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Garrett Atkins

February 20, 2009

            Over the last two years, Colorado third baseman Garrett Atkins has undergone a quite remarkable degeneration in his strikeout to walk ratio.   In 2006, at the age of 26, Atkins’ strikeout/walk ratio was better than even—79 walks, 76 strikeouts.   In 2008 he walked only 40 times and struck out 100 times.  

            This gives us a series of questions:

            1)  How uncommon is that, for a player to go through a quick degeneration of the strikeout/walk ratio like that?

            2)  How do you measure that?

            3)  What causes it?

            4)  Is it a cause for grave concern about the future of his career?

            To which the answers are:

            1)  It’s really uncommon.    One could make the argument that there is no other player in the history of baseball who has gone through an equally severe degeneration of the strikeout/walk ratio between the ages of 26 and 28.   There are some similar cases and maybe some of them are just as bad, but. ..it’s really extreme. 

            2) You could measure the degeneration in a player’s strikeout/walk ratio between any two seasons in this way.   Step 1, multiply his walks in the first year (79) by his strikeouts in the second year (100. .  .7900).   Step 2, multiply his walks in the second year (40) by his strikeouts in the first year (76. ..3040).   Step 3, divide the second figure by the first (3040/7900 = .38).    Step 4, subtract from 1.00 (1.00 - .38 = .62).   Atkins has undergone a 62% deterioration in his strikeout/walk ratio over a period of two years, when he should be in his prime.

            3)  There could be a number of possible causes, and I don’t have any way of knowing which it was.   It could be that, with the aging of Todd Helton, Atkins has felt more of the pressure of being the Rockies’ RBI guy, and has tried to expand his strike zone, Joe Carter-like, to drive in runs.    In 2006 Garrett hit .319 with the bases empty, and.341 with runners in scoring position.   In 2008 he hit .322 with the bases empty, but .225 with runners in scoring position.

            But it could also be any number of other things.   It could be a vision problem.   It could be that the organization has not supported and encouraged him to be a disciplined hitter.  

            One of the other players who turned up in my study who had a very bad degeneration in his strikeout/walk ratio between ages 26 and 28 was Joe Cunningham (1958 to 1960), who had a remarkable 23-82 strikeout/walk ratio as a 26-year-old, but a 59-59 ratio at age 28.  My understanding of this, based on seeing Cunningham on a player panel several years ago, is that his manager in 1958 (Fred Hutchinson) encouraged him to concentrate on getting on base, but that his manager in 1960 (Solly Hemus) gave him the message that “you’re an outfielder; if you’re going to play you’re going to have to hit for power.”  

            It could be that there has been some sort of unusual adjustment in the pitching patterns to him, that he just hasn’t caught up with yet.

            4)  It is certainly a cause for concern about his future—not a death warrant, but something to worry about.    Let’s look at some of the other players who had unususal deteriorations in their strikeout/walk ratio between ages 26 and 28:

Carlos Baerga had a 67% deterioration in his strikeout/walk ratio between ages 26 and 28, but did so as a part of a generalized downward spiral in his career.   Atkins, to this  point, has shown little evidence of a generalized downward spiral in performance, other than strikeout and walk numbers.

Chili Davis had a 46% deterioration in his ratio from 1986 to 1988, going from 84-96 to 56-118.  Davis played in the majors for many years after that, had his best years after that, and gradually improved his strikeout to walk ratio after that.

Cleon Jones hit .340 in 1969, as a part of the Miracle Mets.   In 1971 he still hit .319, but with a 43% degeneration in K/W performance.   Jones stopped hitting in 1972.  His .282 average in 1974 was the only time in his career he hit higher than .260, after 1971. 

Cookie Rojas lost control of the strike zone between 1965 and 1967, going from a K/W ratio of 33-42 to 58-30.   Rojas’ performance continued to deteriorate after 1967, and he lost his job, although he had an unusual late-in-life revival several years later, and actually made a couple of all-star teams in the 1970s. 

Darren Bragg’s strikeout ratio went from almost even (74-69) to almost the same as Atkins (99-42) between 1996 and 1998.   He lost his regular status in 1999, and his career never came out of its downward spiral.

