Newly picked Commissioner Rob Manfred stepped on the first land-mine of his brief career last month, when he mentioned in an ESPN that he was willing to consider banning the defensive shifts that are currently in vogue in the majors, as a way to increase offense in baseball.
The nearly unanimous reaction, from almost everyone with a pulpit to pulpificate on, was that this would be a terrible idea. Why?
I think the strong reaction came because most of us believe that a solution to defensive shifts already exists within the game: if hitters like Chris Davis or Robinson Cano don’t like to see a shift every time they come up to the plate, they’re perfectly welcome to bunt singles or slash doubles into the open field.
So Manfred’s suggestion that he would consider prohibiting defensive shifts seemed an overstep: baseball doesn’t need the Commissioner to come in and tell us where defenders have to play. Let the players sort it out on their own, damn it.
If we wanted to, we could consider this as fans preferring small-governance over big-governance. Advocates for smaller government like to argue that big government is too eager to overstep its rightful bounds: if we let the commissioner take control of defensive shifts, it’s only a matter of time before he moves the bases further apart, just to stop Billy Hamilton from making NL throwing arms look bad.
I think this is generally the way that baseball fans prefer their changes to occur: innovation should occur within the foul lines instead of by committee vote. Let the players figure it out. Let the game adjust on its own accord.
The DH is a potential example: though it’s been forty years since the DH came into existence, it remains a deeply contested changes in baseball. Why? I would hazard that a part of the animosity is how it came about: in January of 1973 some suits in a room voted for it, and the game was changed. And it forced a change in how the game was played: instead of pitchers having to hit, we now had an extra hitter for AL teams. It also split the leagues: it created discontinuity. You had one league doing one thing and another league doing something different. I like that, but I’ve grown up with that. I can understand how that would offend someone’s sensibilities.
There is much less anger about the decision, following the 1968 season, to standardize the height of the pitching mounds. While this influenced the game, it didn’t alter what the players were doing on the field. And it didn’t really alter what we saw: the average fan couldn’t see the supplemental oxygen tanks left at the top of the pitcher’s mound in LA.
This goes a long way towards explaining away the disconnect I felt when the off-season conversation turned its focus on a real problem in baseball: the ever-increasing rate of strikeouts.
Last year major leaguers struck out at a rate of 7.7 times per nine innings pitched. The Cleveland staff struck out 8.9 batters per nine innings pitched….just putting that in perspective, Felix Hernandez has only notched 8.5 k/9 in his impressive career.
While these are all fine suggestions worth considering, a different set of questions rattled around in my brain:
Is there a way for this problem to be solved within the lines? That is: is there a way to adjust with the problem of strikeouts without tinkering with the rules?
And:
Have some teams already started to figure this out?
* * *
Taking a detour: it is a legitimate question where strikeouts ARE a problem. I don’t mean from an entertainment perspective….I mean from an in-game perspective.
Bill has converted me to the belief that baseball is an ever-improving game: I am sold on the idea that baseball as it is played in 2014 is a more difficult game than baseball as it was played in 1920. Or 1960.
Or 1980. All of those moustaches were horrible.
Baseball’s strikeout rate has increased steadily over this time, as the game has gotten incrementally better. It is certainly possible that strikeouts are actually important to an effective offense. It’s possible that the contact-first model that died out in the early 1920’s did so because it was inefficient, and the current trend reflects an improving game.
Just sayin’. We might not like all the strikeouts, but that doesn’t mean they’re a bad strategy.
* * *
Taking another detour, back to 1987.
1987 was an amazing baseball season. For starters, it was sort of a precursor to the offensive spike that would define the 1990’s and 2000’s. Here’s a table:
Year
|
AB
|
HR
|
1985
|
143072
|
3602
|
1986
|
143106
|
3813
|
1987
|
144095
|
4458
|
The 1987 season saw a 17% increase in homeruns. This was the year McGwire hit 49 homers as a rookie.George Bell also hit 49, with Andre Dawson outpacing Dale Murphy 47 to 44 in the NL. Twenty-eight players managed to pop 30+ homers, included two Evans’s (Darrell and Dwight) and two Larry’s (Parrish and Sheets).
There were lots of amazing seasons: Tony Gwynn hit .370, while Wade Boggs added surprising power to his routine 200 hits/100 walks. Alan Trammell had an amazing season. Eric Davis hit 37 homers and stole 50 bases. Pedro Guerrero had a monster season. Rookie Devon White hit 24 homers, stole 32 bases, played great defense in centerfield, and finished fifth in the AL Rookie-of-the-Year vote.
