Before I could get back to work on the Omars and Ozzies, I got the following letter in "Hey, Bill":
Could you please include George McBride & Everett Scott in your Omars and Ozzies article? They both barely miss your cutoff of 1700 games but they are just the type of shortstops that fit the profile otherwise. Both played over 1600 games at SS and both had a career OBP of .281. Both had outstanding conventional fielding stats. McBride led the AL in DPs 6 times and Fielding AVG 6 times. Scott led the AL in Fielding AVG 8 straight years.
--Mark R.
OK, but what am I going to say to the people who think I should include Frankie Crosetti, Marty Marion, Bud Harrelson, Art Fletcher and Freddie Patek? In a weak moment I decided to add McBride and Scott to the study, because otherwise we wouldn’t have had a single player in the study named "Everett", and. ..well, I enjoy having the kind of readers who care about George McBride and Everett Scott. So we’re now up to 32 shortstops—Posnanski’s number—and we’ll have eight in this group, leaving us three groups of six to get through. McBride, chronologically, should have come before Joe Tinker.
GEORGE MC BRIDE
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1901
|
Milwaukee
|
AL
|
20
|
3
|
12
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
.167
|
.167
|
.231
|
.397
|
1905
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
24
|
27
|
87
|
9
|
19
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
7
|
6
|
2
|
.218
|
.264
|
.277
|
.541
|
1905
|
St. Louis
|
NL
|
24
|
81
|
281
|
22
|
61
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
34
|
14
|
10
|
.217
|
.256
|
.264
|
.520
|
1906
|
St. Louis
|
NL
|
25
|
90
|
313
|
24
|
53
|
8
|
2
|
0
|
13
|
17
|
5
|
.169
|
.208
|
.215
|
.422
|
1908
|
Washington
|
AL
|
27
|
155
|
518
|
47
|
120
|
10
|
6
|
0
|
34
|
41
|
12
|
.232
|
.274
|
.292
|
.566
|
1909
|
Washington
|
AL
|
28
|
156
|
504
|
38
|
118
|
16
|
0
|
0
|
34
|
36
|
17
|
.234
|
.266
|
.294
|
.560
|
1910
|
Washington
|
AL
|
29
|
154
|
514
|
54
|
118
|
19
|
4
|
1
|
55
|
61
|
11
|
.230
|
.288
|
.321
|
.609
|
1911
|
Washington
|
AL
|
30
|
154
|
557
|
58
|
131
|
11
|
4
|
0
|
59
|
52
|
15
|
.235
|
.269
|
.312
|
.581
|
1912
|
Washington
|
AL
|
31
|
152
|
521
|
56
|
118
|
13
|
7
|
1
|
52
|
38
|
17
|
.226
|
.284
|
.288
|
.572
|
1913
|
Washington
|
AL
|
32
|
150
|
499
|
52
|
107
|
18
|
7
|
1
|
52
|
43
|
12
|
.214
|
.285
|
.286
|
.571
|
1914
|
Washington
|
AL
|
33
|
156
|
503
|
49
|
102
|
12
|
4
|
0
|
24
|
43
|
12
|
.203
|
.243
|
.274
|
.516
|
1915
|
Washington
|
AL
|
34
|
146
|
476
|
54
|
97
|
8
|
6
|
1
|
30
|
29
|
10
|
.204
|
.252
|
.251
|
.503
|
1916
|
Washington
|
AL
|
35
|
139
|
466
|
36
|
106
|
15
|
4
|
1
|
36
|
23
|
8
|
.227
|
.283
|
.271
|
.555
|
1917
|
Washington
|
AL
|
36
|
50
|
141
|
6
|
27
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
10
|
1
|
.191
|
.213
|
.265
|
.477
|
1918
|
Washington
|
AL
|
37
|
18
|
53
|
2
|
7
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
.132
|
.132
|
.132
|
.264
|
1919
|
Washington
|
AL
|
38
|
15
|
40
|
3
|
8
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
3
|
0
|
.200
|
.275
|
.256
|
.531
|
1920
|
Washington
|
AL
|
39
|
13
|
41
|
6
|
9
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
2
|
0
|
.220
|
.244
|
.256
|
.500
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
1659
|
5526
|
516
|
1203
|
140
|
47
|
7
|
447
|
419
|
133
|
.218
|
.264
|
.281
|
.544
|
GEORGE MC BRIDE or, if you prefer, McBRIDE
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
166-209
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.268
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
70-190
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.841
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
96-18
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.725
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.491
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
1.016
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
14392
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1910
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
3585
|
|
|
|
20-15
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
3362
|
+223
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
1
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
5274
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
5117
|
+157
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
610
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
580
|
+30
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
4
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
484
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
7
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
641
|
+157
|
|
Career Value:
|
144
|
But actually, now that I’ve done the work, McBride and Scott don’t quite fit the profile of this group. Although both were brilliant defensive players, their careers ended a little bit before the 1700 game mark because both were terrible hitters, which reduced their overall value enough to shorten their careers. Both McBride and Scott were worse hitters than anyone else we have seen yet. Mark Belanger sort of defines "bad hitting shortstop" for my generation, and both were far worse hitters than Belanger. Omar Vizquel and Ozzie Smith were not bad hitters; they’re not great hitters, but they’re not bad. The players who define this group—Aparicio, Joe Tinker, Herman Long, Dave Bancroft—are not bad hitters. McBride and Scott were more in the Hal Lanier/Dal Maxvill/Rey Sanchez group—the guys who really couldn’t hit. We have one other guy later on who was a worse hitter than McBride and Scott, but among the 32 players now in the group they rank 30th and 31st with the bat. But McBride was a sensational fielder, and Scott was better than McBride was.
