him with a career defensive won-lost record of 110-8—an even better percentage than Ozzie Smith’s 123-17. 

            His defense justifies his long standing as a regular, and, in his best seasons (21-13, 21-10, 22-12, 19-13, 23-14) a reputation as a star.   However, given his very low on base percentages and moderate offensive contributions in other areas, his inclusion in the Hall of Fame is not quite justified by our analysis.

            It could be that our analysis is wrong.   It could be that more space should have been allocated, in our analysis, for defensive excellence at second base.   But this is my opinion based on what I know.

 

 

Bobby Richardson

Career Won-Lost         129-176   .422

Offensively                     90-144   .385

Defensively                     39-33     .541

Best season:  1962, 21-17

 

YEAR	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	Avg	OBA	Slg	OPS	T WS	-	T LS
1955	11	26	2	4	0	0	0	3	2	0	1	.154	.214	.154	.368	0	-	2
1956	5	7	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	.143	.143	.143	.286	0	-	0
1957	97	305	36	78	11	1	0	19	9	26	1	.256	.274	.298	.573	7	-	11
1958	73	182	18	45	6	2	0	14	8	5	1	.247	.276	.302	.578	4	-	7
1959	134	469	53	141	18	6	2	33	26	20	5	.301	.335	.377	.713	14	-	11
1960	150	460	45	116	12	3	1	26	35	19	6	.252	.303	.298	.601	9	-	18
1961	162	662	80	173	17	5	3	49	30	23	9	.261	.295	.316	.610	15	-	23
1962	161	692	99	209	38	5	8	59	37	24	11	.302	.337	.406	.743	21	-	17
1963	151	630	72	167	20	6	3	48	25	22	15	.265	.294	.330	.624	19	-	17
1964	159	679	90	181	25	4	4	50	28	36	11	.267	.294	.333	.626	15	-	22
1965	160	664	76	164	28	2	6	47	37	39	7	.247	.287	.322	.609	14	-	24
1966	149	610	71	153	21	3	7	42	25	28	6	.251	.280	.330	.610	12	-	24

 

 

            The evaluation of Richardson by the Win Shares method appears, as noted by Matthew Namee, to be irredeemably at odds with his evaluation by contemporary sportswriters.   Not only does Richardson have the very low on-base percentages that plague others of this group (Mazeroski and White), but, despite his excellent reputation as a defensive player—he won Gold Gloves in ’61, ’62, ’63, ’64 and ’65--our analysis concludes that, as a defensive player, he had very limited range and no outstanding positives. 

            Remember, our analysis is set up to give large advantages to a player on a team that is successful.   We are criticized for this often, but we will stand our ground.  

            Richardson in ’60, ’61, ’62, ’63, ’64, plays on a team that is successful at a very high level, which puts him far ahead to start the analysis—yet his individual numbers are so poor that, at the end of the day, he still doesn’t come off very well.  We have his defensive won-lost records, beginning in 1960, at 2-5, 6-3, 4-4, 8-1, 4-4, 4-4 and 3-6.  

            In 1962 the NL Gold Glove second baseman, Mazeroski, is evaluated by our system at 11+2, meaning that we credit him with 10 Win Shares in the space allocated for 9 decisions, thus give him 2 “negative losses”.   The AL Gold Glove second baseman, Richardson , we have at 4-4.   Let me walk you through the process of reaching those evaluations.

            The defensive area of responsibility is assigned based on

            1)  Innings played in the field,

            2)  Outs made as a hitter, and

            3)  The defensive parameters of the team.

            We start by asking the question “How much of the run prevention performance of this team is attributable to fielding, and how much to pitching?"   We look at six categories to make that decision:  Home Runs, Walks, Hit Batsmen, Strikeouts, Errors and Double Plays.   If a team gives up lots of home runs, walks, hit batsmen and has lots of strikeouts, we figure that there isn’t very much that the fielders can do about that, so more of the responsibility for the team’s defensive performance goes to the pitchers.   If the team has more errors and more double plays, that’s an indication that the team’s pitching-and-defense rests, to a larger extent, on the fielders.

            Five of these six factors suggest that the ’62 Pirates—Mazeroski’s team—are more of a “fielding based” team than the ’62 Yankees, Richardson’s team.   The Pirates did have a few more strikeouts, but all of the other “pitching” factors are higher on the Yankees than the Pirates, while the “defense” factors are higher on the Pirates.  We thus assign the Pirate defenders, as a group, 77.3 Defensive Win Shares and Loss Shares, while the Yankees are assigned 70.8.  