One of the most interesting parts of the 1987 season was the team that eventually represented the NL in the World Series. Here are the Cardinals hitters, ranked by homeruns:
Player
|
1987 HR
|
Jack Clark
|
35
|
Ter. Pendleton
|
12
|
Willie McGee
|
11
|
Jim Linderman
|
8
|
Tony Pena
|
5
|
3 tied at
|
3
|
Jack Clark was the team’s leading power threat. The second biggest power threat, at least by at-bats per homer, was Bob Forsch. Thirty-seven year old starting pitcherBob Forsch.
In a year where the homerun rate spiked upward, the team that lost the seventh game of the World Series had exactly one power hitter.
They also had no strikeout pitchers on their rotation. The NL averaged 6.0 strikeouts per nine innings pitched. Here are the Cardinals starters:
Pitcher
|
GS
|
IP
|
K/9
|
Danny Cox
|
31
|
199.1
|
4.6
|
Greg Mathews
|
32
|
197.2
|
4.9
|
Bob Forsch
|
30
|
179
|
4.5
|
Joe Magrane
|
26
|
170.1
|
5.3
|
John Tudor
|
16
|
96
|
5.1
|
Lee Tunnell
|
9
|
74.1
|
5.9
|
Tim Conroy
|
9
|
40.2
|
4.9
|
None of the Cardinals starters topped the NL average…and the three pitchers who threw the most innings for the Cardinals were comfortably below the NL average.
What helped the Cardinals win the most games in the NL was their defense, which was pretty good at turning balls into outs. They had Gold Gloves at shortstop and third (Ozzie and Terry Pendleton), along with Tony Pena and Steve Lake splitting time behind the plate. Their outfield of McGee, Coleman, and Curt Ford doesn’t show up as a great defensive team, but they were certainly fast. Jose Oquendo played 116 games.
I don’t know that the Cardinals were the best team in the NL in 1987: they managed to stay ahead of a very good Mets team and a solid Montreal team, and they beat a very strong Giants team in the NLCS. Maybe they were the best team in the NL, and maybe they were a little lucky to come out on top.
The important thing is this: in a year when homeruns spiked, the team that finished dead-last in the majors at hitting homeruns won the most games in the NL, and reached the 7th game of the World Series. They did it with one power bat, a bunch of starters who didn’t pile up strikeouts, a good bullpen, and speed on the bases.
* * *
I bring the 1987 Cardinals up because they illustrate a truth in baseball: there’s a lot of ways to win a baseball game.
And: they show the value in going against the trends. In 1987, when everyone in the league was coming around to power-hitting being the way forward, the Cardinals built a team around speed and defense and contact-pitching, and they almost won a World Series.
The obvious parallel to the 1987 Cardinals are last season’s Royals. Like their Missouri neighbors, the KC team won games on speed and defense, with a contact-heavy starting rotation and a strong bullpen. Like the Cardinals, the Royals team didn’t cross the century mark in homeruns. Like the Cardinals, the Royals reached Game 7 of the World Series and lost it.
And like the Cardinals, last year’s Royals bucked a trend: while every other offense in baseball seemed okay with the strikeout, the Royals went contact-heavy. The major league average was 1248 strikeouts per team. The second best team at avoiding the strikeout were the A’s, with 1104. Royals batter struck out just 985 times.
I was skeptical about the Royals all year: I wrote a few articles predicting that they’d lose the Central to the Tigers (which they did), and I thought they’d have an early exit in the playoffs.
When they destroyed the Angels, my thinking about them shifted. The reason for my change is obvious: I had actually watched them play. I had seen them play, of course, but I had only watched them sporadically, catching a late game here or there. The Wild Card Game and the ALDS were the first times I watched them with a deliberate focus. And I wondered how anyone ever beat them.
One of my worst tendencies is to rely on statistics too much. I must’ve glanced at the 2014 Royals page on Baseball-Reference countless times, and I always came away thinking the same thing: Meh. Am I supposed to be impressed with a team that has two regulars with an OPS+ above 100? I wasn’t.
But…watching the Royals actually play a bunch of games, I realized that they were a really good team, and a team particularly well-designed to succeed in our modern version of the postseason. They have such a smart structure really: they have something of a one-run offense, but it works because they have a strong defense that keeps their opponents off the scoreboard, and they have a lights-out bullpen that comes in and strikes out everyone in the 7th, 8th, and 9th. They’re hard to beat from behind, and they can win the draws by scratching a run across the board in the late innings.