Mickey Doolan
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1905
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
25
|
136
|
492
|
53
|
125
|
27
|
11
|
1
|
48
|
24
|
17
|
.254
|
.360
|
.292
|
.651
|
1906
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
26
|
154
|
535
|
41
|
123
|
19
|
7
|
1
|
55
|
27
|
16
|
.230
|
.297
|
.270
|
.567
|
1907
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
27
|
145
|
509
|
33
|
104
|
19
|
7
|
1
|
47
|
25
|
18
|
.204
|
.275
|
.243
|
.518
|
1908
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
28
|
129
|
445
|
29
|
104
|
25
|
4
|
2
|
49
|
17
|
5
|
.234
|
.321
|
.267
|
.588
|
1909
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
29
|
147
|
493
|
39
|
108
|
12
|
10
|
1
|
35
|
37
|
10
|
.219
|
.290
|
.276
|
.566
|
1910
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
30
|
148
|
536
|
58
|
141
|
31
|
6
|
2
|
57
|
35
|
16
|
.263
|
.354
|
.315
|
.670
|
1911
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
31
|
146
|
512
|
51
|
122
|
23
|
6
|
1
|
49
|
44
|
14
|
.238
|
.313
|
.301
|
.614
|
1912
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
32
|
146
|
532
|
47
|
137
|
26
|
6
|
1
|
62
|
34
|
6
|
.258
|
.335
|
.302
|
.637
|
1913
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
33
|
151
|
518
|
32
|
113
|
12
|
6
|
1
|
43
|
29
|
17
|
.218
|
.270
|
.262
|
.533
|
1914
|
Baltimore
|
FL
|
34
|
145
|
486
|
58
|
119
|
23
|
6
|
1
|
53
|
40
|
30
|
.245
|
.323
|
.311
|
.634
|
1915
|
Baltimore
|
FL
|
35
|
119
|
404
|
41
|
75
|
13
|
7
|
2
|
21
|
24
|
10
|
.186
|
.267
|
.238
|
.506
|
1915
|
Chicago
|
FL
|
35
|
24
|
86
|
9
|
23
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
9
|
2
|
5
|
.267
|
.302
|
.292
|
.594
|
1916
|
New York
|
NL
|
36
|
18
|
51
|
4
|
12
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
.235
|
.392
|
.264
|
.656
|
1916
|
Chicago
|
NL
|
36
|
28
|
70
|
4
|
15
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
5
|
8
|
0
|
.214
|
.271
|
.295
|
.566
|
1918
|
Brooklyn
|
NL
|
38
|
92
|
308
|
14
|
55
|
8
|
2
|
0
|
18
|
22
|
8
|
.179
|
.218
|
.233
|
.451
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
1728
|
5977
|
513
|
1376
|
244
|
81
|
15
|
554
|
370
|
173
|
.230
|
.306
|
.279
|
.584
|
MICKEY DOOLAN
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
188-208
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.318
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
88-189
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.836
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
100-20
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.815
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.562
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.858
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
14465
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1910
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
3279
|
|
|
|
20-12
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
3194
|
+85
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
2
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
4858
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
4591
|
+267
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
519
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
1
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
507
|
+12
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
5
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
592
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
7
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
682
|
+90
|
|
Career Value:
|
177
|
Doolan was a light hitter in the tradition of Scott and McBride, although even Doolan—whose career OPS was .584—was not as bad a hitter as those two. I think Doolan was a college teammate of Christy Mathewson’s; anyway they were both born in 1880 and they both attended Bucknell, so I would assume they were teammates.
Do you guys use Lee Sinins’ Complete Baseball Encyclopedia? I use it all the time, although I have an antique version of it when it used to be called the Sabermetric Encyclopedia. In doing this series of reports I probably had to look up Mickey Doolan in the Sabermetric Encyclopedia 15 to 20 times, looking up some factoid or another. . .each player in here; I’m sure I looked up Donie Bush 15 to 20 times, and Germany Smith.
Anyway, you can find players in the Sabermetric Encyclopedia by using truncated versions of their names, and. . .stupid observation of the week. . .I began looking these guys up by truncating their names. Mickey Doolan, for example, can be found by typing in "Ickey Doo", which somehow is a lot more fun than looking up Mickey Doolan. Germany Smith can be found by typing in "Ermany Smi", Donie Bush can be found by typing in "Onie Bu", and even George McBride can be found by typing in "Orge McB". Ah, the wonders of a good search engine. . ..
Ickey Doo, who was hardly a good hitter, finished 14th in the NL MVP voting in 1911, the first year there was such an award, and 13th in 1913, when he hit just .218 and scored just 32 runs (!!) in 151 games. That’s actually the third-fewest runs ever scored in 150 or more games—a fact which I found by using the Sabermetric Encyclopedia. Doolan was past 30 and his best years were behind him before the award started, and the fact that he did show up in the voting certainly testifies to his defensive excellence.
In fact, we could generalize from this that "the voters" placed much more value on Doolan’s D than we would; I, after all, have Doolan’s won-lost contributions at 15-17 in 1911 and 13-20 in 1913, which wouldn’t place him among the league’s top 30 players either year. It’s a dangerous inference. Doolan’s performance in MVP voting probably only really means that one or two voters, out of a panel of 8, had some belief in his value. We can say that "the MVP voters valued his defense more highly than modern analysts", but this might be incorrect for about 7 of the 8 voters. George McBride, who was also born in 1880 (like Doolan and Christy Mathewson) was also mentioned in the MVP voting in 1911, 1912, 1913 and 1914. Most of the players in this study were mentioned in MVP voting multiple times in their careers, if there was an MVP vote in their league.
