Soto and Acuna
On who is likely to have a better career, Acuna or Soto:
I don’t remember the specific context, but years ago you wrote about a player (might have been Frank Thomas) that they came to the majors with old player skills, and thus weren’t able to improve as much as other players.
Soto has displayed ridiculous plate discipline, so he may be less likely to "develop" as a hitter. Acuna may be able to improve that skill over time a bit more since it’s not as developed, and his slugging percentage is insane for his age.
If I had to hazard a guess, I’d say Acuna. Barring major setbacks they’re both going to be outstanding. The reality is at least one of them is liable to fall off due to injuries or some other unpredictable factor, which is probably why you answered "no idea"?
I’d love to have either one on the Dodgers. I spent a bunch of time explaining that Max Muncy, being 27, isn’t likely to get much better than he currently is.
--Christopher (Hey, Bill Question)
I did a brief study related to the issue. I took all players in history who earned at least 10 Win Shares and had at least 300 Plate Appearances in a season at age 21 or younger, up to 2009; no players from the current decade. This left a group of 361 players, but with some duplicates because some players had multiple seasons qualifying.
In that group, I tried to find players who matched as nearly as possible in terms of Win Shares, Runs Created, Outs Made and Age, but who were different in walk rate. Also, I put in a time-line separator so that a player from 1885 would not tend to be matched with a player from the 1960s, and then I made a hard rule that a 19th century player would not be compared to a post-1900 player.
To site one of the better examples, Joe Medwick in 1933 was matched with Harlond Clift in 1934. Each player was 21 years old, and each player made 431 outs. Medwick created 97 runs and was credited with 24 Win Shares; Clift created 92 runs but for some reason was credited with only 18 Win Shares. Besides being separated by only one year, both players played in the same park, Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis, Medwick in the National League and Clift in the American, but the teams shared a park. Clift, however, drew 84 walks while Medwick drew only 26, which of course means that, to be even overall, Medwick was stronger in some other areas. In this case, Medwick probably went on to a somewhat better career—not much better—but that would be consistent with your thesis.
A counter-example: Joe Morgan, 1965, was matched with Garry Templeton, 1977. They were the same age, made about the same number of outs (458-461), while Morgan had advantages in runs created and Win Shares based in part on his having drawn 97 walks to Templeton’s 15. Morgan, of course, went on to a much better career than Templeton.
Greg Gross, 1974, was matched with Rocco Baldelli, 2003. Gross, 21 years old, had 85 runs created, 16 Win Shares, made 447 outs; Baldelli, also 21 years old, had 86 runs created, 18 win shares, made 482 outs, but Gross drew 76 walks while Baldelli drew only 30. In that case, neither man went on to a highly successful career, Baldelli because of injury and Gross because the teams of his era did not recognize the value of a slow player with no power having a .375 on base percentage.
Rickey Henderson, 1980, was matched with Cesar Cedeno, 1972; same age, same value, Henderson walked a lot and Cedeno not as much. Ted Williams in 1939 was matched with A-Rod in 1996, and Ted Williams in 1940 was matched with Frank Robinson in 1957. Al Kaline in 1955 was matched with Ty Cobb in 1907. That was neat. Some of you who are older will remember that Cobb was the youngest man ever to win the batting championship, until Kaline. Cobb was born on December 18, Kaline on December 19—thus Kaline was one day younger than Cobb when he won the batting title, thus broke the record. That was a famous fact back in the day; neat coincidence that they popped up as a match in the study. Mel Ott, 1929 (113 walks) was matched with Joe DiMaggio in 1936 (24 walks), while Mel Ott, 1930 (103 walks) was matched with Sam Crawford, 1901 (37 walks). Jimmie Foxx, 1929 (103 walks) was matched with Hal Trosky, 1934 (58 walks). Gary Carter, 1975 (72 walks) is matched with Ted Simmons, 1971 (36 walks). Jason Thompson, 1976 (68 walks) is matched with Harold Baines, 1980 (19 walks).
Some of these make intuitive sense and some of them don’t. Willie Mays, 1951, is matched with Stuffy McInnis, 1911, which seems jarring and inappropriate, but Mays and McInnis were both 20 years old and created 79 runs each. Mays did this while using 353 outs; McInnis, only 338, and McInnis had more Win Shares, 21 to 19. It meets the standards of the study. It seems jarring, I think, because we remember Willie Mays, but from Mays’ rookie season backward to McInnis’ is only 40 years, while from Mays’ rookie season forward to now is 67 years, so he is actually more a part of McInnis’ time than he is of our own.
An example of a case that seems to "prove your point"—understanding that we are all sophisticated enough to know that a sample of one proves nothing—would be Ed Yost, 1948, and Roberto Clemente, 1956. Both players were 21 years old; Yost created 73 runs with 442 outs, Clemente created 71 runs with 406. Each player was credited with 14 Win Shares, both of them playing for bad teams. Yost (The Walking Man) drew 82 walks, while Clemente drew only 13, although Clemente was far better in other ways. Obviously Clemente went on to a much better career, which seems to prove your point: he had a pathway for growth open to him.