Getting back to the strikeout rate: the Royals are interesting because they seem to be a team that has found success in challenging baseball’s broader trend. Is their success a fluke, or is there an advantage to avoiding the strikeout.
* * *
A quick aside, which I didn’t know where to put, so I’m tossing it here:
One reason I am reluctant to change the rules to decrease strikeouts is that the problem will eventually find a balance on its own accord. If the strikeout rate continues to rise, there will come a point when it is valuable just to have hitters making contact. If 80% of batters are striking out, and baseball hasn’t done anything to change the rules, than the players and teams will change. Eventually teams will shift towards a contact approach out of necessity, because there will be value to it.
What I wonder is this: did we see, in 2014, that tipping point?
* * *
I’ve invented a new junk stat, just for fun. Let’s call it Team Strikeout Edge.
Teams averaged 1248 strikeouts last year. That is, a team’s offense, on average, whiffed 1248 times. A team’s pitching staff had the same average, 1248.
Taking the Kansas City Royals. Their pitchers struck out 1168 batters, which is actually eighty fewer strikeouts than the league average. But their batters struck out just 985 times, an advantage of 263 strikeouts on their batting peers.
Here’s an equation:
Team K Rate: (Pitching Ks – League Avg.) + (League Avg. – Hitting K’s)
Doing the math for KC:
(1168 – 1248) + (1248 – 985)
(-80) + (263)
Team K Edge: 183
We can do this for every team in the majors:
Team
|
K (Hitters)
|
K (Pitchers)
|
Team K Edge
|
Rays
|
1124
|
1437
|
313
|
Indians
|
1189
|
1450
|
261
|
Yankees
|
1133
|
1370
|
237
|
Royals
|
985
|
1168
|
183
|
Athletics
|
1104
|
1244
|
140
|
Dodgers
|
1246
|
1373
|
127
|
Diamondbacks
|
1165
|
1278
|
113
|
Tigers
|
1144
|
1244
|
100
|
Cardinals
|
1133
|
1221
|
88
|
Mariners
|
1232
|
1317
|
85
|
Angels
|
1266
|
1342
|
76
|
Brewers
|
1197
|
1246
|
49
|
Blue Jays
|
1151
|
1199
|
48
|
Mets
|
1264
|
1303
|
39
|
Reds
|
1252
|
1290
|
38
|
Padres
|
1294
|
1284
|
-10
|
Nationals
|
1304
|
1288
|
-16
|
Pirates
|
1244
|
1228
|
-16
|
Giants
|
1245
|
1211
|
-34
|
Phillies
|
1306
|
1255
|
-51
|
Rangers
|
1162
|
1110
|
-52
|
Braves
|
1369
|
1301
|
-68
|
Orioles
|
1285
|
1174
|
-111
|
Red Sox
|
1337
|
1213
|
-124
|
Cubs
|
1477
|
1311
|
-166
|
Rockies
|
1281
|
1074
|
-207
|
White Sox
|
1362
|
1152
|
-210
|
Marlins
|
1419
|
1190
|
-229
|
Twins
|
1329
|
1031
|
-298
|
Astros
|
1442
|
1137
|
-305
|
The Royals were the fourth-best team in the majors last year, by this metric, behind Tampa Bay, Cleveland, and the Yankees. The worst teams, by far, were the Twins and the Astros.
We can see if there’s a correlation between Team K Edge and wins:
Team
|
Team K Edge
|
Wins
|
Rays
|
313
|
77
|
Indians
|
261
|
85
|
Yankees
|
237
|
84
|
Royals
|
183
|
89
|
Athletics
|
140
|
88
|
Dodgers
|
127
|
94
|
Diamondbacks
|
113
|
64
|
Tigers
|
100
|
90
|
Cardinals
|
88
|
90
|
Mariners
|
85
|
87
|
Angels
|
76
|
98
|
Brewers
|
49
|
82
|
Blue Jays
|
48
|
83
|
Mets
|
39
|
79
|
Reds
|
38
|
76
|
Padres
|
-10
|
77
|
Nationals
|
-16
|
96
|
Pirates
|
-16
|
88
|
Giants
|
-34
|
88
|
Phillies
|
-51
|
73
|
Rangers
|
-52
|
67
|
Braves
|
-68
|
79
|
Orioles
|
-111
|
96
|
Red Sox
|
-124
|
71
|
Cubs
|
-166
|
73
|
Rockies
|
-207
|
66
|
White Sox
|
-210
|
73
|
Marlins
|
-229
|
77
|
Twins
|
-298
|
70
|
Astros
|
-305
|
70
|
There is a suggestion, at least at the extreme poles, that there’s a correlation between winning and having an edge in strikeouts. Here are the teams +100 in Team K Edge:
Team
|
Team K Edge
|
Wins
|
Rays
|
313
|
77
|
Indians
|
261
|
85
|
Yankees
|
237
|
84
|
Royals
|
183
|
89
|
Athletics
|
140
|
88
|
Dodgers
|
127
|
94
|
Diamondbacks
|
113
|
64
|
Tigers
|
100
|
90
|
Seven of those eight teams were in their races last year, including the Rays, who had a tremendous hot-streak during the summer. Only the D’Backs were a dud.