DONIE BUSH
|
YR
|
City
|
Lg
|
Ag
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1908
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
20
|
20
|
68
|
13
|
20
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
7
|
2
|
.294
|
.338
|
.360
|
.698
|
1909
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
21
|
157
|
532
|
114
|
145
|
18
|
2
|
0
|
33
|
88
|
53
|
.273
|
.314
|
.380
|
.694
|
1910
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
22
|
142
|
496
|
90
|
130
|
13
|
4
|
3
|
34
|
78
|
49
|
.262
|
.323
|
.365
|
.687
|
1911
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
23
|
150
|
561
|
126
|
130
|
18
|
5
|
1
|
36
|
98
|
40
|
.232
|
.287
|
.349
|
.636
|
1912
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
24
|
144
|
511
|
107
|
118
|
14
|
8
|
2
|
38
|
117
|
35
|
.231
|
.301
|
.377
|
.679
|
1913
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
25
|
153
|
597
|
98
|
150
|
19
|
10
|
1
|
40
|
80
|
44
|
.251
|
.322
|
.344
|
.665
|
1914
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
26
|
157
|
596
|
97
|
150
|
18
|
4
|
0
|
32
|
112
|
35
|
.252
|
.295
|
.373
|
.668
|
1915
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
27
|
155
|
561
|
99
|
128
|
12
|
8
|
1
|
44
|
118
|
35
|
.228
|
.283
|
.364
|
.648
|
1916
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
28
|
145
|
550
|
73
|
124
|
5
|
9
|
0
|
34
|
75
|
19
|
.225
|
.267
|
.319
|
.587
|
1917
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
29
|
147
|
581
|
112
|
163
|
18
|
3
|
0
|
24
|
80
|
34
|
.281
|
.322
|
.370
|
.691
|
1918
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
30
|
128
|
500
|
74
|
117
|
10
|
3
|
0
|
22
|
79
|
9
|
.234
|
.266
|
.340
|
.606
|
1919
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
31
|
129
|
509
|
82
|
124
|
11
|
6
|
0
|
26
|
75
|
22
|
.244
|
.289
|
.343
|
.632
|
1920
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
32
|
141
|
506
|
85
|
133
|
18
|
5
|
1
|
33
|
73
|
15
|
.263
|
.324
|
.357
|
.681
|
1921
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
33
|
104
|
402
|
72
|
113
|
6
|
5
|
0
|
27
|
45
|
8
|
.281
|
.321
|
.355
|
.676
|
1921
|
Washington
|
AL
|
33
|
23
|
84
|
15
|
18
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
12
|
2
|
.214
|
.226
|
.313
|
.539
|
1922
|
Washington
|
AL
|
34
|
41
|
134
|
17
|
32
|
4
|
1
|
0
|
7
|
21
|
1
|
.239
|
.284
|
.342
|
.626
|
1923
|
Washington
|
AL
|
35
|
10
|
22
|
6
|
9
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
.409
|
.409
|
.409
|
.818
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
1946
|
7210
|
1280
|
1804
|
186
|
74
|
9
|
436
|
1158
|
403
|
.250
|
.300
|
.356
|
.656
|
DONIE BUSH
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
242-231
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.483
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
161-173
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.581
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
81-58
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.626
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.492
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.416
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
16561
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1909
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
4038
|
|
|
|
26-11
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
3990
|
+48
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
6
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
6119
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
6018
|
+101
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
1
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
585
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
2
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
755
|
-170
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
6
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
689
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
7
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
724
|
+35
|
|
Career Value:
|
247
|
Donie Bush, the shortstop for the Ty Cobb Tigers from 1908 to 1921, was different from most of the shortstops in this group in two respects: 1, that he walked a great deal, and 2, that he was hopeless at turning the double play. Bush, years after his career, was the co-owner of the Louisville team that sold Pee Wee Reese to the Dodgers. Telling this story from memory, but. . .I think the co-owners of the Louisville American Association franchise were Bush, Tom Yawkey, and a third man; Bush managed the team as well as being one of the owners. When the team came up with Pee Wee Reese in 1938, Yawkey assumed that the Red Sox would be able to buy him cheap because he was co-owner of the team, but Bush and the third owner thought "Wait a minute. We have here a young player who is worth more than the franchise is. Why should we give him to Boston, just because Yawkey is a co-owner?" They sold him to the Dodgers, greatly annoying Yawkey.
Fred Haney used to tell a story about when he came up with the Tigers; he hit .352 as a rookie in 1922, 213 at bats. Ty Cobb was his manager. His story was that one time he decided to sit on a fastball and take big rip at it, and he hit a single, but when he got back to the bench Ty Cobb tore him a new one. He wasn’t up there to rip the ball; that was Harry Heilmann’s job, and Veach’s and Cobb’s. His job was to get on base. Take pitches, defend the plate, slap the ball, get on base.
The Tigers had a group of players like that—Bassler, Bush, Topper Rigney, even Lu Blue, the first baseman; their job was to get on base and let the big boys drive them in. That’s a very different philosophy than that which prevails in modern baseball, in which everyone is expected to drive the ball. I am asked frequently what kind of market inefficiencies there might be remaining in baseball, which could be exploited by cash-strapped teams to gain an advantage. There are 50 or 100 obvious market inefficiencies in baseball, but this is one of the largest. Defend the plate, slap the ball, get on base. . .nobody does that stuff in modern baseball. The scouts don’t respect it, the organizations don’t encourage it, the managers don’t insist on it. "Bat speed" is the deal now; everybody is supposed to have bat speed. Everybody is supposed to drive the ball. People overlook the fact that you still CAN slap and punch the ball and get on base, if you focus on that.
Bush’s high walk totals gave him a certain offensive value, but his extremely poor double play numbers offset much of that value. Bush’s double play totals are so poor that one suspects it must represent a deliberate decision—that is, that Bush must have been instructed by an early manager not to worry about the double play, but just to focus on getting the out at second base.
That was one thing when Bush came up. From 1908 to 1911 there were 770 to 809 double plays per season in the American League—about 100 double plays per team per season--and many of those were caught stealing/throw ‘em out double plays or runners thrown out by outfielders. Catchers, in 1911, participated in more than 20% of the American League’s double plays.
But over the course of Bush’s career double play totals increased markedly, from 770 in 1911 to 1,136 in 1922, and the relevant increase is much greater than that, because double plays by catchers and outfielders were not only not increasing, but actually decreasing. The modern double play, the 4-6-3 or 6-4-3 double play, was becoming substantially more important, making Bush’s almost comical inability to turn the DP constantly more central to his game. Bush in his career participated in only 46 double plays per 1,300 innings, while Peckinpaugh—coming to the majors two years later—participated in 71, and Maranville, who came up two years after Peckinpaugh, participated in 80 per 1,300 innings. Bush’s DP/inning ratio is the lowest of any player in this study.