            Mazeroski made 441 outs as a hitter and played 1,410 innings at second base; he is thus assigned a defensive responsibility of 8.74 “games” (which is, of course, 8.74 thirds of a game.)  

            Richardson made 529 outs as a hitter (!) and played 1,440 innings at second base.   We assign him a defensive responsibility of 8.56 games.  The Pirates defensive responsibility is higher as a team, but Richardson ’s individual share is larger relative to the team, so the overall defensive responsibilities of the two players are about the same—8.74 for Maz, 8.56 for Bobby.   (A small note. . .the innings given above are actually an illusion, as the Yankees played more innings than the Pirates did.   The actual split is based on innings as a percentage of the team, which actually is higher for Maz.   We’ll get to that in a minute.) 

            Then, on a separate but not entirely separate track, we assign credit for the team’s defensive success to the second baseman.   As a starting point, we assign to the second basemen 14% of the team’s Defensive Win Shares and Loss Shares:

 

Mazeroski:       77.24 * .14 =  10.82

Richardson        70.76 * .14 =    9.91

 

            Divided by two.   Actually, divided by two on an average team.   If the team’s “Defensive Winning Percentage” is .500, it’s divided by two.

            One of the problems with explaining the Win Shares system is that there is no place to start; something was always done earlier which I didn’t explain.   One of the first things we do, in assigning credit for team wins to individuals, is to figure the team’s offensive and defensive winning percentages.  

            The ’62 Yankees were 96-66; the ’62 Pirates were 93-68—not a big difference.   The league ERAs were 3.97 and 3.94—again, not a big difference.   Yankee Stadium in ’62, however, was very strongly a pitcher’s park—a fact which will help Richardson ’s BATTING evaluation, but not his fielding—whereas Forbes Field was essentially neutral.  In spite of this, the Yankees in ’62 allowed 680 runs.   The Pirates allowed 626.   Which team had better pitching and defense?

            The Pirates, obviously.    The Yankees won in ’62 because they had a vastly superior offense.   The Pirates came close because they had a better defense. The Yankee pitching and defense, park adjusted, is actually below average.   The Yankees allowed 374 runs in road games, which finished sixth in a ten-team league.    Thus, in crediting wins to individuals, we give much more credit to the Yankee hitters—but somewhat more credit to the Pittsburgh defensive players.

            The Pirates in ’62 have a “Defensive Winning Percentage” of .630; the Yankees of .468.   We multiply the player’s (previous) defensive Win Shares by this number:

 

Mazeroski        77.24  * .14 * .630 =   6.82

Richardson        70.76  * .14 * .468 =   4.64

 

            What we are saying at this point is that the ’62 Pirates are more of a pitching-and-defense team than are the ’62 Yankees, and that, in the pitching-and-defense split, more of the responsibility on the Pirates is on the fielders, therefore, if the second basemen have league-average defensive statistics, the Pirate second basemen will be presumed to be better (because the individual defensive stats compete against the team total, and the team total is better.)     Pirate second basemen are (presumptively) credited with 6.82 Win Shares, while Yankee second basemen are presumptively credited with 4.64.

            This, however, is assuming that the player played every inning at the position.  Next we have to adjust for his innings played.   Mazeroski played 1,410 innings out of a team total of 1,432 (.9844), while Richardson played 1,440 out of 1,472 (.9785).  We adjust the Win Share credits for that:

 

Mazeroski        77.24  * .14  * .630  * .9844 =  6.71

Richardson        70.76  * .14  * .468  * .9785 =  4.54

 

            Then we begin to look at the player’s individual defensive statistics.   We figure “expected assists” for the player as

 

            Team assists

            Times the league percentage of assists which are by second basemen

            Adjusted by the left-handed/right-handed bias of the pitching staff

            Times the individual’s percentage of the innings at second base

 

            The left/right adjustment for second basemen is not very large, as the left-right bias of the pitching staff doesn’t change the expected assists of second basemen by very much.   Anyway, when we do this, we find that Mazeroski has 472 expected assists, whereas Richardson has 453. 

            But Mazeroski has 509 actual assists, whereas Richardson has 452 (a career high, by the way.)   Mazeroski is thus +37, whereas Richardson is –1. 

            We adjust the Win Share credits upward by .04 for each assist above expectation—a Linear Weights type of adjustment:

 

Mazeroski        6.71 + (.04 * 37) = 8.19

Richardson        4.54 + (.04 * -1) = 4.50

 

            I could be a distant decimal off; although the spreadsheet that actually figures these things carries everything out to 18 decimals or something, for obvious reasons I’m not doing that here. 