Meanwhile, the -100’s:
Team
|
Team K Edge
|
Wins
|
Orioles
|
-111
|
96
|
Red Sox
|
-124
|
71
|
Cubs
|
-166
|
73
|
Rockies
|
-207
|
66
|
White Sox
|
-210
|
73
|
Marlins
|
-229
|
77
|
Twins
|
-298
|
70
|
Astros
|
-305
|
70
|
The Orioles continued to baffle everyone last year, but the rest of this group had pretty non-competitive seasons.
It works for 2013, too. Here are the best teams by Team K Edge:
Team
|
Team K Edge
|
Wins
|
Tigers
|
355
|
93
|
Rangers
|
242
|
91
|
Giants
|
178
|
76
|
Royals
|
160
|
86
|
Dodgers
|
146
|
92
|
Cardinals
|
144
|
97
|
Rays
|
139
|
92
|
Six contending teams, one sub-.500 one. The Cards lost the World Series to Boston. The Tigers lost the ALCS to Boston. The Rays lost the ALDS to Boston.
And here are the worst teams from 2013:
Team
|
Team K Edge
|
Wins
|
Padres
|
-138
|
76
|
Rockies
|
-140
|
74
|
Braves
|
-152
|
96
|
Mets
|
-175
|
74
|
Twins
|
-445
|
66
|
Astros
|
-451
|
51
|
One contender (the strikeout-prone Braves) and five losing teams. We might have a trend.
* * *
Wrapping this up.
First, I think there’s evidence that teams should consider strikeouts, both on the offensive side and the pitching side: in the ever-competitive rush to find market inequalities, I suspect that a batter’s ability to avoid a strikeout is one of the more underappreciated skills in the game. Teams pay top-dollar for strikeout pitchers, but they don’t pay top dollar for contact hitters….not unless they’re Victor Martinez.
Take the contact-loving Royals. This offseason the team replaced Nori Aoki (8.9% strikeout rate) with Alex Rios (17.9%), for a considerable increase in cost. They replaced Billy Butler (15.9%) with Kendrys Morales (17.0%). They’ve also lost James Shields. One reason I think the Royals will lose more games this year is because their +183 mark is almost certainly going to decline in 2015.
And I think some teams will start exploring ways to get their hitters to make more contact. It is possible that some teams already are.
Certainly, teams could do this. Bill has suggested that major league baseball gradually increase the thickness of bat handles. What I wonder is what is stopping the Boston Red Sox from doing exactly that? In this age of escalating strikeouts, there’s bound to be an advantage in making contact. Why don’t the Red Sox try and cultivate a more contact-focused approach in their minor league system?
I don’t know if I want baseball’s rules committee to pass a bunch of changes: just my preference, I’d like to see teams figure it out themselves. It was very interesting, last year, to watch the contact-reliant Royals dispatch the walk-happy A’s and the brilliant Angels and the homer-hitting Orioles in the playoffs: I imagine that the level pullers on those franchises left those games a little stunned by how badly they were whipped. Maybe one or two of them (not the Orioles, though) will try to emulate the kind of baseball the Royals brought to the playoffs last year. That’d be fun.
I worry that any measure passed down from either the commissioner or the rules committee would limit such variety. If every team starts making more contact, then teams like the Royals will stand out less. Baseball is best when it has a variety of strategies being tested: I don’t know that it is in the game’s best interests to tip the scales in any direction.
A solution exists on the field. Let the teams figure it out for themselves.
Dave Fleming is a writer living in Wellington, New Zealand. His attention is currently diverted by the Cricket World Cup, which is surprisingly interesting.