ROGER PECKINPAUGH
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1910
|
Cleveland
|
AL
|
19
|
15
|
45
|
1
|
9
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
1
|
3
|
.200
|
.200
|
.234
|
.434
|
1912
|
Cleveland
|
AL
|
21
|
69
|
236
|
18
|
50
|
4
|
1
|
1
|
22
|
16
|
11
|
.212
|
.250
|
.262
|
.512
|
1913
|
Cleveland
|
AL
|
22
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
.000
|
.000
|
.000
|
.000
|
1913
|
New York
|
AL
|
22
|
95
|
340
|
35
|
91
|
10
|
7
|
1
|
32
|
24
|
19
|
.268
|
.347
|
.316
|
.663
|
1914
|
New York
|
AL
|
23
|
157
|
570
|
55
|
127
|
14
|
6
|
3
|
51
|
51
|
38
|
.223
|
.284
|
.288
|
.572
|
1915
|
New York
|
AL
|
24
|
142
|
540
|
67
|
119
|
18
|
7
|
5
|
44
|
49
|
19
|
.220
|
.307
|
.289
|
.596
|
1916
|
New York
|
AL
|
25
|
146
|
552
|
65
|
141
|
22
|
8
|
4
|
58
|
62
|
18
|
.255
|
.346
|
.332
|
.678
|
1917
|
New York
|
AL
|
26
|
148
|
543
|
63
|
141
|
24
|
7
|
0
|
41
|
64
|
17
|
.260
|
.330
|
.340
|
.670
|
1918
|
New York
|
AL
|
27
|
122
|
446
|
59
|
103
|
15
|
3
|
0
|
43
|
43
|
12
|
.231
|
.278
|
.303
|
.581
|
1919
|
New York
|
AL
|
28
|
122
|
453
|
89
|
138
|
20
|
2
|
7
|
33
|
59
|
10
|
.305
|
.404
|
.390
|
.794
|
1920
|
New York
|
AL
|
29
|
139
|
534
|
109
|
144
|
26
|
6
|
8
|
54
|
72
|
8
|
.270
|
.386
|
.356
|
.742
|
1921
|
New York
|
AL
|
30
|
149
|
577
|
128
|
166
|
25
|
7
|
8
|
71
|
84
|
2
|
.288
|
.397
|
.380
|
.777
|
1922
|
Washington
|
AL
|
31
|
147
|
520
|
62
|
132
|
14
|
4
|
2
|
48
|
55
|
11
|
.254
|
.308
|
.329
|
.636
|
1923
|
Washington
|
AL
|
32
|
154
|
568
|
73
|
150
|
18
|
4
|
2
|
62
|
64
|
10
|
.264
|
.320
|
.340
|
.660
|
1924
|
Washington
|
AL
|
33
|
155
|
523
|
72
|
142
|
20
|
5
|
2
|
73
|
72
|
11
|
.272
|
.340
|
.360
|
.700
|
1925
|
Washington
|
AL
|
34
|
126
|
422
|
67
|
124
|
16
|
4
|
4
|
64
|
49
|
13
|
.294
|
.379
|
.367
|
.746
|
1926
|
Washington
|
AL
|
35
|
57
|
147
|
19
|
35
|
4
|
1
|
1
|
14
|
28
|
3
|
.238
|
.299
|
.360
|
.659
|
1927
|
Chicago
|
AL
|
36
|
68
|
217
|
23
|
64
|
6
|
3
|
0
|
23
|
21
|
2
|
.295
|
.350
|
.360
|
.710
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
2012
|
7233
|
1006
|
1876
|
256
|
75
|
48
|
739
|
814
|
207
|
.259
|
.335
|
.336
|
.672
|
ROGER PECKINPAUGH
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
252-211
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.430
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
140-186
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.817
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
112-25
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.790
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.647
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.871
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
17464
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1919
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
3919
|
|
|
|
22-5
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
4078
|
-159
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
6
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
6337
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
1
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
6110
|
+227
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
1
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
952
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
3
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
805
|
+147
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
8
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
553
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
5
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
646
|
+93
|
|
Career Value:
|
272
|
In the analytical box I’ve broken players’ defense down into Defensive Winning Percentage up to age 30, and Defensive Winning Percentage after age 30. I’m interested in studying defensive aging, and it makes a clear point; I believe that 27 of the 32 shortstops in the study have higher defensive winning percentages before age 30 than after age 30, generally by a pretty predictable margin.
There are a handful of shortstops, however, who have higher defensive winning percentages after age 30 than before, including three in this group, (Peckinpaugh, Doolan and McBride.) We shouldn’t be too concerned about that; there’s an occasional hitter who has his best years after age 30, probably there’s an occasional fielder as well. But I would attribute these fluke cases to four causes:
1) Conditioning variables,
2) Error tendencies,
3) Hitting abilities, and
4) Measurement error.
The error tendencies are relevant in this way: that fielding percentages predictably improve as a player ages. If a young shortstop is particularly error-prone, like Garry Templeton for example, then it is predictable that, as he ages, this will become less of an issue, and that type of a defensive player may be more likely to have his best defensive years later in his career.
Hitting creates a "performance floor" for the player. Hitting helps define the player’s relationship to replacement level. If a player is a good-hitting shortstop, he may play regularly until he is 37, 38 years old (or more), and has lost a couple of steps in the field. If he is not such a good hitter, he is likely to be forced out of the game at a younger age, thus less likely to have an "aging drag" on his overall fielding record.
And, of course, our measurements are not perfect. I believe in my system; I believe in my results—but we have to be realistic. While we may have very accurate measurements of a player’s overall value, when you divide that record into two parts (offense and defense) then you have a smaller base, and when you have a smaller base you have less accurate measurements. Defense is the smaller of the two parts, even for shortstops.
Then we divide defense into two parts—defense up to age 30, defense after age 30. Defense after age 30 is the smaller of those two. By this time the base is so small that we’re vulnerable to flukes in the data. It may be true that Peckinpaugh’s defense did improve as he aged, or it may be that there’s a fluke in the data.