Deron Johnson in 1965 was a similar player to Atkins—a slow right-handed power hitter; he drove in 130 runs, which led the major leagues in 1965.    His strikeout/walk ratio degenerated by 61% over the following two years, and he lost his regular status.   He began to regain his footing the next year, and, although he never got back to where he was in 1965, he did have some good years later on.

Don Hurst had a 67% degeneration in his strikeout to walk ratio between 1932 and 1934, as a part of a generalized career death spiral similar to Carlos Baerga’s.

Edgar Renteria in 2003, with St. Louis, drew 65 walks, struck out only 54 times, hit .330 and drove in 100 runs.   In 2005, with the Red Sox, he had a strikeout/walk ratio of 100 to 55 (a 54% degeneration), and just generally did not play well, particularly in the field.   Renteria’s has bounced around since then, but his career has not truly spiraled out of control. 

Joe Adcock had a 51% degeneration in his strikeout to walk ratio between 1954 and 1956, which was in no way predictive of a general decline in his career.

John Mayberry had a 41% degeneration in his strikeout to walk ratio between 1975 and 1977, as a part of a general (and premature) downward spiral in his career.

After the Royals “traded” John Mayberry, they replaced him at first with Willie Aikens.   Aikens had a 55% degeneration in his strikeout/walk ratio between1981 and 1983, as a part of a generalized degeneration of his life and career, leading ultimately to several years spent in a Mexico prison.

Rico Petrocelli had a 42% degeneration in his strikeout to walk ratio between 1969 and 1971.   Petrocelli, again, was a similar player to Atkins—a right-handed power hitter.  In 1971 he hit .251 with 28 homers, 91 RBI—a season not too dissimilar from Atkins’ in 2008.   Petrocelli basically stopped hitting in the next season.

So. . .it’s not the end of the world, but it’s definitely not a good sign.

 
 

COMMENTS (3 Comments, most recent shown first)

PeteDecour
why do you think his splits in k/bb deteriorated so much more on the road than at home? they were 1-1 in 2006, worse that 2-1 in 2007 and more than 3-1 in 2008, while deteriorating far more slowly and to a lesser degree at home.

Do you think pitchers learned a weakness against him on the road and exploited it at home?
5:26 PM Feb 26th
 
evanecurb
Bill:

For some reason, there was no "What do you think?" tab on your article regarding fly ball / line drive / ground ball splits, so this comment is in response to that article. This is truly groundbreaking stuff, and I see it as a potential breakthrough along the lines of Voros McCracken's discoveries about batting average on balls in play. Some applications:

1. (most obvious) team construction and fitting a team to the home park: Guys who hit the ball HARD and have a high average on fly balls are always more valuable, but this advantage increases in home run parks.
2. Pitchers' ground ball/fly ball ratios have a similar relationship to the type of park.
3. Ground ball hitters should be more valuable on artifical turf.
4. We should be able to derive the cost of a strikeout to each hitter by using this data.

I know you do this for a living so I am not telling you anything you don't already know. There are probably a dozen other applications that a good brainstorming session could unveil. All of these things should be tested rather than assumed.

The fact that there aren't really guys that hit line drives even 33% of the time on a regular basis is mind numbing. I would have guessed that Boggs, Carew, Gwynn, Brett, and Ichiro were all at least 40% line drives.

9:11 PM Feb 21st
 
ventboys
I don't know if it relates, but Atkins got off to a better start last year than he had the previous 2 years. He started out really slow in 2006 and 2007, then closed with a huge rush, like a race horse with a big closing move. In 2008 he started well, and had much better first half numbers than he had ever had, then seemed to fade away.

I only know this because of fantasy baseball. Atkins is one of those guys that is tossed around our league, much like Adam LaRoche, because everyone is trying to get him just before the hot streak. Harold Baines used to do this, I seem to remember Bobby Murcer was like this too. Adam Dunn, etc. Some guys get the reputation for being slow starters, who then go off when the weather gets hot. Jason Giambi did it a couple of times in the last few years.

I don't know if it's germane, it's just an observation.
4:09 AM Feb 21st
 
 
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