Another case of a 1940s/1950s comp with a similar message is Whitey Lockman, 1948, and Orlando Cepeda, 1959. Both men played for the Giants, Lockman in New York, Cepeda in San Francisco. Three years later (1951) Lockman would be the first baseman for a New York Giants team that went to the World Series, losing to the Yankees; three years later, Cepeda would be the first baseman for a San Francisco Giants team that went to the World Series, losing to the Yankees. Lockman had an outstanding season as a 21-year-old, scoring 117 runs. Lockman, 21 years old, created 102 runs with 427 outs and was credited with 20 Win Shares. Cepeda, also 21 years old, created 110 runs with 436 outs, and is credited with 23 Win Shares. Lockman, however, walked 68 times while Cepeda walked only 33 times. Consistent with your thesis, Cepeda went on to a great career and is now in the Hall of Fame, while Lockman faded away after a brilliant start to his career.
Donie Bush, 21 years old, was the regular shortstop on the 1909 Detroit Tigers, who won the American League pennant for the third consecutive time but lost in the World Series. Travis Jackson, also 21 years old, was the regular shortstop for the 1924 New York Giants, who won the National League pennant for the fourth consecutive time but also lost the World Series. Each player made 439 outs. Bush created 83 runs, Jackson 81 runs, although, mostly because of offensive context, Bush was credited with 28 Win Shares to Jackson’s 20. Bush, however, drew 88 walks to Jackson’s 21. Again, Travis Jackson went on to a Hall of Fame career and Bush did not, although there is not a huge discrepancy in terms of career value, but it can accurately be said that Bush, who was almost the Eddie Yost of his era, never improved as a hitter after his fine season at age 21. His career high in WAR was at age 21.
I made 120 matched sets of players. From this, I eliminated those in which the difference in walks was less than 20; for example, Jose Canseco in 1986 was matched with Eddie Murray in 1977, an outstanding match in terms of similar age, runs created, outs made and win shares, but the difference between them in walks is only 17 (65 to 48), and it doesn’t seem reasonable to include them in this study with such a small difference in the critical area. This reduced the number of matched sets in the study to 88.
Conclusion
The study argues fairly convincingly that the Frank Thomas Thesis, as applied to walks, is not true. While of course no one study of the issue is exhaustive or perfect, there appears to be little possibility, based on this study, that young players who walk a lot have less room for development than players who walk less. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case.
We will call the high-walk players the "Ted Williams type" players and the low-walk players the "Joe DiMaggio type players". In the base year of the study, the Ted Williams-type (high walk) hitters hit more home runs (983-860), drew more walks (5577-2346) and scored more runs (6830-6357), but the Joe DiMaggio-type (low-walk) hitters hit for a higher average (.298 to .279), had more doubles and triples, drove in more runs and had (cumulatively) 1,000 more total bases (18,518 to 17,526). The Joe DiMaggio-type (low-walk) players had a .334 on base percentage, .440 slugging, .774 OPS; the Ted Williams-type (high-walk) players had a .363 on base percentage, .421 slugging, .784 OPS. The two groups were identical in terms of age (average 20.7614 in both cases), and very near to one another in terms of the controlled factors of runs created, outs made and win shares. The Joe DiMaggio group was actually 1% ahead in terms of Win Shares, 1,635 to 1,614.
The Joe DiMaggio group was slightly FASTER, on average, than the Ted Williams group, and also was slightly larger. The Ted Williams group had six more left-handed hitters.
In the rest-of-their careers performance, however, the Ted Williams-group (high-walk) hitters did slightly BETTER than the Joe DiMaggio-type (low-walk) hitters. The two groups were almost identical in terms of career at bats (558,689 to 553,954) and in terms of career RBI (79298-79279). The difference between them in walks relatively narrowed in rest-of-career performance (71864-44617); the difference between them in walks was 138% in the base year study, but only 61% in rest-of-career performance. (I should alert the readers that I am sometimes citing rest-of-career performance and sometimes final career totals, which is nearly the same thing but not EXACTLY the same.)
However, the advantages of the low-walk group narrowed as well. The rest-of-career batting average for the Joe DiMaggio group went down from .298 to .294; for the Ted Williams group it went up from .279 to .285. The Joe DiMaggio (low-walk) group had a 9% advantage in doubles, as young players; in the rest of their careers it was 5%. The advantage in triples stayed at 19%.
What did NOT narrow, however, was the home run gap. The Ted Williams group had a 15% advantage in home runs, as young players. In the rest of their careers, it was 32%. Thus, while the Joe DiMaggio group drove in more runs as very young players, the Ted Williams group drove in slightly more in the rest of their careers, winding up almost exactly even, as noted before.
In the rest of their careers, the Joe DiMaggio group had a .801 OPS and created 6.11 runs per 27 outs. The Ted Williams group had an .842 OPS and created 6.658 runs per 27 outs. The Ted Williams group had 29 Hall of Famers in the 88 players; the Joe DiMaggio group had 27 Hall of Famers. The Ted Williams group won 38 MVP Awards; the Ted Williams group won 27. The Ted Williams group played in 249 All Star games cumulatively; the Joe DiMaggio group, 149.
These numbers do not prove definitively than the Juan Soto high-walk rookie is a BETTER bet than the Ronald Acuna low-walk rookie, and they do not address the related but more general question of "old player’s skills" versus "young player’s skills." But it would be difficult to reconcile this study with the theory that the a low-walk total represents a growth advantage for a younger player.