RABBIT MARANVILLE
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1912
|
Boston
|
NL
|
20
|
26
|
86
|
8
|
18
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
9
|
1
|
.209
|
.233
|
.292
|
.524
|
1913
|
Boston
|
NL
|
21
|
143
|
571
|
68
|
141
|
13
|
8
|
2
|
48
|
68
|
25
|
.247
|
.308
|
.330
|
.638
|
1914
|
Boston
|
NL
|
22
|
156
|
586
|
74
|
144
|
23
|
6
|
4
|
78
|
45
|
28
|
.246
|
.326
|
.306
|
.632
|
1915
|
Boston
|
NL
|
23
|
149
|
509
|
51
|
124
|
23
|
6
|
2
|
43
|
45
|
18
|
.244
|
.324
|
.308
|
.632
|
1916
|
Boston
|
NL
|
24
|
155
|
604
|
79
|
142
|
16
|
13
|
4
|
38
|
50
|
32
|
.235
|
.325
|
.296
|
.620
|
1917
|
Boston
|
NL
|
25
|
142
|
561
|
69
|
146
|
19
|
13
|
3
|
43
|
40
|
27
|
.260
|
.357
|
.312
|
.668
|
1918
|
Boston
|
NL
|
26
|
11
|
38
|
3
|
12
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
4
|
0
|
.316
|
.368
|
.381
|
.749
|
1919
|
Boston
|
NL
|
27
|
131
|
480
|
44
|
128
|
18
|
10
|
5
|
43
|
36
|
12
|
.267
|
.377
|
.319
|
.696
|
1920
|
Boston
|
NL
|
28
|
134
|
493
|
48
|
131
|
19
|
15
|
1
|
43
|
28
|
14
|
.266
|
.371
|
.305
|
.676
|
1921
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
29
|
153
|
612
|
90
|
180
|
25
|
12
|
1
|
70
|
47
|
25
|
.294
|
.379
|
.347
|
.727
|
1922
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
30
|
155
|
672
|
115
|
198
|
26
|
15
|
0
|
63
|
61
|
24
|
.295
|
.378
|
.355
|
.733
|
1923
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
31
|
141
|
581
|
78
|
161
|
19
|
9
|
1
|
41
|
42
|
14
|
.277
|
.346
|
.327
|
.673
|
1924
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
32
|
152
|
594
|
62
|
158
|
33
|
20
|
2
|
71
|
35
|
18
|
.266
|
.399
|
.307
|
.706
|
1925
|
Chicago
|
NL
|
33
|
75
|
266
|
37
|
62
|
10
|
3
|
0
|
23
|
29
|
6
|
.233
|
.293
|
.308
|
.602
|
1926
|
Brooklyn
|
NL
|
34
|
78
|
234
|
32
|
55
|
8
|
5
|
0
|
24
|
26
|
7
|
.235
|
.312
|
.312
|
.624
|
1927
|
St. Louis
|
NL
|
35
|
9
|
29
|
0
|
7
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
.241
|
.276
|
.290
|
.566
|
1928
|
St. Louis
|
NL
|
36
|
112
|
366
|
40
|
88
|
14
|
10
|
1
|
34
|
36
|
3
|
.240
|
.342
|
.310
|
.652
|
1929
|
Boston
|
NL
|
37
|
146
|
560
|
87
|
159
|
26
|
10
|
0
|
55
|
47
|
13
|
.284
|
.366
|
.344
|
.710
|
1930
|
Boston
|
NL
|
38
|
142
|
558
|
85
|
157
|
26
|
8
|
2
|
43
|
48
|
9
|
.281
|
.367
|
.344
|
.711
|
1931
|
Boston
|
NL
|
39
|
145
|
562
|
69
|
146
|
22
|
5
|
0
|
33
|
56
|
9
|
.260
|
.317
|
.329
|
.646
|
1932
|
Boston
|
NL
|
40
|
149
|
571
|
67
|
134
|
20
|
4
|
0
|
37
|
46
|
4
|
.235
|
.284
|
.295
|
.579
|
1933
|
Boston
|
NL
|
41
|
143
|
478
|
46
|
104
|
15
|
4
|
0
|
38
|
36
|
2
|
.218
|
.266
|
.274
|
.539
|
1935
|
Boston
|
NL
|
43
|
23
|
67
|
3
|
10
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
3
|
0
|
.149
|
.179
|
.186
|
.365
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
2670
|
10078
|
1255
|
2605
|
380
|
177
|
28
|
884
|
839
|
291
|
.258
|
.340
|
.318
|
.658
|
RABBIT MARANVILLE
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
317-317
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.399
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
177-267
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.737
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
140-50
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.822
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.564
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.642
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
19259
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1914
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
5139
|
|
|
|
24-13
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
4837
|
+302
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
7
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
7354
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
7194
|
+160
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
1183
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
6
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
1171
|
+12
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
11
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
631
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
6
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
782
|
+151
|
|
Career Value:
|
317
|
Rabbit Maranville was a .500 player in a very long career, and no doubt some people will disapprove of the fact that a .500 player is in the Hall of Fame. That’s a little unfair to Maranville. Maranville’s won-lost contributions, beginning in 1914, are 24-13, 20-14, 24-16, 22-13, 1-1, 19-11, 15-15, 24-14, 22-19, 19-17, 20-19. He hung around for eleven years after that as a sub-.500 who was still over replacement level, and this very long, very slow decline phase pulled his career winning percentage down to .500. But the fact that he aged very slowly does not mean that he was not a good player for ten years.