            Anyway, we then do the same with the putouts. . .we figure the player’s expected putouts in the same way.  Mazeroski has an expectation of 354 putouts, Richardson an expectation of 396. 

            But Mazeroski has 425 actual putouts (+71), whereas Richardson has 378 (-18).   For each putout above expectation, we credit the player with an additional .02 Win Shares:

 

Mazeroski        8.19 + (.02 * 71) =      9.61

Richardson        4.50 + (.02 * -18) =     4.14

 

            Next we look at the team’s Double Play total.   I don’t use the second baseman’s individual Double Plays; I use the team total.  The two numbers are extremely closely related, and I just think that you get a better line on whether the team is good or bad at turning double plays if you stay focused on the team totals.  

            We figure each team’s expected double plays as:

            The league average of double plays per team,

            Adjusted for innings played,

            Adjusted for the number of runners on base against the team,

            Adjusted for the team assist total (which is closely connected to the ground ball tendency of the pitching staff.)

 

            The ’62 Pirates had an expectation of 160 double plays, but actually turned 177, or +17.   The ’62 Yankees had an expectation of 149, but actually turned 151, or +2.  We credit the second baseman with one Win Shares for each 20 double plays above average, and of course we have to adjust that again for the player’s innings at second base, which makes:

 

Mazeroski        9.61  +  (17/20 * .9844)  =  10.45

Richardson        4.14  +  ( 2/20 * .9785)   =   4.24

 

            Finally, we figure actual versus expected errors.   Expected errors are simply Total Chances, times the league error percentage at the position.  

            Mazeroski had 14 errors vs. 25 expected errors, making him +11.  Richardson had 15 errors vs. an expectation of 17, making him +2.   (Mazeroski’s expected errors are higher because 1) he made more plays, and 2) the NL fielding percentage at second base in 1962, for some reason, was much lower.)  Anyway, we credit the player with one extra Win Share for each 16 errors not made, making:

 

Mazeroski        10.45 + (11/16) =   11.14

Richardson          4.24 +  (2/16) =      4.37

 

            Carrying more decimals at some point, it is actually 11.09 for Mazeroski, 4.38 for Richardson .

            The player’s defensive Loss Shares are simply his Defensive Responsibility, minus his Win Shares.   For Mazeroski, this is 8.74 minus 11.09, or a negative 2.35 losses (11 + 2).   For Richardson it is 8.56 minus 4.38, or 4.18 losses (4 – 4).   Richardson , despite his Gold Glove, appears to be an essentially average defensive second baseman. 

 

            As you can see, there are many elements of this system which are not locked in place by extensive research and rigorous logic.   Many elements of the system are somewhat arbitrary.   It is likely that future researchers, twenty or thirty years from now, will understand some of the internal issues better than I understand them, and that they will reach somewhat different conclusions because of that. 

            However, based on my understanding of the data, Mazeroski’s Gold Gloves are well justified by the facts.    Nellie Fox’s Gold Gloves are well justified by the facts.   Richardson ’s are not. 

 

 

Willie Randolph

Career Won-Lost         283-164   .634

Offensively:                   213-136   .610

Defensively:                    69-27     .720

Best season:  1980, 25-4

 

YEAR	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	Avg	OBA	Slg	OPS	T WS	-	T LS
1975	30	61	9	10	1	0	0	3	7	6	1	.164	.246	.180	.427	1	-	4
1976	125	430	59	115	15	4	1	40	58	39	37	.267	.356	.328	.684	18	-	9
1977	147	551	91	151	28	11	4	40	64	53	13	.274	.347	.387	.734	21	-	11
1978	134	499	87	139	18	6	3	42	82	51	36	.279	.381	.357	.738	21	-	8
1979	153	574	98	155	15	13	5	61	95	39	33	.270	.374	.368	.741	21	-	14
1980	138	513	99	151	23	7	7	46	119	45	30	.294	.427	.407	.834	25	-	4
1981	93	357	59	83	14	3	2	24	57	24	14	.232	.336	.305	.641	12	-	11
1982	144	553	85	155	21	4	3	36	75	35	16	.280	.368	.349	.717	18	-	13
1983	104	420	73	117	21	1	2	38	53	32	12	.279	.361	.348	.708	14	-	9
1984	142	564	86	162	24	2	2	31	86	42	10	.287	.377	.348	.725	21	-	10
1985	143	497	75	137	21	2	5	40	85	39	16	.276	.382	.356	.738	20	-	10
1986	141	492	76	136	15	2	5	50	94	49	15	.276	.393	.346	.738	17	-	11
1987	120	449	96	137	24	2	7	67	82	25	11	.305	.411	.414	.825	18	-	6
1988	110	404	43	93	20	1	2	34	55	39	8	.230	.322	.300	.621	11	-	13
1989	145	549	62	155	18	0	2	36	71	51	7	.282	.366	.326	.692	21	-	9
1990	26	96	15	26	4	0	1	9	13	9	1	.271	.364	.344	.707	3	-	2
1990	93	292	37	75	9	3	1	21	32	25	6	.257	.331	.318	.650	9	-	8
1991	124	431	60	141	14	3	0	54	75	38	4	.327	.424	.374	.798	18	-	5
1992	90	286	29	72	11	1	2	15	40	34	1	.252	.352	.318	.670	8	-	9

