There's an article in the new Handbook (The Bill James Handbook 2020) which addresses that exact issue, and makes the same point that you just made.   As I said in that article, unless you do that--do what you just said--unless you do that, you are NOT going to meaningfully improve the pace of play.  Until you do that, you're just PRETENDING that you are trying to solve the problem; you're not really trying to solve it.  

 Incorporating sabermetrics at that level is not a matter of data as much as it is a matter of principles.  It's not a matter of little data points; sabermetrics itself is not about little data points.  There are things that you learn from studying the game in the way that we study it which are useful to the manager--for example, the realization that what drives an offense is on base percentage, or the realization that some batters hit the ball predominantly to one side of the infield, or the realization that all pitchers are more effective in short stints than in long outings, or the realization that whether a hitter has been hot or cold doesn't have anything at all to do with what he will do in his next at bat, or the realization (which has not yet been accepted by MLB, but it will in time) that there is no such thing as a right-handed hitter who hits better against right-handed pitchers or a left-handed hitter who hits better against left-handed pitching.   These insights generally apply throughout baseball and thus can generally be applied anywhere in baseball even without the level of detail that we have in the majors.

 

 

But not universaly, probably.   Speed, for example.  Speed in the majors has a lot of value for defense in the outfield, but very marginal impact on the offense.  But in high school baseball that might not be true.  In high school baseball, dealing with pitchers who are not well-schooled in holding runners and catchers who may or may not be able to throw to second. . .

 

 

Let me try that again.   In preventing a stolen base, three fielders have to do their jobs, and two of those jobs are very difficult.  There really are not a large number of people who can pop out of a crouch and throw accurately to second base, and there also are not a lot of people who can catch a baseball traveling at 80+ miles per hour and slap a tag on a sliding baserunner.   Those are tough things to do, and those skills are in limited supply at the high school level, so it may well be that, in high school, base stealing is much more important than it is at the major league level.  

 

It might also be that the insight that everybody is more effective pitching 1 inning than pitching 7 innings is not as useful in high school as it is in the majors, because in high school you probably have one pitcher who is WAY better than everybody else and is still better than everybody else if he pitches 9 innings, and in high school the 12th man on your pitching staff probably couldn't throw a strike from 10 feet away, whereas in the majors the 12th man on your staff is probably not vastly less effective than your closer.  

 

But what I'm trying to get to is, it's a matter of applying sabermetric principles, rather than data mining.   Sabermetrics gets obsessed with data mining, and there is some value in that, but that's not essentially what it's about.  

 He was listed 26th.  

 Well, I think that's actually why the rule was put in place:  to say that the batter CAN'T do that.  The rules in general are designed to say that the needs of the fielder take precedence over the needs of the baserunner.  If two guys have to be in the same place at the same time, then the baserunner has to get out of the way to allow the fielder to make the play.  The rules say that, essentially, in 25 different ways and in 25 different places; that's the overarching theme.  

 

But the limitation is that, while the rights of the fielder are dominant over the rights of the baserunner, this is not absolute.   The baserunner still has the right to touch the base.   The fielder has the right to make the play; the baserunner only has the right to do what he absolutely HAS to do.  The problem with the Trea Turner call is that it denied the baserunner the right to do what he ABSOLUTELY has to do, which is touch the base.   The rights of the fielder don't take precedence over the rights of the baserunner in that situation.  

 

 

 

 I'm behind you; I don't know what SDI is.   I don't speak acronyms.  

 Joe Torre was a great player.  I thought it was odd that Torre didn't make the Hall of Fame just as a player, although he never did, but he was a hell of a player.  Frank Robinson was a good manager.  Dusty Baker was a very good player and a very good manager.  Alvin Dark was a marginally great player and a marginally great player.  

 

Prior to 1950, when the job manager was different, there were many great players who were long-term managers, and many who were highly successful in both roles.  John McGraw was a fantastic player, although his career as a player was relatively short.  

 I'm puzzled by the question.   Why would anyone think that managers are being devalued over time?  

 My belief is that an analytical system could be developed that compares the strength of any two leagues--not merely the PCL to the majors, but the majors to the team that you played on in high school.  It is an immense amount of work and no one is working on it, but it could be done.  

 

One difference between the PCL and the majors is that there were not as many long-term players in the PCL, which limits one's ability to compare seasons separated by multiple years.  In other words, in comparing let us say the American League in 1983 and in 1986, you would have hundreds of players who played in both leagues to help in your comparison.  In the PCL in the 1920s and 1930s you would have probably more than in any other minor league, but still not as many as in the majors.  

 No, I don't know him.  Met him a couple of times is all.  

 Thanks.  Gibson by 1967 was not yet a Cy Young Award winner, but he was a huge star.  He was arguably the best pitcher in the National League in 1962, although he finished just 15-13, but there are lines of analysis that would conclude that he was the best pitcher in the league.  Then he was great every year 1963-1966 and was the MVP of the 1964 World Series, then was great in 1967 but was injured in mid-season for the only time in his career.  

 Even '68 wouldn't have been there; Lolich in '68 was still a young pitcher.  His great years were later.   I don't know.  .. there may be one somewhere.   

 Still trying to reach Jesse Barfield's mother for comment.  . .

 I think that's a misunderstanding.  The rule doesn't say a hitter can't run inside the base line; it says that he can't run inside the base line (Until the last stride) in such a manner as to interfere with the first baseman catching the throw.   It don't think the right-handed/left-handed issue is relevant to the play.  

 OK. 

 I've spoken my last word on this.