EVERETT SCOTT
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1914
|
Boston
|
AL
|
21
|
144
|
539
|
66
|
129
|
15
|
6
|
2
|
37
|
32
|
9
|
.239
|
.301
|
.286
|
.586
|
1915
|
Boston
|
AL
|
22
|
100
|
359
|
25
|
72
|
11
|
0
|
0
|
28
|
17
|
4
|
.201
|
.231
|
.237
|
.468
|
1916
|
Boston
|
AL
|
23
|
123
|
366
|
37
|
85
|
19
|
2
|
0
|
27
|
23
|
8
|
.232
|
.295
|
.283
|
.578
|
1917
|
Boston
|
AL
|
24
|
157
|
528
|
40
|
127
|
24
|
7
|
0
|
50
|
20
|
12
|
.241
|
.313
|
.268
|
.581
|
1918
|
Boston
|
AL
|
25
|
126
|
443
|
40
|
98
|
11
|
5
|
0
|
43
|
12
|
11
|
.221
|
.269
|
.242
|
.510
|
1919
|
Boston
|
AL
|
26
|
138
|
507
|
41
|
141
|
19
|
0
|
0
|
38
|
19
|
8
|
.278
|
.316
|
.306
|
.621
|
1920
|
Boston
|
AL
|
27
|
154
|
569
|
41
|
153
|
21
|
12
|
4
|
61
|
21
|
4
|
.269
|
.369
|
.300
|
.669
|
1921
|
Boston
|
AL
|
28
|
154
|
576
|
65
|
151
|
21
|
9
|
1
|
60
|
27
|
5
|
.262
|
.335
|
.295
|
.630
|
1922
|
New York
|
AL
|
29
|
154
|
557
|
64
|
150
|
23
|
5
|
3
|
45
|
23
|
2
|
.269
|
.345
|
.304
|
.649
|
1923
|
New York
|
AL
|
30
|
152
|
533
|
48
|
131
|
16
|
4
|
6
|
60
|
13
|
1
|
.246
|
.325
|
.266
|
.591
|
1924
|
New York
|
AL
|
31
|
153
|
548
|
56
|
137
|
12
|
6
|
4
|
64
|
21
|
3
|
.250
|
.316
|
.278
|
.593
|
1925
|
New York
|
AL
|
32
|
22
|
60
|
3
|
13
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
2
|
0
|
.217
|
.217
|
.242
|
.459
|
1925
|
Washington
|
AL
|
32
|
33
|
103
|
10
|
28
|
6
|
1
|
0
|
18
|
4
|
1
|
.272
|
.350
|
.299
|
.649
|
1926
|
Chicago
|
AL
|
33
|
40
|
143
|
15
|
36
|
10
|
1
|
0
|
13
|
9
|
1
|
.252
|
.336
|
.296
|
.632
|
1926
|
Cincinnati
|
NL
|
33
|
4
|
6
|
1
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
.667
|
.667
|
.667
|
1.33
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
1654
|
5837
|
552
|
1455
|
208
|
58
|
20
|
549
|
243
|
69
|
.249
|
.315
|
.281
|
.596
|
EVERETT SCOTT
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
176-204
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.277
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
74-194
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.907
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
102-10
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.926
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.643
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.842
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
14244
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1921
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
3351
|
|
|
|
19-17
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
3316
|
+35
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
0
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
5053
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
4847
|
+206
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
710
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
675
|
+35
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
5
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
306
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
6
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
401
|
+95
|
|
Career Value:
|
162
|
There are a bunch of these players who played for Washington in the early 1920s. McBride was there until 1920, Donie Bush (as an old player) in ’22-’23, Roger Peckinpaugh from 1922 to 1926, Everett Scott as an old player in 1925.
Roger Peckinpaugh was the Yankee shortstop from 1913 to 1921. On December 20, 1921, the Yankees traded a package of players including Peckinpaugh and a pile of money to the Red Sox for a package of players including Everett. The Yankees were a dominant organization at that time, the Red Sox a submissive organization that was selling off talent. The inclusion of Peckinpaugh and Scott in this trade almost certainly indicates that the Yankees preferred Scott to Peckinpaugh.
This—like the MVP votes for Dooley, McBride and others—indicates that contemporary observers placed a higher value on defense than I do. My analytical method here places a higher value on the defense of these guys (Dooley, McBride, Scott and others). . . my analytical method credits these players with .850+ winning percentages as defensive players, and thus places a very high value on their defense. But—while agreeing that Scott was a great defensive player—I still see Peckinpaugh as a better all-around player than Scott, and thus see the Yankees as weakening their team by trading Peckinpaugh for Scott.
We need to respect the opinions of on-scene observers. We cannot and should not assume that we’re right and they are wrong. We need to respect the fact that they saw these men play with their own eyes, and we didn’t.
That’s not to say that they are right and we’re wrong; I still believe in my method. But. . .it is possible that the value of their defense was even greater than the value I have placed on it.
DAVE BANCROFT
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1915
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
24
|
153
|
563
|
85
|
143
|
18
|
2
|
7
|
30
|
77
|
15
|
.254
|
.330
|
.346
|
.676
|
1916
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
25
|
142
|
477
|
53
|
101
|
10
|
0
|
3
|
33
|
74
|
15
|
.212
|
.252
|
.323
|
.574
|
1917
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
26
|
127
|
478
|
56
|
116
|
22
|
5
|
4
|
43
|
44
|
14
|
.243
|
.335
|
.307
|
.641
|
1918
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
27
|
125
|
499
|
69
|
132
|
19
|
4
|
0
|
26
|
54
|
11
|
.265
|
.319
|
.338
|
.656
|
1919
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
28
|
92
|
335
|
45
|
91
|
13
|
7
|
0
|
25
|
31
|
8
|
.272
|
.352
|
.333
|
.686
|
1920
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
29
|
42
|
171
|
23
|
51
|
7
|
2
|
0
|
5
|
9
|
1
|
.298
|
.363
|
.337
|
.700
|
1920
|
New York
|
NL
|
29
|
108
|
442
|
79
|
132
|
29
|
7
|
0
|
31
|
33
|
7
|
.299
|
.396
|
.349
|
.745
|
1921
|
New York
|
NL
|
30
|
153
|
606
|
121
|
193
|
26
|
15
|
6
|
67
|
66
|
17
|
.318
|
.441
|
.389
|
.830
|
1922
|
New York
|
NL
|
31
|
156
|
651
|
117
|
209
|
41
|
5
|
4
|
60
|
79
|
16
|
.321
|
.418
|
.397
|
.815
|
1923
|
New York
|
NL
|
32
|
107
|
444
|
80
|
135
|
33
|
3
|
1
|
31
|
62
|
8
|
.304
|
.399
|
.391
|
.789
|
1924
|
Boston
|
NL
|
33
|
79
|
319
|
49
|
89
|
11
|
1
|
2
|
21
|
37
|
4
|
.279
|
.339
|
.356
|
.694
|
1925
|
Boston
|
NL
|
34
|
128
|
479
|
75
|
153
|
29
|
8
|
2
|
49
|
64
|
7
|
.319
|
.426
|
.400
|
.826
|
1926
|