 

 

            Willie Randolph was vaguely comparable to Nellie Fox as an offensive player—a singles hitter with very good strikeout/walk ratios.  However, although his averages were a little lower than Fox’s, he walked more, so his on base percentages were higher, plus he was much faster than Fox.  Overall, Randolph was the best offensive player among the four we have discussed so far, and the third-best defensive player (behind Maz and Fox, the two Hall of Famers.) 

            It is my view that Willie Randolph’s playing career would justify a Hall of Fame selection—as much as Fox or a little more, and more so than Mazeroski.   But not as much as Lou:

 

 

 

Lou Whitaker

Career Won-Lost         301-164   .647

Offensively:                   241-127   .655

Defensively                     60-37      .627

Best season:  1983, 26-8

YEAR	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	Avg	OBA	Slg	OPS	T WS	-	T LS
1977	11	32	5	8	1	0	0	2	4	6	2	.250	.333	.281	.615	0	-	2
1978	139	484	71	138	12	7	3	58	61	65	7	.285	.361	.357	.718	20	-	9
1979	127	423	75	121	14	8	3	42	78	66	20	.286	.395	.378	.774	18	-	6
1980	145	477	68	111	19	1	1	45	73	79	8	.233	.331	.283	.614	12	-	16
1981	109	335	48	88	14	4	5	36	40	42	5	.263	.340	.373	.714	13	-	6
1982	152	560	76	160	22	8	15	65	48	58	11	.286	.341	.434	.775	21	-	9
1983	161	643	94	206	40	6	12	72	67	70	17	.320	.380	.457	.837	26	-	8
1984	143	558	90	161	25	1	13	56	62	63	6	.289	.357	.407	.764	22	-	9
1985	152	609	102	170	29	8	21	73	80	56	6	.279	.362	.456	.819	22	-	11
1986	144	584	95	157	26	6	20	73	63	70	13	.269	.338	.437	.775	19	-	14
1987	149	604	110	160	38	6	16	59	71	108	13	.265	.341	.427	.768	18	-	14
1988	115	403	54	111	18	2	12	55	66	61	2	.275	.376	.419	.795	16	-	6
1989	148	509	77	128	21	1	28	85	89	59	6	.251	.361	.462	.822	18	-	10
1990	132	472	75	112	22	2	18	60	74	71	8	.237	.338	.407	.744	16	-	11
1991	138	470	94	131	26	2	23	78	90	45	4	.279	.391	.489	.881	19	-	6
1992	130	453	77	126	26	0	19	71	81	46	6	.278	.386	.461	.847	16	-	9
1993	119	383	72	111	32	1	9	67	78	46	3	.290	.412	.449	.861	16	-	5
1994	92	322	67	97	21	2	12	43	41	47	2	.301	.377	.491	.867	9	-	7
1995	84	249	36	73	14	0	14	44	31	41	4	.293	.372	.518	.890	8	-	5

 

            In my opinion, Lou Whitaker is a Hall of Fame player.   I think that he is the best of the six players we are discussing here, and I think that he is more qualified for the Hall of Fame, strictly as a player, than his longtime double play partner, Alan Trammell.

            Whitaker was simply a better hitter than the other players involved here.   Yes, he was behind them as a fielder (other than Richardson ), but not that far behind.   He was still pretty good.  While I try to stay out of Hall of Fame arguments and will continue to do so, Whitaker is the only player in the discussion who clearly meets the Hall of Fame standards I have suggested—300 Win Shares, and 100 Wins over Losses. 