Boston
|
NL
|
35
|
127
|
453
|
70
|
141
|
18
|
6
|
1
|
44
|
64
|
3
|
.311
|
.384
|
.399
|
.783
|
1927
|
Boston
|
NL
|
36
|
111
|
375
|
44
|
91
|
13
|
4
|
1
|
31
|
43
|
5
|
.243
|
.307
|
.322
|
.629
|
1928
|
Brooklyn
|
NL
|
37
|
149
|
515
|
47
|
127
|
19
|
5
|
0
|
51
|
59
|
7
|
.247
|
.303
|
.326
|
.629
|
1929
|
Brooklyn
|
NL
|
38
|
104
|
358
|
35
|
99
|
11
|
3
|
1
|
44
|
29
|
7
|
.277
|
.332
|
.331
|
.663
|
1930
|
New York
|
NL
|
39
|
10
|
17
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
.059
|
.118
|
.158
|
.276
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
1913
|
7182
|
1048
|
2004
|
320
|
77
|
32
|
591
|
827
|
145
|
.279
|
.358
|
.355
|
.714
|
DAVE BANCROFT
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
262-183
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.518
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
161-150
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.753
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
101-33
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.854
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.587
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.645
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
16647
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1921
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
4623
|
|
|
|
27-9
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
4166
|
+457
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
6
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
6561
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
6365
|
+196
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
3
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
1017
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
7
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
1048
|
-31
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
10
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
660
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
4
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
696
|
+36
|
|
Career Value:
|
301
|
There are two players in this group of eight who are in the Hall of Fame, Maranville and Bancroft. There are also two players in this group of eight who have "Career Value" over 300—Maranville and Bancroft. To this point in our study, every player who has had a career value higher than 300 has been selected to the Hall of Fame (Ward, Wallace, Tinker, Maranville and Bancroft), while no one with a career value of 300 or lower has been selected. Herman Long was at 300 even.
I’d better put a little more time into explaining the data. I’ll move on to "Assists", because I think how we figure "Expected Assists" is a little easier to explain than putouts or double plays.
The first thing you need to understand is that "assists" by a team represent ground balls. A team has a few assists that do not result from ground balls, and they have a few ground ball outs that do not cause an assist, but only a relative handful of each. Basically, ground ball outs are assists, and assists are ground ball outs. Thus, we don’t need to adjust separately for the ground ball tendencies of the pitching staff because, in starting with the team’s assist total, we are, for all practical purposes, starting with their ground balls.
We then ask two questions:
1) How many assists did this team have, and
2) What percentage of the league’s assists were recorded by shortstops?
National League, 1917. There were 16,598 assists in the league, of which 4,155 were by shortstops. Basically, one in four. 25%. The percentage is higher now; now it’s more like 29%.
Dave Bancroft was the Philadelphia shortstop. The Phillies had 2,106 assists as a team. If 25% of those had been recorded by the Philadelphia shortstops, that would have been 527 assists. We thus have an expectation that Philadelphia shortstops might have recorded about 527 assists on the season—the team assists total, times the percentage of assists that the shortstop normally records.
But we have to adjust that for the left handed/right-handed mix of the pitching staff. More left-handed pitching leads to more right-handed hitters batting for the other team, which leads to more ground balls to the third base side. The team defensive statistics reflect the left/right balance of the pitching staff. Teams with more left-handed pitching DO have more assists by third basemen and shortstops than teams with less left-handed pitching; not just in theory, they actually do.
For third basemen, this is a pretty significant adjustment. For shortstops, it is not nearly as significant, but here’s what we do.
1) We figure what percentage of the balls put in play against the team were put in play against left-handed pitchers,
2) We figure the same for the league,
3) We figure whether the team is over or under the league norm, and by how much.
The Phillies had 1,156 Balls in Play against left-handed pitchers, which is 257 fewer than the expectation based on the league norms. There’s an increase of one assist by the shortstop for each 120 balls in play against left-handed pitchers, so that decreases the expected assists by Philly shortstops from 527 to 525.
OK, that was kind of a waste of time; so maybe it wasn’t the best example. It’s not always a waste of time. In 1918, for example, the Phillies had no balls in play against left-handed pitchers; none.
We take the 525 expected assists for Philadelphia shortstops in 1917, and we scale it back for Bancroft’s innings. Bancroft played an estimated 1,066 innings at shortstop for the Phillies in 1917, out of a team total of 1,389 innings. If we expect a team to have 525 shortstop assists in 1,389 innings, then we expect them to have 403 assists in 1,066 innings.
Bancroft in 1917 actually had 439 assists at shortstop—36 more than expected. So, for the year, he’s +36 assists. . ..439 actual vs. 403 expected. Which was a fairly typical year for him at that time; he was +47 in 1916, +20 in 1918.
Small note. For data prior to 1914, we don’t adjust the expected assists for the left/right mix of the pitching staff because, prior to 1914, teams did not platoon to any significant extent. There was isolated platooning before 1914, here and there, and there were a handful of switch hitters in the game before 1914, but basically, platooning starts in 1914—therefore, we have to adjust the data beginning in 1914.
DICK BARTELL
|
Yr
|
City
|
Lg
|
Age
|
G
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
BI
|
BB
|
SB
|
AVG
|
SLG
|
OBA
|
OPS
|
1927
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
19
|
1
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
.000
|
.000
|
.500
|
.500
|
1928
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
20
|
72
|
233
|
27
|
71
|
8
|
4
|
1
|
36
|
21
|
4
|
.305
|
.386
|
.377
|
.763
|
1929
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
21
|
143
|
610
|
101
|
184
|
40
|
13
|
2
|
57
|
40
|
11
|
.302
|
.420
|
.347
|
.766
|
1930
|
Pittsburgh
|
NL
|
22
|
129
|
475
|
69
|
152
|
32
|
13
|
4
|
75
|
39
|
8
|
.320
|
.467
|
.378
|
.845
|
1931
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
23
|
135
|
554
|
88
|
160
|
43
|
7
|
0
|
34
|
27
|
6
|
.289
|
.392
|
.325
|
.717
|
1932
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
24
|
154
|
614
|
118
|
189
|
48
|
7
|
1
|
53
|
64
|
8
|
.308
|
.414
|
.379
|
.792
|
1933
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
25
|
152
|
587
|
78
|
159
|
25
|
5
|
1
|
37
|
56
|
6
|
.271
|
.336
|
.340
|
.675
|
1934
|
Philadelphia
|
NL
|
26
|
146
|
604
|
102
|
187
|
30
|
4
|
0
|
37
|
64
|
13
|
.310
|
.373
|
.384
|
.757
|
1935
|
New York
|
NL
|
27
|
137
|
539
|
60
|
141
|
28
|
4
|
14
|
53
|
37
|
5
|
.262
|
.406
|
.316
|
.722
|
1936
|
New York
|
NL
|
28
|
145
|
510
|
71
|
152
|
31
|
3
|
8
|
42
|
40
|
6
|
.298
|
.418
|
.355
|
.773
|
1937
|
New York
|
NL
|
29
|
128
|
516
|
91
|
158
|
38
|
2
|
14
|
62
|
40
|
5
|
.306
|
.469
|
.367
|
.836
|
1938
|
New York
|
NL
|
30
|
127
|
481
|
67
|
126
|
26
|
1
|
9
|
49
|
55
|
4
|
.262
|
.376
|
.347
|
.724
|
1939
|
Chicago
|
NL
|
31
|
105
|
336
|
37
|
80
|
24
|
2
|
3
|
34
|
42
|
6
|
.238
|
.348
|
.335
|
.683
|
1940
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
32
|
139
|
528
|
76
|
123
|
24
|
3
|
7
|
53
|
76
|
12
|
.233
|
.330
|
.335
|
.665
|
1941
|
Detroit
|
AL
|
33
|
5
|
12
|
0
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
0
|
.167
|
.250
|
.333
|
.583
|
1941
|
New York
|
NL
|
33
|
104
|
373
|
44
|
113
|
20
|
0
|
5
|
35
|
52
|
6
|
.303
|
.397
|
.394
|
.791
|
1942
|
New York
|
NL
|
34
|
90
|
316
|
53
|
77
|
10
|
3
|
5
|
24
|
44
|
4
|
.244
|
.342
|
.351
|
.692
|
1943
|
New York
|
NL
|
35
|
99
|
337
|
48
|
91
|
14
|
0
|
5
|
28
|
47
|
5
|
.270
|
.356
|
.371
|
.727
|
1946
|
New York
|
NL
|
38
|
5
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
.000
|
.000
|
.000
|
.000
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Totals
|
2016
|
7629
|
1130
|
2165
|
442
|
71
|
79
|
710
|
748
|
109
|
.284
|
.391
|
.355
|
.747
|
DICK BARTELL
|
Career Won-Lost Contribution:
|
251-203
|
|
|
Offensive Winning Percentage:
|
.482
|
Offensive W-L Contribution:
|
159-170
|
|
|
Defensive Winning Percentage:
|
.739
|
Defensive W-L Contribution:
|
92-33
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, Up to Age 30:
|
.770
|
Team Success Percentage:
|
.582
|
|
|
Defensive WPct, After 30:
|
.644
|
Estimated Innings at Short:
|
14762
|
|
|
Best Season:
|
1937
|
Career Putouts at Shortstop:
|
3872
|
|
|
|
24-6
|
Expected Putouts at Short:
|
3475
|
+397
|
|
Career 20-Win Seasons:
|
4
|
Career Assists at Shortstop:
|
5590
|
|
|
.800 Seasons (as a regular):
|
0
|
Expected Assists at Short:
|
5495
|
+95
|
|
.700 Seasons (as a regular):
|
2
|
Career Double Plays a/Short:
|
1072
|
|
|
.600 Seasons (as a regular):
|
4
|
Expected DPs at Shortstop:
|
1132
|
-60
|
|
.500 Seasons (as a regular):
|
10
|
Career Errors at Shortstop:
|
471
|
|
|
Sub-.500 seasons a/regular:
|
5
|
Expected Errors at Short:
|
504
|
+33
|
|
Career Value:
|
275
|
There are profound and obvious similarities between Dick Bartell and Dave Bancroft. They were both National League shortstops, overlapping eras, similar hitters. Both of them played short for Philly for several years, got traded or sold to the Giants, had four really good years with the Giants—winning three pennants each--bounced out of New York, came back to the Giants to finish their careers.
In one of my books, one of the Historical Abstracts, I cited a string of these similarities between Bartell and Bancroft, and wrapped it up by saying that if Bancroft belonged in the Hall of Fame, Bartell belonged, and if Bancroft did, Bartell didn’t. One thing that I did not know when I wrote that was how similar their defensive play was, as well; they both have huge positive numbers in putouts, smaller positives in assists and errors, and they’re both negative in double plays. . .a pattern that suggests that they had strong arms. If a shortstop has a strong arm he backs up and tends to play further from second, which enables him to chase down more balls in shallow left, and still make the throw to first when he has to. A shortstop with a weaker arm tends to creep in and cheat toward second, resulting in more assists but fewer putouts. Bancroft and Bartell are defensively similar as well.
But having said that, I now realize now that this was not the best logic. What I was saying was that because Bancroft and Bartell have a long string of the same characteristics, that makes them equally qualified for the Hall of Fame. It doesn’t. That they have many of the same characteristics makes them similar; it doesn’t make them equal. Bartell has a won-lost contribution of 251-203; Bancroft, of 262-183. Those are similar records and it’s a small difference, but you have to draw a line somewhere. It is not unreasonable to draw that line between Bartell and Bancroft, even though they are unusually similar.
Which is the same argument as with Omar and Ozzie; yes, they are similar on many different levels. But the fact that they are similar does not make them equal, and it may be reasonable to draw a line between them.