 

Frank White

Career Won-Lost         222-244    .476

Offensively:                   137-213    .391

Defensively                     85-31      .731

Best season:  1986, 19-13

 

 

YEAR	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	Avg	OBA	Slg	OPS	T WS	-	T LS
1973	51	139	20	31	6	1	0	5	8	23	3	.223	.262	.281	.542	2	-	6
1974	99	204	19	45	6	3	1	18	5	33	3	.221	.239	.294	.533	4	-	9
1975	111	304	43	76	10	2	7	36	20	39	11	.250	.297	.365	.662	10	-	8
1976	152	446	39	102	17	6	2	46	19	42	20	.229	.263	.307	.570	13	-	16
1977	152	474	59	116	21	5	5	50	25	67	23	.245	.284	.342	.626	14	-	15
1978	143	461	66	127	24	6	7	50	26	59	13	.275	.317	.399	.716	16	-	12
1979	127	467	73	124	26	4	10	48	25	54	28	.266	.300	.403	.703	11	-	16
1980	154	560	70	148	23	4	7	60	19	69	19	.264	.289	.357	.646	15	-	18
1981	94	364	35	91	17	1	9	38	19	50	4	.250	.285	.376	.661	9	-	12
1982	145	524	71	156	45	6	11	56	16	65	10	.298	.318	.469	.788	16	-	14
1983	146	549	52	143	35	6	11	77	20	51	13	.260	.283	.406	.690	16	-	17
1984	129	479	58	130	22	5	17	56	27	72	5	.271	.311	.445	.756	17	-	11
1985	149	563	62	140	25	1	22	69	28	86	10	.249	.284	.414	.698	17	-	16
1986	151	566	76	154	37	3	22	84	43	88	4	.272	.322	.465	.787	19	-	13
1987	154	563	67	138	32	2	17	78	51	86	1	.245	.308	.400	.708	15	-	19
1988	150	537	48	126	25	1	8	58	21	67	7	.235	.266	.330	.595	12	-	20
1989	135	418	34	107	22	1	2	36	30	52	3	.256	.307	.328	.635	13	-	12
1990	82	241	20	52	14	1	2	21	10	32	1	.216	.253	.307	.560	5	-	10

 

            I think the world of Frank White, and I would never speak ill of him.  I enjoyed watching him for many years, and, as we are members of the same community, I have met him a number of times over the years.   He is a fine man as well as a fine player.

            Also, his Gold Gloves appear, based on my interpretation of the evidence, to be at least reasonable.   His career defensive winning percentage (.731) is the highest of any player in this group, other than the two Hall of Famers, Fox and Mazeroski.    Defensively he rates as superior to Willie Randolph or Lou Whitaker, his chief contemporary rivals in the American League, although I’m not sure how he would compare to Bobby Grich. 

            White’s defensive contribution never goes “over the top”, as Mazeroski’s does.  However, his defensive won-lost records, beginning in 1983, read 7-1, 6-1, 7-2, 6-2, 6-2, 7-1, and 6-1—consistently excellent.

            Doing a short form of the analysis above for White’s 1988 season, when he hit just .235 with a .266 on base percentage, leading to a regrettable 6-19 record as an offensive player.   As a defensive player, however:

 

            1)  The 1988 Royals have 77.08 Defensive Win Shares and Loss Shares.

            2)  White, with 443 batting outs and 1,186 innings in the field, is assigned responsibility for 7.97 of those—a little lower total than Mazeroski or Richardson because he didn’t play as many innings in the field.

            3)  The Royals team defensive winning percentage was .569, so the presumptive Win Shares of their second basemen are 77.08 * .14 * .569, or 6.14.  

            4)  White played 1,186 innings of a team total of 1,408, so his share of those is .8305, or 5.10.

            5)  White had 426 assists vs. 403 expected assists, boosting him upward by .92.

            6)  White had 293 putouts vs. 278 expected putouts, boosting him upward by .30.

            7)  The Royals turned 147 double plays vs. 155 expected double plays, so he loses 4/10^ths of a point there.

            8)  White was charged with only 4 errors vs. 13 expected errors, boosting him upward by .56.

            9)   Adding everything together, I credit White with 6.59 Win Shares out of a “field” of 7.97, which leaves 1.38 Loss Shares.   7-1, rounded off. 

            This was kind of a typical year for him.   Harold Reynolds won the Gold Glove that year; I don’t know what his record was.  But White was a very good second baseman, and he didn’t have to hit a lot to justify his place in the lineup.